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Rhetoric and metaphor in the emergence of modem physics 
Richard David Johnson 
Major Professor: Dr. Scott Consigny 
Iowa State University 
This dissertation offers a series of rhetorical analyses of the seminal papers of the 
quantum theory. Specifically, it discusses the central role that metaphors play in the 
invention of new scientific arguments that form the basis of schools of scientific 
thought. The theory of metaphor that is developed for analysis is situated into the 
tradition of the rhetoric of the "older" sophists of ancient Greece. Metaphor, or more 
accurately 'trope,' was a constitutive feature of sophistic beliefs about language and 
rhetoric. Applied to scientific texts, the sophistic understanding of metaphor illusti'ates 
how scientific beliefs can be brought into contrast, leading to conceptual changes in 
scientific communities. The study applies metaphorical analysis to three different papers 
from quantum theory. First, it analyzes Max Planck's original 1900 quantum paper, 
"On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Specuum," showing 
how his use of another metaphor leads to the unexpected emergence of the quantum 
postulate as a new metaphor. Second, it analyzes Albert Einstein's 1905 light quanta 
paper, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of 
Light," showing how new scientific metaphors, like the quantum postulate, urge other 
scientists to change their perspective and adopt a new understanding of reality. Finally, 
it analyzes Niels Bohr's 1927 Copenhagen interpretation paper, 'The Quantum 
Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," showing how the quantum 
postulate leads to a new world view for modem physics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
QUANTUM THEORY AND RHETORIC 
Our task is not to penetrate into the essence of things, the meaning 
of which we dcm't know anyway, but rather to develop concepts 
which allow us to talk in a productive way about phenomena in 
nature. 
Niels Bohr 
The discipline of physics in the twentieth century is defined by the development 
of two theoretical narratives that dramatically changed the way scientists interpret 
nature. The first is the theory of relativity. The second is the quantum theory. Of these 
two narratives, the quantum theory, especially "quantum mechanics," is far more 
revolutionary in scope.' Undoubtedly, tiie tiieory of relativity dramatically changed 
physicists' understandings of time, space, and movement, but in many ways Einstein's 
notion of a relativistic universe represented the final summit of classical physics witli its 
reliance on notions of causality, certainty, and objectivity. In contrast, quantum 
mechanics undermined much of the core of physics by abandoning cherished notions of 
causality, certainty, and objectivity that had been unquestioned pillars of physics since 
Newton. With the evolution of the quantum theory in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century, the physics community underwent a dramatic change in beliefs about nature. 
This period marks tiie transition from what is commonly called "classical physics" to 
"modem physics." 
Though few would deny that the physics community experienced an important 
change in beliefs in the first quarter of the twentieth century, historians, philosophers, 
and sociologists tend to disagree about how such large-scale conceptual changes in the 
body of scientific beliefs can be interpreted or explained. One of the first 
comprehensive attempts at such an explanation, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of 
' J.C. Polkinghome, The Quantum World (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984) ix. 
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Scientific Revolutions, introduced many scholars to the notion that scientific 
revolutions are periods in which the members of scientific communities dramatically 
change the way they conceive of reality. Kuhn writes 
What are scientific revolutions, and what is their function in scientific 
development?... scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative 
developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in 
part by an incompatible new one.'-
Although Kuhn's tiieories have been disputed on many fronts, especially by 
philosophers, his notion that the history of science is not progressive has had a lasting 
impact on numerous fields. Indeed, the terms paradigm and revolution on which he 
attempted to confer formalized meanings have been worn smooth with usage. 
In the aftermath of the debates over Kuhn's book, however, we find ourselves 
still laboring to explain tiiese periods of "revolution" in science. They seem to be 
periods of great conceptual change and intellectual creativity in which the members of 
the physics community begin to regard natural phenomena in new ways. Moreover, 
these transitions between theoretical perspectives, as Kuhn points out, seem to be 
heavily reliant on scientists' use of persuasion, as factions within tiie scientific 
community argue for conceptually different descriptions of nature.^ Kuhn claims that 
"When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is 
necessarily circular... the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion."'' 
By acknowledging the importance of persuasion in scientific change and advocacy, 
scholars like Kuhn, who research science and scientists, stress the cultural and social 
2 Thomas Kubn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2 ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970) 92. 
^ Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 94. 
Kuhn, TTte Structure of Scientific Revolutions 94. 
3 
aspects of the development of scientific theories. They also intensify the importance of 
argumentation, or rhetoric, as an important means of conceptual change in science. 
Marcello Pera stresses this important relationship between scientific theories and 
rhetoric when he claims, 
scientific discourse is not rhetorical in an ornamental way, as if scientific claims 
could be proved on certain grounds and made appealing or palatable on others. 
Scientific discourse is rhetorical in a constitutive way, because scientific claims 
are accepted only if they persuade the audience (community) within which they 
are put forward and debated through an exchange of arguments and 
counterarguments.^ 
Stressing this "rhetorical" nature of scientific discourse, in this study I will use 
concepts from rhetorical theory to analyze the period of comprehensive conceptual 
change that occurred between the appearance of the quantum hypothesis in 1900 and 
the introduction of the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of the quantum theory in 1927. 
These years mark the emergence and maturation of quantum mechanics as a new 
interpretation of natural phenomena—one that guides much of the cunent research in 
modem physics. The period between 1900 and 1927 encompassed one of the most 
vigorous theoretical periods in the history of Western physics, leaving the field of 
physics thoroughly changed. However, in this study these years will not be used as 
boundaries that rope off the beginning and completion of a new science (or paradigm 
for that matter); rather they are significant milestones in the evolution of scientific 
thought. This period of conceptual change in physics between 1900 and 1927 is 
especially interesting because we witness a drastic transformation in the perspective 
from which scientists interpret natural phenomena. 
^ Marcello Pera, The Discourses of Science, Trans. C. Botsford (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) viii-
ix. 
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In this study, I will discuss scientific change in terms of rhetorical "invention," 
illustrating how the development and advocacy of new scientific arguments formed the 
basis of the transition from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. Starting with 
Max Planck's 1900 paper in which the quantum hypothesis was introduced, I will 
show how the quantum theory originated in the form of a metaphor that challenged the 
theoretical basis of classical physics. Then, by studying Einstein's 1905 paper on 
quantized light, I will show how Einstein's interpretation of Planck's quantum 
metaphor shifted Einstein's perspective toward the phenomenon of light, urging him to 
reinvent previous "knowns" into new forms that were consistent widi Planck's notion 
of "energy quanta." Finally, I will offer a rhetorical analysis of Bohr's 1927 paper in 
which the Copenhagen interpretation was introduced. I will illustrate how Bohr 
consummated a new theoretical perspective by linking dominant metaphors from the 
quantum theory together and then "renouncing" classical understandings of objectivity, 
causality, and certainty as tenets of physics. I believe these papers collectively offer an 
excellent example of the way in which metaphors are used to invent new scientific 
beliefs in a community that is often resistant to them. They also show how these new 
metaphors, often against the wishes of their creators, urge scientists to change or 
abandon their entrenched beliefs about nature, leading to large scale conceptual changes 
in scientific communities. 
My purpose in this study, therefore, is to offer rhetorical analyses of the 
seminal papers of quantum theory, illuminating how the new scientific metaphors they 
engendered formed the basis of their rhetorical invention. Indeed, I believe the 
following analyses of the metaphors in these texts dramatically illustrate how new 
scientific metaphors urge physicists to interpret their physical and social situations from 
quite different perspectives, thus leading to the invention of arguments that suggest new 
ways of conceiving reality. Toward this purpose, in chapter two, I will develop an 
5 
understanding of scientific metaphors that is designed to illuminate the usage of 
metaphors by physicists to invent scientific texts. Then, in chapters three through five, 
I will apply a metaphor-based rhetorical analysis methodology to the texts of Planck, 
Einstein, and Bohr, showing how each of these authors introduced new metaphors to 
the physics community by using these metaphors to invent arguments that urged 
dramatic changes in scientific beliefs. My purpose, however, is not to explain why 
scientific communities experience these dramatic changes in beliefs; rather, it is to 
develop a means of analysis that allows us to talk about these changes in a productive 
way. 
I believe the field "rhetoric of science" offers a setting for this type of analysis. 
To generalize, rfietoric of science studies the use of discourse to develop, advocate, and 
change beliefs in the scientific community. As field of study, rhetoric of science is quite 
young, having emerged in the last half of the twentieth century. According to Alan 
Gross, "The rhetoric of science discipline was bom late because a persistent dream of 
the West died hard: the dream of certain truth concerning an independent reality."® 
Indeed, this "dream of certain truth" has probably encouraged the disciplines of rhetoric 
and science to maintain a distanced if not antagonistic relationship toward one another. I 
believe Jean Dietz Moss is correct when she writes, "Ironically, one of the reasons for 
the decline of the academic discipline [rhetoric] appears to be the simultaneous rise of 
interest in experimental science and the desire of scientists to prevent the incursion of 
rhetoric into the 'objective' communications of its findings."^ More recently, though, 
reconsideration in the twentieth century concerning the ability of science to discover a 
certain or universal truth has opened breathing space for studies of science that adopt a 
® Alan Gross, "The Origin of Species: Evolutionary Taxonomy as an Example of the Rhetoric of 
Science," The Rhetorical Turn, ed. H. Simons (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990): 91. 
^ Jean Dietz Moss, Novelties in the Heavens (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993) viii. 
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"rfietorical perspective."® Lawrence Prelli suggests that the development of rhetoric of 
science as a field is important because "apodictic proofs are rare, even in science,... 
concepts associated with formal logic are insufficient to describe the activities of 'doing 
science.'"^ He suggests that rhetoric can help us understand how scientists create and 
evaluate scientific discourse. Similarly, Gross states that "As rhetoricians, we study the 
world as meant by science."'® He argues that rhetoric "reveals" science as just another 
"intellectual enterprise" like other disciplines such as philosophy, history, criticism, and 
rhetoric itself. In other words, according to Gross, rhetoric shows that science is not a 
privileged route to truth or knowledge. Instead, rhetoric offers us insight into how 
scientists invent arguments and use symbols to consU-uct their conceptions of reality." 
R. Allen Harris claims that "rhetoric of science is the study of suasion in the 
interpretation of nature." He points out that scientists use persuasion to influence one 
another about interpretations of nature. Therefore, rhetoric, as a discipline that studies 
discourse, is suited to analyzing scientists' use of persuasion to change the beliefs of 
the scientific community. 
In every sense, however, rhetoric offers only one more perspective from which 
to research and explain scientific activity.'^ Rhetoric of science is a younger sibling to 
® Herbert Simons sees this recent rise of rhetoric as part of an overall academic and cultural movement. 
See Herbert Simons, 'The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement," The Rhetorical Turn. 
ed. H. Simons (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990): 1-31. 
5 Lawrence Prelli, A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse (Columbia, S.C.; South 
Carolhia UP, 1989) 1. 
Alan Gross, The Rhetoric of Science, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990) 4. 
Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 3. 
R. Allen Harris, "Rhetoric of Science," College English 53 (1991): 284. 
A few scholars like J.E. McGuire and Trevor Melia suggest that the notion of a rhetoric of science 
leads to subjectivism and relativism. See J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, "Some Cautionary 
Strictures on the Writing of the Rhetoric of Science," Rhetorica 7 (1989): 87-100. 
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more established studies of science like philosophy of science, sociology of science, 
psychology of science, and history of science. The perspective offered by rhetoric of 
science, however, does not exclude or invalidate the perspectives offered by 
philosophy, sociology, psychology, or history. Instead, it complements their research 
interests. Indeed, there is a great amount of overlap among rhetoric of science and these 
disciplines. For example, a majority of the effort in rhetoric of science thus far has been 
devoted especially to "historical" issues, using rhetorical theories to illuminate the 
invention, arrangement, and style of important historical scientific texts.''' On a smaller 
scale, rhetoric of science has followed "sociological" approaches, illustrating how 
members of the scientific community use communication to interact and persuade one 
another. 15 Nevertheless, rhetoric of science is distinguished from history of science, 
philosophy of science, sociology of science, and psychology of science by its primaiy 
focus on discourse in science. By maintaining this focus, rhetoric emphasizes the 
For examples of historical research in rhetoric of science, see Charles Bazerman, Shaping Written 
Knowledge (Madison, Wis.: U of Wisconsin P, 1988); Peter Dear, "Totius in verba: Rhetoric and 
Authority in the Early Royal Society," ISIS 76 (1985): 145-161; Alan, Gross, "On the Shoulders 
of Giants: Seventeenth-Century Optics as an Argumentation Field," Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 
(1988): 1-17; Alan Gross, "The Cdgin of Species: Evolutionary Taxonomy as an Example of the 
Rhetoric of Science," The Rhetorical Turn, ed. H. Simons (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990): 91-
115; (Tarolyn Miller, "Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science," A Rhetoric of Doing, ed. S. Witte, N. 
Nakadate, and R. Cherry (Carbondale, III: Southern Illinois UP, 1992): 310-327; Jean Dietz Moss, 
Novelties in the Heavens (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993); James Paradis, "Bacon, Linnaeus, and 
Lavoisier. Early Language Reform in the Sciences," New Essays in Technical and Scientific 
Communication, ed. P. V. Anderson et al. (Farmington, N.Y.: Baywood, 1983): 200-224James 
Stephans, Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago: U of Chicago P., 1975); Kenneth 
Zagacki and William Keith, "Rhetoric, Topoi, and Scientific Revolutions," Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 25 (1992): 59-78; James P. Zappen, "Francis Bacon and the Histiography of Scientific 
Rhetoric," Rhetoric Review 8 (1989): 74-88. 
For examples of sociological research in rhetoric of science, see Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric, 
and the End of Knowledge (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1993); Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 
Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979); John 
Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald McCloskey, eds., The Rhetoric of the Hutnan Sciences 
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1987); Greg Myers, "Texts and Knowledge Claims: The Social 
Construction of Two Biology Articles," Social Studies of English 15 (1985): 593-630; Greg 
Myers, "Writing Research and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," College English 48 (1986): 
595-610. 
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social, human, and political discourses that are part of the development and expression 
of scientific beliefs. 
Rhetoric 
The application of rhetorical theory to scientific discourse, though, requires 
some preliminary explanation. In chapter two, I will discuss the rhetorical invention of 
scientific beliefs and arguments. Before we move into that discussion, however, the 
following brief review of rhetoric seems necessary, especially for readers less familiar 
with contemporary theories of rhetoric. After tiiis review of rhetoric, this chapter will 
end with a discussion of rhetorical analysis as the operative instrument of the rhetoric of 
science project This review is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of 
rhetoric or the discipline of rhetoric; rather, it is an introduction to the general features 
of rhetoric that are important to the study in the following chapters. 
Let us start out by discussing the term 'rhetoric' in contrast to the term 
'science.' In popular culture, the term 'rhetoric' is often wielded as an accusation. It is 
used by politicians and pundits to suggest that others are covering up truth by 
employing deceptive manipulations, overly verbose displays, or excessive emotional 
appeals. Plato, the original detractor of rhetoric, classified it among the "sham arts of 
flattery" akin to cooking and cosmetics (464b8). It is diis popular understanding tliat 
causes rhetoric to often be associated with words like "mere," "just," or "empty," 
especially by someone who is attempting to discredit the beliefs of anotiier. In staik 
contrast, the term 'science' is often regarded as synonymous with truth, rationality, and 
reason.'® To Uie general public "being scientific" means to be objective, even-handed, 
and methodological. So, the association of a god-term like 'science' with a typical evil-
term like 'rhetoric' might seem unusual, because for many people science and rhetoric 
•6 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991) 35. 
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imply different motives.Science is assumed to be the discoverer and arbiter of 
certainty and knowledge, while rhetoric is perceived to be the all-too-human 
ornamentation and amplification of opinion. Nevertheless, like any popular stereotype 
or caricature, neither rhetoric nor science lives up to its reputation. Rhetoric is a 
complex discipline that studies aU forms of human communication, not only strategies 
of manipulation and adornment Science is a deeply cultural enterprise that is 
inescapably human. Indeed, the discipline of science is known for its passionate 
debates, political struggles, moments of seeming irrationality, methodological blind 
alleys, and wildly successful intuitions.'® It is when one recognizes the richness of botli 
science and rhetoric as complex disciplines that the connectives between them can be 
productively explored. 
Making a "rhetoric of science" possible, contemporary rhetoricians typically 
broaden the province of rhetoric by suggesting that all forms of discourse, including 
scientific discourse, can be interpreted from a rhetorical perspective. This broader 
understanding of rhetoric perhaps emerges from Kenneth Burke's definition of humans 
as "symbol-using animals."'® According to Burke, humans are defined by their ability 
to use symbols to interpret situations, express themselves, and alter their sunoundings. 
He defines the function of rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."-® Similarly, another 
modem rhetorician, Chaim Perelman, writes that "the new rhetoric is concerned with 
discourse addressed to any sort of audience The theory of argumentation, 
•7 The concept of "god-terms" and "evil-terms" are discussed in depth in Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of 
Motives (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969) 298-300. 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Science 8. 
" Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: U of California P, 1966) 3. 
2° Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 43. 
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conceived of as a new rhetoric or dialectic, covers the whole range of discourse that 
aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the 
subject matter."2i indeed, the use of rhetoric to bring about change plays a central role 
in human existence. For this reason, as Lloyd Bitzer claims, rhetoric is essentially a 
pragmatic feature of humanity because it "functions ultimately to produce action or 
change in the world In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the 
direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes 
reality through the mediation of thought and action."^^ 
In this study, rhetoric will be understood to be the use of language to interpret 
and shape the ever-changing social and physical situation in which individuals are 
inevitably immersed. In contemporary definitions of rhetoric, including the one that 
guides this study, it is important to recognize the intertwining of two significant themes 
of rhetoric: interpretation and expression.^^ Though expression has always been a 
definitive feature of rhetoric, the rebirth of interpretation as a function of rhetoric is the 
result of a twentieth century revival of ancient Greek rhetoric.^'* This revival restores the 
hermeneutic dimension to rhetoric that was Uivialized during the Middle Ages, 
Renaissance, and Enlightenment By recovering this hermeneutic dimension, 
contemporary meanings of rhetoric are close in spirit to the meanings held by the 
ancient Greeks. For example, Aristotie's definition of rhetoric is "an ability, in each 
21 Cbaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric O^Iotre Dame, Ind.: U of Notre Dame P, 1982) 5. 
22 Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric (1968): 3-4. 
23 See Simons, "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement" 1-31. 
2"* Gadamer identifies hermeneutics, the theory of interpretation, with rhetoric when he says 
"Hermeneutics may be precisely defmed as the art of bringing what is said or written to speech 
again. What kind of art this is, then, we can learn from rhetoric." See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason 
in the Age of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992) 119. 
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case, to see the available means of persuasion."25 In this definition, we see the balance 
between interpretation and expression in Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric. 
Aristotelian rhetoric stresses that speakers or writers first interpret the situation, or case 
(peri hekaston), then "see" the means of persuasion (pisteis), and finally express 
themselves appropriately in that particular context.^® Indeed, topos, a central feature of 
Aristotle's Rhetoric, literally meant the "place" where the rhetor could find the 
"available means of persuasion."^' Another quite different example of the interpretive 
nature of Greek rhetoric is the stress that "sophistic" rhetoricians, especially Gorgias of 
Leontini, placed on the presumption that speakers and writers are always in an 
interpretive stance.28 Gorgias taught that rhetors are inescapably part of mutating 
situations that they must interpret rhetorically and to which they must react 
rhetorically.29 Though their views on rhetoric differed greatly, both Aristotle and the 
sophists stressed the importance of interpretation in rhetoric.^o It was during tlie Middle 
Ages, Renaissance, and Enlightenment that rhetoric was primarily reduced to 
considerations of expression. 
25 Aristotle, On Rhetoric (New York; Oxford UP, 1991) 36. 
26 GeOTge Kennedy offers a detailed discussion of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric in his translation of 
Aristotle, On Rhetoric 36. 
2' Kennedy defines Aristotle's understanding of topics in Aristotle, On Rhetoric 45. 
2® Scott Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 22 (1992): 43-53. 
29 Eric Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1987) 13-15. 
Reflecting the interpretive nature of rhetoric, Gorgias talks about rhetoric as similar to medicine in 
his "Enconium to Helen." See Gorgias, "Enconium to Helen," The Older Sophists, ed. Rosamond 
Sprague. trans. G. Kennedy (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1972): 53. Also, 
in Plato's less flattering account of Gorgias in the dialogue Gorgias, Gorgias makes many references 
to the relationship between rhetoric and medicine. These references suggest that in life he may have 
talked about these connections. Plato, parodying Gorgias, challenges Gorgias' connection. 
It is important to note that rhetoric during the Middle Ages and Renaissance loses much of its 
interpretive quality, thus stripping away concerns about the invention of arguments in favor of 
prescriptive understandings of style or eloquence. See James Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1974) 42. 
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In large measure, the rekindled interest of the discipline of rhetoric in 
interpretation is important because it has re-established the primary role of invention in 
rhetoric that was of paramount concern to the ancient Greeks. Broadly defined, 
invention is the act of interpreting one's situation through rational means and then 
developing a persuasive argument that is appropriate to one's purpose in that situadon. 
In Greek rhetoric, invention was clearly the focal point of the traditional three-part 
division of rhetoric: invention, style, and arrangement. Aristode privileged invention 
through his quasi-logical system that stressed the usage of "artistic" (entechnoi) means 
of persuasion ipisteis) to develop arguments.^' Gorgias, even more mindful of the 
importance of invention than Aristotle, collapsed style and arrangement into invention, 
employing antithesis and narrative to create and mold arguments.^^ Gorgias also drew 
analogies between rhetoric and fighting to suggest tiiat speakers need to be constantly 
interpreting their opponents' verbal attacks while looking for the opportune moment 
and place to counterattack.^^ For Gorgias, as Eric White argues, rhetoric was 
synonymous with one's ability to invent 
The revival of the interpretive nature of rhetoric, however, has also awakened 
some of the debates about rhetoric that were common in ancient Greece. These debates 
focused on the depth to which rhetoric can be used to inteipret one's context and shape 
one's understanding of reality. Aristotie's original answer to this debate was to enforce 
clear epistemological divisions that separated Uie disciplines of science, dialectics, and 
rhetoric. Some contemporary rhetorical scholars, like James Kinneavy, maintain these 
White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent 29. 
Susan Jarrett, Rereading the Sophists (Carbondale, III: Southern Illinois UP, 1991) 27-28. 
Scott Consigny, "Gorgias Use of the Epideictic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (1992): 286-287. 
3'' White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent 29. 
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divisions by viewing rhetoric as a limited form of communication that is specifically 
concerned with intentional attempts to persuade.^^ These scholars argue that other 
forms of discourse, sometimes called "referential" discourse, are ideally non-persuasive 
and thus non-ihetorical.^^ For example, they suggest that grocery lists, logical proofs, 
or scientific demonstrations can be purely referential because their authors did not set 
out to persuade. Also, these scholars assume that ideally science and/or dialectics can 
develop discourse that avoids persuasion. For example, Kinneavy writes "A discourse 
which becomes noticeably expressive or directly persuasive or literally preoccupied is a 
discourse which is in danger of becoming nonscientific."^^ Denying the premise that all 
communication must be rhetorical, Kinneavy argues that scientific discourse can 
achieve a "referential" status and thus be non-rhetorical, because scientific discourse is 
dominated by propositions that can be verified empirically or through pure logic.^® 
Similarly, Trevor Melia attempts to guard the traditional division between rhetorical and 
non-rhetorical discourse when he writes. 
In their disposition of philosophical issues, Kline, Munevar, and 
Weimer establish the possibility, in the most fundamental sense, for a 
rhetoric of science. Along with Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, Polyani, 
Bohm, eL al., they breach the once impenetrable wall of hai'd science. 
35 James Berlin calls this approach the "objective" form of rhetorical theory. Among the objective 
theories, he places "current-traditional rhetoric" that dominates most of the current textbooks in 
English. He also classifies most revivals of classical rhetoric and cognitive rhetorics into this camp. 
See James Berlin,/f/j«onc am//fcfl/jO'(Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois UP, 1987) 180-186. 
36 James Kinneavy and Edwin Black offer the most definitive explanations of the limited view of 
rhetoric. See James Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse (New York: Norton, 1971) 215-217 and 
Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York: Macmillan, 1965) 11-20. Few 
recent defenses of view have been made recently; however, many rhetoricians implicitly assume that 
such a division exists, especially between logic and rhetoric. 
3' Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse 88. 
38 Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse 76. 
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Inside these walls lies terra incognita for rhetoric. And no amount of 
debate about the work of the philosophers of science, whatever its 
merit, will secure scientific territory for rhetoric.^® 
Ideally, according to this view of the limited role of rhetoric, scientific discourse only 
becomes "rhetorical" when considered from issues of style and arrangement. It is 
assumed that "facts" of science and the non-rhetorical logic or method of science are 
grounded in reality-^o Therefore, at its most basic level, scientific discourse has a 
"recalcitrance" or "factual content" that is not open to rhetorical interpretation.**' 
Unlike Aristotle, the sophists believed that meaning and "truth" are created 
solely through interpretations and expression of one's ever-changing social and 
physical situation.''^ John Poulakos claims that the sophists were concerned with the 
possible, whereas Aristotle was concerned with the actual.''^ Also, the sophists stressed 
change while rejecting the notion of permanence that became a central feature of 
Western philosophy after Plato.'''' Therefore, in sophistic rhetoric there was the 
assumption that no "factual content" or "outside reality" exist that can be separated from 
Trevor Melia, "And Lo the Fooq)rint... Selected Literature in Rhetoric and Science," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 311. 
After the decline of logical positivism, few scholars would suggest that science can get at a raw form 
of absolute truth. Instead, like Kinneavy, they might suggest that "certainty as something to be 
approximated is still the ideal of scientific logic." Kinneavy, ^4 Theory of Discourse 106. Likewise 
Melia writes, "Without a doubt, science has offered the most hope in the continuing quest for 
certainty. The quest should not be too easily abandoned." Melia, "And Lo the Footprint... 
Selected Literature in Rhetoric and Science" 312. Interestingly, quantum mechanics abandoned 
certainty a little over fifty years before Melia wrote this article. 
See McGuire and Melia, "Some Cautionary Suictures on the Writing of the Rhetoric of Science" 
87-100. 
''2 White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent 14-15. 
John Poulakas, "Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 
44-45. 
'''' Poulakas, "Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric" 45. 
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the discourse in which meaning and knowledge are negotiated.''^ Scott Consigny 
suggests that the sophists did not ground their understanding of knowledge or reality 
on a systematic epistemology.''^ Rather, the sophists believed that humans are "thrown 
into" mutating cultural, social, and physical situations in which they create and shape 
meaning only through contextualized interpretation and expression.*^^ Consigny 
suggests that sophistic rhetoric is hermeneutic, or interpretive, and not epistemic. As 
such, sophistic rhetoric avoids the "foundationalist" or "essentialist" philosophies that 
are brought about by the notion of an epistemology.''® Instead, sophistic rhetoric is 
interpretive in nature, viewing all discourse as open-ended. "To the hermeneutic 
thinker," Consigny writes, "there is no one description of knowledge that is 'ultimate' 
or 'final."''*® Instead, various descriptions are endlessly reinvented as one's cultural, 
social, and physical situation changes. 
Various contemporary scholars have knowingly or unknowingly picked up the 
mantle of the sophists. Victor Vitanza and Susan Jarrett claim that much of the recent 
work in postmodernism and deconstruction is appropriately classified as a part of the 
sophistic tradition of rhetoric-^" Michael Leff sees the recent revival of sophistic rhetoric 
as a means to create unity among fields that are attempting to "push the foundationalist 
Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 48. 
Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 47. 
White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent 14-15. 
Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 48; See also Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 315-322. 
Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 48. 
Victor Vitanza, "Critical Sub/Versions of the History of Philosophical Rhetoric," Rhetoric Review 
6 (1987): 45. See also Jarrett, Rereading the Sophists. 
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bully off the academic block."5i Gross, a rhstorician of science, claims that the erasure 
of Aristotle's arbitrary lines between the rhetorical and the so-called "non-rhetorical" 
allows the "spirit of the first Sophistic to roam free."^^ jn Paralogic Rhetoric, Thomas 
Kent fiUs out the relationship between postmodern rhetoric and the sophistic tradition 
by suggesting that sophistic rhetoric offers an alternative understanding of discourse: 
An alternative to our Platonic-Aristotelian rhetorical tradition, the Sophistic 
tradition, provides the historical foundation for a paralogic rhetoric, a rhetoric 
that treats the production and analysis of discourse as open-ended hermeneutic 
activities and not as a codifiable system.^^ 
Discourse, therefore, is not the use of a codifiable system to transmit or approximate an 
"outside" truth. Rather, as Kent claims, 
Because a truthful sentence cannot exist outside the language in which the 
statement is uttered, our knowledge of the world—^knowledge constituted by 
assertions we take to be true about the world—cannot be something we 
discover "out there." Like truth, knowledge cannot be separated from the 
languages we employ in our discourses about language.^** 
Contemporary work in this "sophistic" tradition of rhetoric, therefore, suggest that 
discourse is the continuous effort to interpret one's situation and use language to 
pragmatically invent arguments and express one's beliefs. 
Michael Leff, "Modem Sophistic and the Unity of Rhetoric," The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: 
Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, ed. J. Nelson, A. Megill, and D, 
McCloskey (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1987) 34. 
Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 3. 
Thomas Kent, Paralogic Rhetoric (Lewisburg: Bucicnell UP, 1993) 36. 
Kent, Paralogic Rhetoric 67. 
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In sum, a large majority of the contemporary work in the discipline of rhetoric, 
including rhetoric of science, renews the Aristotelian and sophistic traditions that were 
initiated in ancient Greek rhetoric. Though both traditions are marked by a common 
interest in interpretation and invention, they offer very different conceptions of reality 
and rhetoric's role within that reality. The Aristotelian tradition makes clear divisions 
between rhetoric and an "actual" or "true" reality that does not change. For example. 
Aristotle writes in his Rhetoric, 
to the degree that someone makes a better choice of the premises he will have 
created knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric..; for if he succeeds in 
hitting on first principles, the knowledge will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric 
but the science of which [the speaker] grasps the first principles.^^ 
The sophistic tradition, on the other hand, rejects these arbitrary divisions between 
rhetoric and the "actual" or "true." Instead, this tradition assumes that one cannot 
reference a certain truth that is outside of language. Rather, language is our means of 
interpreting and making meaning in a physical and social reality that is always 
changing. In the next chapter, I will explore the importance to rhetoric of science of this 
difference between the Aristotelian and sophistic traditions. 
Rhetorical Analysis of Scientific Discourse 
To claim diat scientific texts are rhetorical is to open them up to analysis through 
rhetorical methodologies. Indeed, the analysis means of the rhetoric of science project 
is the use of rhetorical theory to illuminate how scientists use language to affimi their 
beliefs or change the beliefs of others. Much energy has been expended by rhetoricians 
to rope off a domain for rhetoric of science as a field.^^ But now, as the field finds itself 
Aristotle, On Rhetoric 46. 
Numerous articles and books titled "Rhetoric of Science" have established a base for the field by 
contrasting rhetoric of science to other more established fields. See Harris, "Rhetoric of Science" 
282-307; Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," Western Speech Communication 40 (1976): 
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on surer footing, a majority of its effort has turned to developing analyses of scientific 
discourse. Through these analyses, rhetoricians highlight the way scientific discourse 
creates, defines, and influences scientific thought and action in a cultural, social, and 
physical context. 
Similarities can be drawn between rhetorical analysis and what is often called 
"rhetorical criticism." As Edwin Black suggests, both rhetorical analyses and rhetorical 
criticisms are essentially "hermeneutic endeavors" because the rhetorician is called on to 
interpret the text from a rhetorical perspecdve.^' Nevertheless, the two are different in 
an important way. Rhetoricians who consider themselves "rhetorical critics" believe it is 
important to judge or evaluate texts when an analysis is completed. For example, 
Bernard Brock and Robert Scott write, "The critic judges. In some way or the other, 
implicitly or explicitly, he says that the rhetoric, product or process, is well done or 
ill."58 Similarly, Carroll Arnold claims that rhetorical criticism "(1) identifies significant 
qualities of the speaking commented on, (2) reveals criteria applied to those qualities, 
and so (3) offers a reasoned judgment of how fuUy the speaking achieved what is 
possible under the circumstances."^^ Finally, Susan Foss writes, "Rhetorical criticism 
226-235; Walter Weimer, "Science as Rhetorical Transaction: Toward a Nonjustificational 
Conception of Nature," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (1977): 1-29; Gross, The Rhetoric of Science; 
Prelli, A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse. Also, the interchange between Gross 
and McGuire and Melia is an excellent example of how the lines of the field are being debated; see 
McGuire and Melia, "Some Cautionary Strictures on the Writing of the Rhetoric of Science" 87-
100; Alan Gross "Rhetoric of Science without Consuaints," Rhetorica 9 (1991): 283-299; and J.E. 
McGuire and Trevor Melia, "The Rhetoric of the Radical Rhetoric of Science," Rhetorica 4 (1991): 
301-316. 
Edwin Black, Rhetorical Questions (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) 1. 
Bernard Brock and Robert Scott, Methods of Rhetoric Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1980) 
19. 
Carroll Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus, Oh.: Merrill, 1974) 11. One can uace this 
need to judge texts to the often cited seminal text of rhetorical criticism, Herbert Wicheln's "The 
Literacy Criticism of Oratory" (1925). Wicheln launched the field of rhetorical criticism by arguing 
that rhetorical criticism, unlike literary criticism, "is not concerned with permanence, nor yet witii 
beauty." Instead, it is concerned with "effect." See Herbert Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of 
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does not stop with an interpretation of an artifact. The critic goes beyond interpretation 
to criticize or evaluate."®* 
A rhetorical analysis, on the other hand, is only concerned with gaining an 
understanding of the rhetorical features and strategies evidenced in a particular text or 
set of texts. Therefore, for rhetoricians of science the evaluation of scientific texts is not 
an important goal of their effort. Stressing analysis over criticism, rhetoricians of 
science rarely judge the effectiveness of scientific texts. Nor do I believe there is any 
privileged platform from which we might make such assessments. After all, who can 
really say with any confidence whether Einstein's 1905 papers on special relativity or 
light quanta are "well done or ill" or if they "achieved what is possible under the 
circumstances." Forsaking the evaluative component of rhetorical criticism, the puipose 
of rhetorical analysis is to discuss the features of discourse rather than addressing 
issues of why or how well. Rhetorical analyses of scientific texts attempt to show how 
scientists go about developing and expressing their beliefs about nature. For example, 
Carolyn Miller uses the rhetorical concept of kairos to analyze Watson and Crick's 
1954 introduction of the double-helbc DNA structure;'^' Gross explores the rhetorical 
strategies used by Newton in his Opticks by considering issues of arrangement, 
rhetorical presence, and the use of rhetorical questions;®^ and Alex Argyros' argues that 
the rise of Chaos Theory in biogenetic anthropology can be illuminated by applying 
Oratory," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans, ed. A.M. 
Dnimmond (New York: Century, 1925): 181-182. 
^ Sonja Foss, Rhetorical Criticism (Prospect Heights, III: Waveland P, 1989) 22. 
Miller, "Kairos in the Rbetoric of Science" 310-327. 
Gross, "On the Shoulders of Giants: Seventeenth-Century Optics as an Argumentation Field" 1-17. 
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concepts from narrative theory.<53 These are only a few representative examples of a 
growing number of rhetorical analyses of scientific texts. 
Typically, rhetorical analyses follow a few simple steps that are reflected in the 
organization of this study. First, they identify a text or body of texts that they will use 
rhetorical theory to analyze. The texts are usually selected because they are historically 
important, or they offer insight into the beliefs or conventions of a particular scientific 
community. Second, rhetorical analyses develop a framework or means for illuminating 
the text A rhetorician might choose to analyze scientific texts from various 
comprehensive approaches, including narrative, feminism, marxism, genre theoiy, 
Burkean dramatism, metaphor, neo-classical rhetoric, among others. Each of these 
approaches stresses different aspects of the text. So, a marxist rhetorician and a 
feminist rhetorician might come to completely different, but not necessarily 
contradictory, interpretations of the same text. Another approach a rhetorician might 
choose is to focus on one or a few rhetorical concepts that can be illustrated in a 
scientific text. For example. Miller's analysis of Watson and Crick's DNA articles is as 
much or more an illustration of the rhetorical concept of kairos as it is an analysis of the 
scientific articles themselves. The final step of a rhetorical analysis is the illumination of 
the text The rhetorician employs the previously defined analysis framework to the 
scientific texts, showing how the authors of the texts used communication to develop 
arguments and persuade others of their beliefs. 
To conclude, the question that has plagued rhetorical analyses of scientific 
texts—for that matter, the field of rhetoric of science as a whole—is the depth to which 
rhetoric can be used to analyze the development of sciendfic discourse. In his book, 
The Rhetoric of Science, Gross argues that rhetorical analyses "increase our 
Alex Argyros, "Narrative and Chaos," New Literary History 23 (1992): 639-673. 
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understanding of science, both itself and as a component of an intellectual and social 
climate."^ In other words, Gross, like many other rhetoricians of science, assumes that 
rhetoric can be viewed as an inherent quality of the discipline of science itself. 
Therefore, rhetorical analyses not only consider the style and arrangement of scientific 
texts, but also the activities that went into their invention as scientific discourse. Gross 
suggests that rhetorical analysis of scientiflc discourse 
includes... features commonly construed not as rhetorical but as the discovei^ 
of scientific facts and theories. From the rhetorical point of view, scientific 
discovery is properly described as invention.®^ 
It is here where traditional rhetoricians like Melia and Kinneavy start drawing lines in 
the sand. Few rhetoricians would deny that the style and arrangement of scientific texts 
is safe territory for analysis by rhetoricians of science.®^ But some resist the 
implications of analyzing scientific activities, especially discovery, in teniis of rhetorical 
invention, because claiming that scientific discourse, and thus science itself, is 
"invented" potentiaUy implies a metanarrative status for rhetoric. McGuire and Melia 
sum up this angst: 
In the meantime we do not propose to meet the obvious deficiencies of the claim 
diat there is nothing in the text with the equally vulnerable riposte that there is 
nothing outside of the text. Rhetoric should not become an implausible 
pretender to the throne so recently and reluctantly vacated by science and its 
^ Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 5. 
Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 6-7. 
^ It is often remarked tbat the so-called "plain style" is just another rhetorical style that is designed to 
evoke an image of impartiality. Also, the development of the organization of the scientific article is 
presented in Charles Bazemian, Shaping Written Knowledge. 
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philosophy. It should, by pressing the claim of proportion rather than limits, 
resist the very idea of disciplinary hegemony.®^ 
This argument, however, is merely a red herring. A rhetorician views science as 
"rfietorical" through and through, just as a sociologist might consider all science 
"sociological" because it invariably involves social interaction. Likewise, a 
psychologist approaches all science as "psychological" by studying thought, and a 
philosopher views all science as "philosophical" because it embodies a culture's 
philosophy. In other words, rhetoric offers a means of illuminating a particular side of 
scientific activity, namely scientific discourse, in a way that is in line with the paiticulai' 
interests of rhetoricians. Rhetoric of science is not—and as far as 1 know no one claims 
it is—the hegemony that McGuire and Melia fear. In this study, therefore, as a 
rhetorician of science I will endeavor to follow a piece of advice Bohr offered for 
physicists. Bohr writes. 
Our task is not to penetrate into the essence of things, the 
meaning of which we don't know anyway, but rather to 
develop concepts which allow us to talk in a productive 
way about phenomena in nature.®® 
Likewise, in rhetoric of science, our task is not to suggest in some hegemonic way that 
"all is rhetorical" but rather to develop concepts through rhetorical theory that allow us 
to talk about scientific discourse in a productive way. 
McGuire and Melia, "The Rhetoric of the Radical Rhetoric of Science" 316. 
Niels Bohr letter to H.P.E. Hansen, 20 July 1935. Quoted in Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 446. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INVENTION AND METAPHOR IN SCIENTIHC DISCOURSE 
We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. 
We have devised profound theories one after another, to account for 
its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature 
that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own. 
Sir Arthur Eddington 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that various approaches are available that 
rhetoricians can use to analyze texts. Each rhetorical approach, whether it be a form of 
narrative theory, feminism, marxism, dramatism, neo-Aristotelian criticism, or 
metaphorical analysis among others, stresses different features or themes in discourse. 
No one approach offers a final or ultimate interpretation that cancels out the others. 
Rather, the various rhetorical approaches offer a plurality of descriptions of discourse, 
each emphasizing some features and themes of discourse while excluding others.' 
In this study, I will employ metaphorical analysis to illuminate the invention of 
the seminal texts of die quantum tiieory. Though odier approaches are certainly 
appropriate, a study of metaphors in scientific texts, as I will show in this chapter, is 
especially helpful in illustrating how new concepts enter and change the beliefs of the 
members of the scientific community. Also, metaphorical analysis effectively highlights 
the interplay between change and stability in the scientific community as beliefs struggle 
for dominance and then eventually decline. Some metaphors, often called 'root' or 
'dominant' metaphors, offer enduring perspectives through which the members of the 
scientific community conceptualize reality. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson call these 
metaphors "metaphors we live by."^ Other "emergent" metaphors urge scientists to 
' Several rhetorical critics argue that rhetorical analysis methods never lead to a flnal interpretation of a 
text; however Foss offers the clearest argument that there is no "correct" form of rhetorical 
interpretation. See Foss, Rhetorical Crilicism 17. 
2 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago; U of Chicago P, 1980). 
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change their interpretations of nature and thus conceptualize their beliefs and their 
situations from new points of view. Metaphorical analysis allows one to illuminate the 
way different metaphors in texts support stability or urge change in the scientific 
community. 
Though metaphors often serve an "ornamental" role in texts—as they often do 
in poetry or fiction—in this chapter, I will show that metaphors can also serve as a 
basis of invention for scientific arguments, including description of phenomena and 
theories. Often, the contrasts among concepts brought about by metaphors urge 
scientists to embrace particular points of view from which they interpret reality and 
develop their theories about the behavior of natural phenomena. Also, emergent 
metaphors in the scientific community regularly become a source of invention for 
arguments that offer novel, even revolutionary, descriptions and theories for 
phenomena from the perspectives these new metaphors create. Kenneth Burke, I 
believe, correctly identifies the important role of metaphors in the invention of scientific 
arguments when he asks in Permanence and Change, "as the documents of science pile 
up, are we not coming to see that the whole works of scientific research, even entire 
schools, are hardly more than tiie patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile 
metaphor?"^ Indeed, tiiough scientific metaphors are "persuasive," even ornamental, in 
this study I will be particularly interested in showing how they fom the basis of 
invention for scientific texts. 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to develop an understanding of metaphors 
that is suitable for discussing the use of metaphors to invent scientific arguments. Other 
scholars, including Max Black, Mary Hesse, Earl MacCormac, David Rothbart, Stuart 
Peterfreund, Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell have used theories of metaphor to discuss 
' Burke, Permanence and Change 95. 
25 
scientific discourse. However, this study will differ somewhat from their approaches 
because I will situate my discussion of scientific metaphors and rhetorical invention into 
the broader sophistic tradition of rhetoric. As I will show in this chapter and in the rest 
of this study, "sophistic" understandings of invention and metaphor are particularly 
useful when analyzing the highly complex and abstract arguments engendered in the 
texts of the quantum theory. 
Invention 
The assertion that metaphors play an important role in the rhetorical invention of 
scientific arguments, including theories, is made in various forms by scholars who 
study metaphors in scientific texts. For example, Arbib and Hesse argue that "all 
language is metaphorical," thus allowing scientists to "construct worlds" and develop 
models based on "metaphoric redescription of the domain of phenomena."'' Rothbai't 
states approvingly that "many commentators ... have accepted the metaphoric 
elements underlying [scientific] theory invention."^ Peterfreund, discussing theories of 
optics, suggests that "metaphor is implicated in theory-building ... one need only think 
of the wave front [of light] as a metaphor to see the kind of role that metaphor takes in 
theory building."® Indeed, those who have studied metaphors in science have 
repeatedly stressed a central role for metaphors in the way scientists conceptualize and 
develop descriptions of their experiences with reality. 
To analyze scientific activities in terms of rhetorical invention, however, 
significantiy changes how one views what scientists do in their offices, laboratories, 
Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) 156-
157, 170. 
^ Daniel Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Structure of Science," Philosophy of Science 5 
(1984): 610. 
6 Stuart Peterfreund, "Scientific Models in Optics: From Metaphor to Metonym and Back," Journal of 
the History of Ideas 55 (1994): 65. 
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and discussions with other scientists. Traditionally, scientific activities have been 
aligned with the Enlightenment notion of "discovery," a term that, as Gross points out, 
is a "hidden metaphor that begs the question of the certainty of scientific knowledge."^ 
Indeed, to discover something is to uncover it or to gain insight or knowledge about the 
way things really are. When things are discovered they are unmasked, exposed, and 
dis-covered. Discovery, therefore, implies that there is a definable, immutable "thing" 
to be laid bare^ and that scientists can put us in touch with fixed immutable truths that 
are beyond humanity (i.e. the way things really are).^ But, herein lies the problem. To 
identify a scientific claim or theory as a "discovery" one must disregard the temporal 
existence of theories and facts throughout the history of science. Did Aristotle discover 
that the sun orbits die earth? Did Newton discover the laws of motion? Did Einstein 
discover relativity? If anything, scientific theories and the "brute facts of nature" have 
shown a tendency toward obsolescence, not certainty. Indeed, more than anything else, 
the theories of Aristofle, Newton, and Einstein, seem to be the products of these 
scientists' interpretations of reality, not die results of an act of finding or even 
approximating immutable Uiiths. Without question, the development of these theories 
appropriately accorded witii the physical contexts in which Aristotle, Newton, and 
Einstein lived; but these theories were also shaped appropriately to the social contexts in 
which they were advocated. The temporal nature of these contexts implies that these 
theories were a matter of interpreting die passing show rather than discovering the brate 
facts of nature. Moreover, the acceptance of these theories as truth by the scientific 
^ Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 7. 
8 Toulmin, Human Understanding 184. 
' Rorty discusses this assumption of Western culture in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 35. 
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community were the results of effective arguments, not a revealing of the skeleton of 
reality. 
Other disciplines like history, sociology, philosophy, and psychology that 
study science might offer different concepts to account for the development of scientific 
beliefs and arguments; but, as Gross notes, "from a rhetorical point of view, scientific 
discovery is properly described as invention.'''^ In contrast to discovery, as Gross 
points out, the concept of invention in rhetorical theory better embodies the changing, 
contextual, uncertain, and temporal nature of scientific theories and beliefs." If 
scientific arguments, including descriptions of phenomena and theories, aie "invented" 
then their inevitable obsolescence need not be chalked up to their failure to find 
certainty. Rather, the eventual obsolescence of scientific theories can be viewed as a 
natural trait of a scientific culture that is situated within a changing physical and social 
context. Reinforcing this point, Herbert Simons, editor of a series of essays called The 
Rhetorical Turn, argues that this broader application of rhetorical invention to the 
sciences signals that "the entire process of inquiry, far from being a fully rule-bound 
process as the positivists had hoped or supposed, is, at all stages, underdetermined by 
rules; it is dependent, therefore, on individual and community judgments."'^ Moreover, 
Simons points out that interpreting scientific activities as rhetorical invention stresses 
that inquiry and the advocacy of beliefs are more or less the same activity because 
scientists design their inquiries according to research questions they want to answer and 
arguments they wish to develop, support, or undermine. 
Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 1. 
" This point is also made by Gross and Prelli. See Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 7: and Prelli, A 
Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse . 
Simons, "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement" 2. 
Simons, "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement" 4. 
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Various understandings of invention arc available, but rhetorical invention 
invariably refers to one's interpretive effort toward developing an argument that is 
appropriate to a particular physical and social context Karen Burke LeFevre suggests 
that "the act of inventing... relates to the process of inquiry, to creativity, to poetic and 
aesthetic invention.""' Therefore, to suggest that scientific beliefs are invented rather 
than found implies that scientists are not discovering the immutable brute facts of 
nature. Rather, such an assertion suggests that they invent their explanations and 
descriptions in order to come to terms with their experiences in a changing physical and 
social reality. To view scientific inquiry as invention stresses that the purpose and result 
of scientific inquiry is to use various invention strategies to interpret natural phenomena 
within a broader social context and then develop arguments that advocate particular 
scientific beliefs. Indeed, I believe in most cases, invention, more than discovery, 
reflects what scientists are doing in their offices, laboratories, and discussions with 
other scientists. When inventing descriptions of phenomena or theories, scientists 
interpret their changing physical and social situations to (1) identify what issues are 
available for inquiry, (2) discriminate among the possible courses of actions that would 
lead to successful explanations or arguments, and (3) determine appropriate ways to 
argue for their interpretations for scientific or lay audiences. This process seems more a 
matter of inventing scientific beliefs, not discovering them. 
Interaction Views of Scientific Metaphors 
Metaphor, as Arbib and Hesse, Rothbart, and Peterfreund suggest, plays a vital 
role in the invention of scientific texts. In this study, I too will argue that metaphors are 
a pivotal feature in the invention of scientific arguments, including the invention of 
descriptions of phenomena and theories. Therefore, much of my discussion of 
14 Karen LeFevre, Invention as a Social Act (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois UP, 1987) 3. 
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scientific metaphors will fall into line with the existing work of scholars who have 
researched the influence of metaphors in the development of science. However, my 
discussion will differ somewhat from the current tradition, because I do not agree with 
some of the prevailing assumptions about how scientific metaphors bring about change 
in the beliefs of the scientific community. So, before offering my own ideas about how 
scientific metaphors effect change and serve as die basis for the invention of scientific 
arguments, let me first review the predominant understanding of scientific metaphors. 
Almost all scholars who have recentiy discussed the role of metaphor in 
scientific discourse have conformed to a variation of what is often called die 
"interaction" or "tension" view of metaphor. The interaction view presumes that 
metaphors structure and systematize the way humans conceive and talk about reality. 
Lakoff and Johnson explain this central "structural" and "systemic" role of metaphor in 
the interaction view when they claim, 
We have found ... that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in the 
language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of 
which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.... Our 
concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how 
we relate to other people ... If we are right in suggesting diat our conceptual 
system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and 
what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. 
Originally developed by LA. Richards, the interaction view centralized metaphor as a 
constitutive element in the development and expression of human understanding. 
Richards in 1936, first complained tiiat "throughout the history of Rhetoric, metaphor 
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 3. 
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has been treated as a sort of happy extra trick with words."'® Suggesting that the 
opposite is true, he wrote. 
That metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language can by shown by mere 
observation. We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse 
without it.... our pretense to do without metaphor is never more than a bluff 
waiting to be called," 
According to Richards, a metaphor comes about when "we have two thoughts of 
different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose 
meaning is a result of their interaction."He explained that the meanings associated 
with the first part of the metaphor (the tenor) are altered by the meanings associated 
with the second term (the vehicle). For example, in Richards' scheme for metaphor, the 
simple metaphor 'thought is light' is believed to cause a hearer or reader to consider the 
meaning of the tenor (thought) through meanings associated with the vehicle (light). 
Richards claimed that the meanings of both words then "interact" in a way that creates a 
unique meaning for the metaphorical phrase.'' 
Metaphorical interaction between concepts, Richards argued, is a central feature 
in the way human conceptualize reality because, ''Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds 
by comparison, and metaphors of language derive therefrom.For example, to 
illustrate Richards' notion of the pervasive influence of metaphor in human 
understanding, consider the metaphorical relationship between 'thought' and 'light' in 
LA. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: Oxford UP, 1936) 90. 
1' Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 92. 
Richards. The Philosophy of Rhetoric 93. 
Richards, Vie Philosophy of Rhetoric 96. 
20 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 94. 
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Western culture. Unless we were paying attention, we probably would not discern the 
use of a metaphor when someone said "She is bright," "Then, the light bulb came on," 
"He enlightened me," "She cast some light on the issue," "Suddenly the fog lifted and I 
had my answer," or "Would you highlight the main points for me?" And yet, the 
metaphor, 'thought is light,' and its related metaphorical concepts determine the way 
we conceptualize and discourse about human thought. The metaphor itself, according to 
Richards' interaction view of metaphor, determines how humans actually conceive and 
talk about activities in which 'thought' is an important concern. Indeed, it is important 
to recognize that people do not merely refer to 'thought' in terms of 'light.' Rather, this 
metaphor in many ways defines how people understand and experience thought itself. 
Decades later, Max Black refined Richards' interaction view of metaphor by 
claiming that a metaphor serves as a "filter" in which the context or "frame" of the 
metaphor causes an elaboration of the meaning of the focal word.-' As such. Black 
suggested that a metaphor contains a special cognitive content that goes beyond the 
literal meanings of the words that make up the metaphor.22 Explaining how this 
cognitive content comes about. Black suggested that the subsidiary subject (vehicle) 
coupled with the primary subject (tenor) creates a tension that "imposes extension of 
meaning upon the focal word."^^ For example, in Black's understanding of metaphor, 
one would say that the metaphor 'thought is light' extends the meaning of the word 
'thought' to accommodate meanings associated with 'light.' The metaphor. Black 
claimed, becomes a filter in which the "principal subject is 'seen through' the 
metaphorical expression" and is then "'projected upon' the field of the subsidiaiy 
Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ichica, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1962) 39. 
22 Black, Models and Metaphors 46. 
Black, Models and Metaphors 40-41. 
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subject."^'' As a result of this interaction, Black argued, the cognitive content of the 
metaphor causes a semantic shift of the concepts associated with the primary subject by 
"organizing our view" of it through suppression of some details and emphasis of other 
details associated with the subsidiary subject^s 
One of the first thorough applications of the interaction view to scientific 
discourse is found in Hesse's Models and Analogies in Science (1966). Hesse 
faithfully applies Black's interaction view of metaphor to scientific discourse by 
suggesting that metaphors are used to alter scientists' "models" of reality.^® She points 
out that the "referent" (the aspect of reality under consideration) in the metaphor sei-ves 
as Black's primary subject (i.e. Richards' tenor).27 Illustrating how metaphors work in 
scientific discourse, Hesse offers the following examples: "Sound (primary system) is 
propagated by wave motion (taken from a secondary system)"; "Gases are collections 
of randomly moving massive particles''^^ Hesse suggests that metaphors like these are 
pervasive in scientific thought and discourse, and that they often cause changes in 
scientific beliefs that cannot be explained in logical terms. Furthering this point, she 
claims that because scientific discourse is essentially metaphoric, "the deductive model 
of scientific explanation should be modified by a view of theoretical explanation as 
metaphoric redescription of the domain of the explanandum."-® 
24 Black, Models and Metaphors 41. 
^ Black, Models and Metaphors 41. 
Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame; U of Notre Dame P, 1966). 
2'' Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 166-167. 
28 Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 158. 
Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 157. 
33 
Hesse points out, however, that an interesting problem with tlie application of 
the interaction view of metaphor to describe phenomena is that this understanding of 
metaphor potentially leads to the conclusion that the referent itself (the object discussed) 
is changed when seen thrqugh the filter produced by the subsidiary subject.In other 
words, this application of metaphor seems to suggest that the metaphor changes the 
physical reality it seeks to describe.^' For example, Hesse points out that the metaphor 
'Man is a wolf might suggest that Man actually changed into a wolf; yet, as Hesse 
explains, "Man does not in fact change because someone uses the metaphor.''^^ Hesse 
attempts to counter this problem by suggesting that the metaphor only changes the 
stable "model" that approximates the referent. The referent itself (i.e. the natural 
phenomenon), however, remains unchanged. 
More recently, in collaboration with Michael Arbib, Hesse has considerably 
extended her understanding of the importance of metaphor in science. In The 
Construction of Reality{\9%6), Arbib and Hesse write, 
Meaning changes, or tropes, of various kinds are, in fact, pervasive in 
language. They are required in the learning of language at its most elementary 
levels, and they are also inescapable in the expression of social and religious 
"constructions of reality".... we argue for the thesis that "all language is 
metaphorical."^'' 
Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 166-167. 
Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 167. 
32 Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 167. 
Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science 169-170. 
3'* Arbib and Hesse, The Construction of Reality 150. 
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Relying on this thesis, Arbib and Hesse suggest that "scientific revolutions are, in fact, 
metaphoric revolutions, and theoretical explanation should be seen as metaphoric 
redescription of the domain of phenomena.''^^ They argue that new metaphors compel 
scientists to "see" phenomena differently, causing so-called 'literal' and even 
observational terms to "shift toward the metaphorical meaning."^® Metaphors, Arbib 
and Hesse claim, alter the "socially constructed" cognitive schemata to which the 
metaphors relate.Moreover, Arbib and Hesse claim that metaphors which are 
"incompatible" with current scientific paradigms eventually become the new structural 
basis for scientists' schemata or paradigms. Arbib and Hesse write, 
To use Kuhnian terminology, in the development of science ... nomial science 
seeks to reduce instability of meaning and inconsistency and to evolve logically 
connected theories; revolutionary science makes metaphoric leaps that are 
creative of new meanings and applications that may constitute genuine theoretical 
progress.38 
Therefore, metaphors in Arbib and Hesse's understanding of science become the 
impetus for both stability and change because they form the structural basis of schema 
and paradigms while also at times undermining the predominant scientific paradigm. 
Another scholar, Rothbart, also utilizes much of Black's understanding of the 
interaction view of metaphors by claiming that the creation of a new scientific metaphor 
results in a "cognitive gain" that comes about from the interaction of two scientific 
concepts.^® He suggests that a metaphor projects the properties of a set of literal 
Arbib and Hesse, The Construction of Reality 156. 
Arbib and Hesse, The Construction of Reality 156. 
Arbib and Hesse, The Construction of Reality 2. 
Arbib and Hesse, The Construction of Reality 157. 
Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Smicture of Science" 610. 
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meanings onto a subject term, addressing "some weakness within the system of 
concepts, the gain from metaphor is expansion of the range of possible features 
attributable to the subject."''® For example, Rothbart illustrates, when Descartes 
employed the metaphor "each act of human behavior is the movement of a clock," he 
established a metaphor that addressed the weaknesses in the meaning of "human 
behavior;" then Descartes utilized the metaphor to reshape and reorganize the literal 
meanings associated with human behavior.*" Rothbart claims that die development of 
scientific beliefs tiirough metaphoric concepts is "an essential aspect of scientific 
reasoning for the purpose of solving conceptual problems."''^ Therefore, he argues, the 
"structure" of science is shaped by metaphors that promote theoretical unification by 
drawing connections between theories that are grounded in the same "fundamental 
methodological and ontological precepts from their respective research traditions."''^ 
Peterfreund also advocates Black's interaction view of metaphor, suggesting 
that scientific discourse involves a continual process of transference from metaphor to 
metonym as the scientific community turns from revolution to normal science as Kuhn 
describes them.'^ Peterfreund argues that "interactive" metaphors are "transferential," 
thus shifting or transferring the meaning of the primary subject. Once established, 
however, the scientific metaphor eventually becomes a metonym, gaining literal status 
as the metaphor's figurative meaning is forgotten over time (a metonym is a reduction 
of a previous metaphor that substitutes for a previously literal word).''-'' Peterfreund 
Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Suiicture of Science" 611. 
Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Smicture of Science" 607. 
Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Structure of Science" 595. 
Rothbart, "Semantics of Metaphor and the Structure of Science" 613. 
^ Stuart Peterfreund, "Scientific Models in Optics: From Metaphor to Metonym and Back" 73. 
Burke, A Grammar of Motives 503. 
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uses examples from studies of optics in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century to 
argue that a tendency of scientists to privilege the use of the 'particle' metonym (the 
perceived 'literal') over the use of 'wave' metaphor confined scientists to a set of 
beliefs that retained a 'particle' interpretation of light In a sense, Peterfreund notes, the 
tendency of scientists to rely on stable metonyms—what is assumed to be die literal— 
leads to the normal science/revolution cycle described by Kuhn because eventually a 
new metaphor overcomes the stability of the older metonym and then replaces it."*^ 
One of the more interesting adaptations of the interaction view of metaphor to 
scientific discourse is found in Gerhart and Russell's Metaphoric Process: The Creation 
of Scientific and Religious Understanding (1984). Gerhart and Russell ai'gue diat 
cieadve scientists "fold ... a map of a world of meanings," thus creating a metaphor 
that "reforms fields of meanings themselves."''' In science, Gerhart and Russell 
suggest, this map-folding results in a flash of insight. They write, "it is here that the 
words 'Eureka, I have it!' are spoken. At this point an 'ontological flash' occurs."'*® 
Then, they claim that the metaphor causes a "structural change which demands that 
other meanings and understandings have to be changed in the wake of the metaphor. 
In general, the interaction view of scientific metaphors has proven to be a useful 
way to illuminate the importance of metaphors in the invention of scientific beliefs. My 
reservations about the interaction view of scientific metaphors come about, however, 
because I believe this view relies on erroneous assumptions about conceptual change in 
Peterfreund, "Scientific Models in Optics: From Metaphor to Metonym and Back" 73. 
"•7 Mary Geitiait and Allan Russell, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious 
Understanding (Fort Worth: Texas Christian UP, 1984) 113. 
'•8 Gerhart and Russell, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding 
114. 
Gerhartand Russell, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding 
119. 
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science. What I deny is that science and scientific metaphors work in relation to a stable 
paradigm, conceptual structure, model, or schema that offers a fixed framework for 
scientific beliefs. Moreover, I do not believe that metaphors contain special meanings, 
offer insights into the way things really are, or create "ontological flashes" that 
transcend normal scientific discourse and thus cause or impel scientific beliefs to 
change. Indeed, for the most part, I believe Hesse, Arbib, Rothbart, and Peterfreund 
are correct in their descriptions of the role and influence of metaphor in scientific 
discourse. Where I disagree with them is in their accounts of how conceptual change in 
science comes about and the way in which metaphors are used to bring about these 
changes. These points will be addressed in more depth later in this chapter. 
Since my intention is to develop an understanding of scientific metaphors and 
their role in the invention of scientific arguments—not to undermine the views of others 
with whom I for the most part agree—my discussion from this point will build on the 
strengths of the existing theories of scientific metaphor while attempting to reform their 
weaknesses. I believe the understanding of invention and metaphor in science that 
emerges is more useful toward analyzing the role of metaphors in the invention of 
actual scientific texts. 
Conceptual Change 
I begin by noting that current views of scientific metaphors, including the one I 
will develop in this chapter, all suggest that metaphors are an important feature of 
conceptual change in science. Conceptual change takes place when humans, including 
scientists, come to understand their physical and social situation differently than tliey 
had before.50 An interesting characteristic of conceptual change in science is that it 
Much of my understanding of conceptual change is in line with Touhnin's comprehensive study of 
this topic in Toulmin, Human Understanding 41-130. 
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seen.s to occur at varying rates.^' Several historians and philosophers of science make 
this obscr-'ation in one form or another, including Kuhn, I. Bernard Cohen, Gerald 
Holton, Paul Feyerabend, and Stephen Toulmin, so I will try to summarize their similar 
but divergent views as generally as possible at this point. 
These historians claim that during some time periods, the rate of conceptual 
change in science is relatively gradual with scientists readily laboring within the 
guidelines offered by comprehensive theories that bind scientific communities together. 
The predominant theories themselves facilitate gradual conceptual change as scientists 
pose research questions and develop explanations that extend and reinforce their 
communities' tiieoretical assumptions. These periods are hardly tranquil, though, as 
scientists struggle among divergent interpretations that more or less follow the accepted 
theoretical assumptions, goals, and procedures of their scientific community. Other 
time periods, however, witness rapid conceptual change in science. Often called 
"revolutions," these periods in the history of science are marked by a sudden 
acceleration in the change of a scientific community's understanding of nature. Two 
such periods were the century-long supplanting of pre-Copemican physics with the 
mechanistic physics of Galileo and Newton and the twentieth century supplanting of 
classical physics with the quantum physics of Planck, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg. 
During these periods, firmly established theories were challenged and then undermined 
by new theoretical assumptions that the old theories could not absorb. 
It is often popular to refer these periods of accelerated conceptual change as 
"revolutionary," but this term has become problematic. Stephan Toulmin argues that 
identifying these periods as revolutionary promotes an inaccurate "illusion" about die 
See Toulmin, Human Understanding; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ; Gerald 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1988); I. Bernard 
Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960): Paul Feyerabend. 
Against Method (Verso: New York, 1988). 
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history of conceptual change in science.52 He points out that the "revolutionary iUusion" 
is created by the assumption that human understanding operates in reference to "some 
system of fixed principles" that takes the unchanging form of a "paradigm," 
"conceptual scheme," or an absolute systemic reality.^^ Toulmin suggests that the 
assumption that scientific beliefs correspond to a fixed conceptual system leads one to 
presume that conceptual stability is normal or even ideal, and that periods of 
pronounced conceptual change are abnormal or revolutionary. Turning the tables on the 
revolutionary illusion, Toulmin proposes that "intellectual flux, not intellectual 
immutability, is... something to be expected: any continuous, stable, or universal 
features to be found in men's actual patterns of thought now become the 'phenomena' 
that calls for explanation."^'' Indeed, Toulmin seems well aware that he is calling not 
only for a different way of interpreting the history of science but also for new ways of 
looking at science itself. He writes 
We have no more reason to take immutability as self-explanatory in mental 
philosophy (epistemics) than we have in natural philosophy (physics), or to 
regard stability as more 'natural' or 'intelligible' than change. Rather, we must 
set out to show how a single set of factors and considerations, interacting in 
different ways, can be used to explain both why our 'forms of thought and 
perception'—concepts, standards of rational judgement, a priori principles and 
the rest—vary rapidly in some cases, situations, and circumstances, and also 
how, in some cases, situations, and circumstances, they can remain 
unchanged.55 
^2 Toulmin, Human Understanding 96. 
Toulmin, Human Understanding 96. 
54 Toulmin, Human Understanding 96. 
Toulmin, Human Understanding 98. 
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Toulmiti's point, one that I wiU take to heart in this study, is that our ways of 
conceptualizing and discoursing about nature are always changing, just as our physical 
and social situations are always changing. Indeed, the idea of intellectual flux in human 
understanding, as Toulmin points out, seems to be corroborated by the history of 
science itself. After aU, die history of science is more or less a narrative of conceptual 
change in which each theory or description maintains only a temporal existence. Even 
so-called "stable" or "normal" periods in science have been marked by gradual changes 
in scientific theories as scientists sought to better explain the workings of nature. 
Therefore, to posit conceptual change as the basis of human understanding is to better 
describe the temporal nature of science itself. It should be pointed out, however, that 
conceptual change does not necessarily imply conceptual progress.56 We might, relative 
to a particular historical context, say that someone or an entire community progressed 
or moved forward; but such assessments are pertinent to those individuals' or our 
contexts, not to any system of fixed principles. A step forward in one context (e.g. 
antibiotics, DDT, the atom bomb) is perhaps a step backward in another context. 
The implications of Toulmin's idea of intellectual flux, however, are far more 
significant than they may appear on the surface. As Toulmin recognizes, his argument 
that change is an integral feature of human understanding challenges what is often 
referred to as the objectivist, absolutist, or foundationalist tradition in Western 
philosophy.57 Toulmin calls this tradition die "cult of Systematicity" and suggests diat 
absolutists and relativists are partners in a long tradition, beginning with Socrates, that 
posits immutability.5® The absolutist side of this tradition, claims Toulmin, is 
56 Toulmin recognizes that his term "evolution" might imply progress, but he, like Darwin, suggests 
that evolution concerns change and not progress. See Toulmin, Human Understanding 356, 
5'' Simons, "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement" 1-31. 
5® Toulmin, Human Understanding 52-53. 
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represented by those who attempt to "define an 'objective' standpoint in terms of 
'absolute' standards of rational judgement;" the relativist side of this tradition is 
represented by those who challenge "any demand for a universal, objective standpoint 
as no longer tenable, falling back on local, temporary, or 'relative' standards."^® 
Though absolutists and relativists claim to be opponents, Toulmin points out that they 
are essentially two sides of one tradition due to their "commitment to a logical 
systematicity which makes absolutism and relativism appear die only logical alternatives 
available."®' Toulmin suggests that the first step away from "logical systematicity" is to 
reject both absolutism and relativism. By doing so, he argues, scholars are then free to 
discuss issues of rationality and scientific inquiry in terms of conceptual change. 
But, I believe Toulmin's abandonment of systematicity and his assumption that 
change is the modus operand of science goes against the predominant studies on 
scientific metaphors that employ Richards' and Black's interaction view of metaphor. 
Usually relying on Kuhn's understanding of paradigms and revolutions, scholars who 
follow the interaction view of scientific metaphors invariably suggest that scientific 
beliefs are grounded in a system of fixed principles like a paradigm, model, schema, or 
some other conceptual structure. Then, these scholars argue, scientists periodically 
introduce new metaphors that are irreconcilable witii the predominant conceptual 
structure on which scientists rely, ultimately causing a "revolution" to occur. As 
Toulmin points out, though, this reliance on the "revolutionary illusion" suggests that 
change in science is somehow "abnormal" and that conceptual stability is to be 
expected. Therefore, if new metaphors are the instigators of these revolutions, as 
interaction view scholars claim, then they must be regarded as abnormal features of 
Toulmin, Human Understanding 53. 
^ Toulmin, Human Understanding 84. 
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scientific discourse that threaten the otherwise normal workings of science. Moreover, 
the interaction view implies that new metaphors must be understood as working 
'outside' normal scientific discourse and thought, transcending the fixed principles that 
make up paradigms, models, and schemata. Indeed, in the interaction view of scientific 
metaphors, inteUectual stability is presumed—even required—to be the norm while 
change and the metaphors that bring about change are the exception. 
To put it concisely, the central problem with the interaction view of scientific 
metaphors, I believe, is that it leads its followers back into what Toulmin calls the "cult 
of Systematicity," offering them the usual choice between absolutism (i.e. metaphors 
offer "special insight" into the way things "really are") or conceptual relativism (i.e. 
metaphors have "special meanings" that create anomalies which are 'outside' a 
community's common conceptual scheme). When faced with this choice, scholars like 
Arbib and Hesse, Rothbart, Peterfreund, Gerhart and Russell have implicidy adopted a 
conceptual relativist position. In their writings, new metaphors are understood to be 
working in an incommensurable relationship to "normal" science because they do not fit 
into or are relative to the larger system of stable scientific beliefs. Meanwhile, older 
dominant metaphors are understood to provide a stable systemic conceptual framework 
that "accepted" scientific beliefs are relative to. Finally, revolutions are supposed to 
occur when a new metaphor which is incommensurable with the dominant paradigm 
replaces an older dominant metaphor, thus causing all the concepts relative to the old 
metaphor to change to suit the new metaphor. This conceptual relativist position 
stresses that reality is completely a construct of the human mind, specifically 
metaphors. 
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Of course, conceptual relativism in science has been defended by scholars like 
Feyerabend and to a lesser extent Kuhn.®' However, as scholars like Toulmin, Donald 
Davidson, and Kent have shown, conceptual relativism does not seem to adequately 
explain how thought and language, including scientific discourse, actually function in 
communities.®^ These scholars point out that conceptual changes in beliefs never seem 
to occur in an either/or fashion in which whole conceptual schemes, and even partial 
conceptual schemes, are suddenly replaced by incommensurable new conceptual 
schemes. Rather, as Toulmin claims, changes in beliefs seem to be more evolutionary 
in nature as scientists work through many interpretations to come to terms with their 
changing physical and social contexts. Davidson writes, "that truth is relative to a 
conceptual scheme ... has not so far been shown to be anything more than the 
pedestrian and familiar fact that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other 
things) the language to which it belongs. Instead of living in different worlds, Kuhn's 
scientists may ... be only words apart."® 
Indeed, once again, the compelling evidence for accepting Toulmin's 
understanding of conceptual change and modification of interaction views of scientific 
metaphor is the history of science itself. At what point in histoiy can one say that a 
complete change in paradigm or conceptual scheme occurred in the scientific 
community? It took the better part of a century for Copernicus' argument that the eai th 
goes around the sun to be broadly accepted within the scientific community. Similarly, 
See especially Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987) 19-88, 265-272. 
Excellent rebuttals to the conceptual relativist position can be found in philosopher Donald 
Davidson's essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" and rhetorician Thomas Kent's "On 
the Very Idea of an Interpretive Community." See pages 184-198 of Donald Davidson,into 
Truth Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1991); and pages 76-96 in Kent, Paralogic Rhetonc. 
I agree completely with their arguments against conceptual relativism. 
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the quantum theory was ardently debated for at least thirty years before many scientists 
would accept it Even today, nearly a century after the emergence of the quantum 
theory, philosophers and scientists still debate its implications. So, if one wants to 
argue that metaphors bring about conceptual change in science, one needs to account 
for the fact that these changes take time, even lifetimes, to settle into a more or less 
stable form. When viewed in terms of intellectual flux, the history of science does not 
support the idea that metaphors are abnormal or anomalous features of scientific 
discourse that cause incommensurable changes in conceptual structures like paradigms, 
models, or schemata. Rather, if change is the norm in science, then metaphors, as die 
instigators of change, are most likely an all-too-normal feature of the invention of 
scientific discourse, including descriptions of phenomena and theories. 
Sophistic Invention 
There is a way to address Toulmin's claim that conceptual change is the norm in 
science from a rhetorical point of view. However, we must first leave aside the notion 
that scientists and the metaphors they use to invent arguments are working in relation to 
a systemic fixed set of principles. In other words, as Toulmin suggests, we must reject 
the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition of "logical systematicity" that offers absolutism and 
relativism as our only paths for understanding scientific inquiry. Only then can we 
discuss the role of metaphors in inventing scientific arguments without resorting to 
absolutism or relativism. 
Fortunately, an alternative to logical systematicity can be found in the ancient 
and modem "sophistic" tradition of rhetorical theory. The sophistic ti'adition stresses 
that rhetoric is by nature interpretive, or hermeneutic, making it adaptive, even 
expectant, of change.®^ Furthermore, sophistic rhetoric foregoes absolutist appeals to 
^ Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 48. 
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truth and epistemology that Toulmin aligns with the cult of Systematicity; yet, it also 
avoids giving in to a relativist position because it denies that there exists a stable 
structure to which beliefs can be relative to. Indeed, unlike the Platonic/Aristotelian 
tradition, which assumes that an immutable Being lays hidden beneath the outward 
motion of reality, the sophistic tradition believes in the Hericlitean notion that change is 
an essential feature of knowledge and human understanding. John Poulakos echoes this 
understanding of the temporal nature of sophistic rhetoric when he writes that the 
sophists of ancient Greece assumed that "Being is not a fixed, but a continuously 
unfolding entity whose most notable trait is its capacity for self-manifestation and self-
concealment."^ 
When used to discuss scientific discourse, sophistic rhetoric stresses the 
assumption that speakers—in our case scientists—are always in an interpretive 
relationship with nature, inventing and reinventing arguments to account for a changing 
physical and social reality. According to Eric White and Mario Untersteiner, the 
sophistic understanding of kairos, "the opportune time and place," stressed the 
assumption that speakers are inevitably thrown into mutable and changing situations 
that force them to use hermeneutic strategies toward developing appropriate expressions 
to the situation.®^ As White points out, the sophists believed that "invention would 
renew itself and be transformed from moment to moment as it evolves and adapts itself 
to newly emergent contexts."®'' Therefore, sophistic rhetoric assumes that speakers are 
always interpreting the passing show, inventing courses of action that are appropriate to 
John Poulakos, "Rhetoric, The Sophists, and the Possible," Comnmication Monographs 5 (1984): 
219. 
^ Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954) 106; White, Kaironomia: On the Will 
to Invent 13-16. Gorgias' use of the word kairos can be found in the Helen ("to speak the needful 
rightly" DK B11,2) and the Palamedes ("out of the present necessity" DK 1 la). 
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the physical and social features that make up their rhetorical situation. Another 
important feature of sophistic understandings of invention is the assumption that 
various, often antithetical, arguments are always available in any case. Protagoras' 
fragments, dissoi logoi and "impossible to contradict"—which I will discuss shortly— 
imply important open-ended and pluralistic qualities for the sophistic understanding of 
invention, because these fragments suggest that no one description of nature can 
legitimately close out discussion by arriving at the ultimate or final description of 
reality.®® Rather, sophistic invention is often a matter of playing different arguments or 
concepts against each another in ways that develop new accounts of reality and new 
points of view from which to interpret rhetorical situations. 
Of course, it must be conceded that what we know of the rhetorical theories of 
the "older" sophists of ancient Greece is developed from speculative interpretations of 
surviving fragments of their work. So, I will refrain from suggesting that we can apply 
the rhetoric of the older sophists toward analyzing scientific texts in some direct way. 
Rather, I believe we can view the Greek sophists as early inspirational members of a 
broader sophistic tradition that, as scholars like Jarrett, Vitanza, Leff, and Kent 
suggest, has re-emerged in twentieth century. As such, much of the discussion of 
sophistic invention and metaphor that takes up the remainder of this chapter will be 
filled out by writings from the "modem sophistic," including the works of scholais 
from Nietzsche and Burke to recent scholars like Davidson and Richard Rorty who 
have been advancing non-absolutist theories of thought and language. Indeed, one is 
working within the sophistic tradition when one recognizes that humans, including 
scientists, cannot remove themselves from their physical and social reality, thus 
denying that an objective 'outside' position can be attained. Instead, physical and social 
Consigny, "The Styles of Gorgias" 48. 
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situations are assumed to be always changing and thus humans are understood to be 
always in a process of interpreting their situations and 'inventing' ways to express their 
beliefs. 
A sophistic understanding of rhetorical invention, therefore, offers a way of 
looking at scientific texts that avoids seeing diem as talking about what is "probably 
true" about a fixed absolute or immutable reality. Meanwhile, it avoids the temptation to 
slip into a form of conceptual relativism in which an absolute reality is substituted witii 
a systematic, fixed conceptual scheme like a paradigm. Instead, sophistic rhetoric 
encourages us to see scientific texts as opportune attempts to argue about or describe 
phenomena in ways that are appropriate to scientists' and tiie scientific community's 
physical and social experiences, knowing full well that other interpretations of reality 
are possible and inevitable. 
Though other features of sophistic invention are available for use in analyzing 
scientific texts, I will limit my study by concentrating on the relationship between the 
sophistic understandings of metaphor and logos in the invention of arguments. Before 
discussing metaphor and logos in relation to scientific arguments, however, it is 
necessary to first clarify these concepts and their function in the sophistic tradition. 
Logos 
G.R. Kerferd notes that logos had three related meanings in ancient Greece-i^f 
The first meaning of logos concerned forms of discourse, speech, or arguments. The 
second meaning concerned thought, reasoning, or mental processes that allowed one to 
form discourse. Finally, the third meaning concerned the "area of the world, that abour 
which we are able to speak, hence suiictural principles, formulae, natural laws and so 
on." David Roochnik, echoing these meanings, suggests that logos could be interpreted 
G.B Kerferd, TTie Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981) 83. 
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to mean "rational structure" in a way that encompassed language, thought, and reality.'^o 
Both Kerferd and Roochnik suggest that Greek usage of the word logos inevitably 
brought all of these meanings into play, though in specific contexts one of the three 
meanings seems to take precedence over the others. This caution is especially meant to 
ward off alignments of logos trivially with 'argument.' For the Greeks, especially the 
sophists, to change a person's logos was to change the way they rationalized or 
interpreted reality itself. Therefore the use of logos in reference to argument usually 
meant that the rational structure of reality itself was being altered in some way. This 
deepened the power and importance of argument, the revealing or altering of logos, in 
Greek understandings of reality and language. 
For Gorgias, "Speech {logos] is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest 
and most invisible body effects the finest works" (DK B11, 8)."'' Indeed, Gorgias 
believed that an understanding of the power of logos was essential to the study of 
rhetoric because he did not believe in a truth that was beyond what a person could be 
persuaded to believe.'^ As such, Charles Segal argues, Gorgias did not make a cleai-
distinction between thought, language, and reality.^^ They were inevitably wrapped up 
in one another, supporting a broader view of reality as mutable. Logos, the sophists 
believed, is the "rational structure" on which thought, language, and reality are made 
meaningful for humans. The proper manipulation of logos, Gorgias believed, makes 
real changes in the audience's interpretation of reality and thus changes their reality 
'0 David Roochnik, The Tragedy of Reason (New York; Routledge, 1990) 25. 
" TTie translation I am using is Rosamond Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists (Columbia, S.C.; U of 
South Carolina P, 1972). 
w. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1971) 211. 
Charles Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 
66 (1962): 107. 
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itself. Gorgias demonstrated his belief in the power of logos as a great influence over 
rationality when he stated, "The effect of speech [logos] upon the condition of the soul 
is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies" (DK B11,14). He also 
stated that all are willingly but not forcibly made slaves under the influence of logos 
(DK 26A). In this sense, logos inevitably governs the way in which one interprets and 
rationalizes reality. For Gorgias, bgos was the beginning of speech as well as action. 
He states "and the beginning would have been speech, for before any future deeds it is 
necessary first for there to be logos." (DK B11,6). 
Throughout history, Gorgias especially has been accused of being a skeptic, 
nihilist, or relativist due to his views of logos presented in his speech On Not-Being. 
Gorgias' argument against Being, though, can also be interpreted as a rather obvious 
parodic rebuttal to the Eleatic (and later Platonic and Aristotelian) notion of one static 
Being that rationalizes all.'''' For the Eleatics, motion and change were mere illusions 
due to the deception of the senses, making the acquisition of truth through the senses or 
language impossible. The Eleatics believed that certain knowledge was only achievable 
through reasoning that contemplated Being (the one Logos). In arguing for Being, the 
Eleatics claimed—quite the opposite of the sophists—that there is only one logos 
(Being) that serves as a rational, immutable, and unifying structure of reality. In On 
Not-Being, Gorgias parodies the Eleatics by showing that their arguments for Being 
can also be supportive of an argument for Not-Being. Gorgias asserts, "for that which 
we reveal is logos, but logos is not substances and existing things. Therefore we do not 
reveal existing things to our neighbors, but bgos, which is something other than 
substances.... logos arises from external things impinging on us, that is, from 
perceptible things" (DK B3,84-85). In making this argument, Gorgias shows the 
Guthrie, The Sophists 15. 
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opposite of the Eleatic position. Logos (reality) is not something beyond humanity; 
rather, logos is a blending of beliefs, reality, senses, and language. According to 
Consigny, Gorgias' On Not-Being suggests that 
one is always within the framework of logos, and can never perceive 'reality' 
directly; for the domain of discourse permits no access to any putative domain 
that is posited to exist 'outside' the reality fabricated from within logos. In 
Sextus's terms, Gorgias thus abolishes the illusory "criterion" presumed to 
exist outside of logos, one that would presumably indicate which speech is true 
or false (3B)75 
On Not-Being, rather than implying relativism because it rejects Being, reinforces the 
sophistic and Hericlitean notion that reality {logos) is always undergoing change, or 
coming to heJ^ If the sophists were skeptics or nihilists, they were only skeptics of 
claims of the possibility of certain and immutable knowledge.^' 
For the sophists, logos was often paradoxical and more or less subversive, 
leading to a pluralistic understanding of reality. This feature of their rhetoric is perhaps 
best observed in three of Protagoras' fragments. Together they create a comprehensive 
view of Protagoras' understanding of logos. The first, commonly called the dissoi 
logoi fragment, reads "Two logoi are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each 
other."'^ The second fragment translates "to make the weaker argument (logos) the 
stronger." Finally, the thh-d fragment is simply "It is not possible to contradict." 
Scott Consigny, "Sophistic Freedom: Gorgias and the Subversion of Logos." Pretext 12 (1991): 
228. 
Nietzche offers an excellent discussion of coming to be in Friedrich Nietzche. Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1962) 50-74. 
Guthrie, The Sophists 47. 
'8 yyi three of these translations are taken from Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos (Columbia: U 
of South Carolina P, 1991) 87-197. 
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Edward Schiappa suggests that these fragments, especially the dissoi logoi fragment, 
are an extension of the Hericlitean thesis that reality is in flux. He writes, "the two-
logoi... fragment can be read productively as responses to certain Eleatic theories 
concerning human ability to comprehend and speak correctly about 'what is.'"^® The 
fragments, especially when read together, suggest a pluralistic understanding of nature 
in which various accounts or descriptions are possible in any situation. As such, no one 
'final' or 'ultimate' description or argument can reach closure, because no one account 
(logos) can completely refute another. Instead, various arguments are opposed to one 
another in weaker/stronger relationships. A dominant logos is assumed to be 'the 
stronger' in a given context, while other arguments, or logoi, take on a weaker status. 
To make the weaker argument stronger demonsUates the subversive nature of logos 
because the stronger argument cannot completely wipe out, or contradict, its 
competitors, making it always susceptible to being undermined. 
Logos is a very complex concept in Greek philosophy, so a comprehensive 
view of it is unattainable here. However, some useful suppositions can be drawn from 
this small sketch of the meaning of logos toward developing a means rhetorical 
analysis. First, in sophistic rhetoric, bgos concems the rational stiaicture of language, 
thought, and reality. Consigny summarizes this aspect of logos: "Because the power of 
logos is unnoticed and not coercively imposed, it exerts its repressive power 
pervasively and insidiously. For when a community accepts certain patterns of 
speaking, they deceive themselves into accepting these patterns as representing 
'reality.'"®*' Second, logoi can be opposed to one another, ensuring a pluralistic 
understanding of reality in which various accounts might be sU'onger than others—but 
Scbi^pa, Protagoras and Logos 92. 
Consigny, "Sophistic Freedom: Gorgias and tiie Subversion of Logos" 230. 
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none can rule others out completely and adopt the mantle of certainty. Roochnik 
demonstrates this feature well through a useful demonstration: 
A physicist for example, when asked to give a logos of the human body, would 
do so given his own version of what constitutes a rational account. His logos 
would be composed largely in the language of mathematics and would explicate 
the body as a moving object in space. The biologist, when asked the same 
question, would present quite a different story and might use a language not 
nearly so mathematical. More different still would be the logos given by a 
sculptor concerned with only the body's lines of beauty and grace. 
The third feature of bgos is die notion that reality, language, and thought are always in 
flux. This aspect of logos, I believe, reflects Toulmin's claim that conceptual change is 
an inevitable and unavoidable feature of human understanding. Language, thought, and 
reality are always changing, urging humans to be continuously reinventing their beliefs 
to suit the changing and mutable physical and social situations in which they live. 
Metaphor 
Metaphor, as far as we know, was first treated in a formal way by Aristotle, so 
it would be inaccurate to claim that the "older" sophists of ancient Greece offer a 
formalized conception of 'metaphor' like that of Aristotle, Richards, or Black.^i Rather, 
the sophists typically employed the term trope, a word that meant 'turn' in ancient 
Greek, to characterize features of figurative language like metaphor. Later, poets and 
rhetoricians, among them Aristotie, divided the unified notion of tropes into 'figures of 
speech,' encompassing metaphor, antithesis, simile, metonym, synecdoche, allegory, 
irony, personification, among many others. The sophists, however, did not appear to 
make these sorts of divisions, using tropes generously in their speeches without calling 
Ricoeur attributes botb our formal notions of metaphor and rhetoric to Aristotle. See Paul Ricoeur, 
The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1977) 9-10. 
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attention to any differences among them. Gorgias was especially notorious for his use 
of tropes to play contrasting elements of words and phrases off one another in 
unexpected ways.®^ Jacqueline de Romilly points out that the Greeks often aligned 
Gorgias' way of twisting words together with "magic."^^ Athanasius wrote of Gorgias' 
rhetoric. 
Many have displayed it in flgures of thought and tropes, but especially Gorgias, 
since he was most affected; during the course of the very narrative in his 
Funeral Oration, not venturing to say "vultures" he spoke of "animate tombs" 
(DK 5a). 
Besides offering an example of one of Gorgias' most notorious tropes, Athanasius' 
matching of "figures of thought" with tropes reveals the connection between tropes, 
language, and thought that the sophists probably made themselves. For the sophists, 
tropes were figurative devices with which a speaker could 'turn' listeners' logoi, or 
their rational structures/accounts of reality. Successful tfopes, they believed, could 
change one's perspective, one's way of thinking about things, and even the way one 
talks. Indeed, the contemporary usage of the phrase "figures of speech" to mean 
'metaphor' and other tropes still retains a suggestion that figures of speech shape and 
give form (figures) to logos (speech and thought). 
In the modem sophistic tradition, however, the meaning of the term 'metaphor' 
has in many ways been broadened to become a synonym for 'trope;' so at risk of some 
confusion, I will use the term 'metaphor' to mean what the sophists probably meant by 
Consigny, "Gorgias Use of the Epideictic" 289; Richard Enos, Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle 
(Prospect Heights, 111.: Waveland, 1993) 61. 
Jaqueline de Romilly, "From Aphorisms to Theoretical Analyses: The Birth of Human Sciences in 
the Fifth Century B.C," Diogenes 144 (1988): 5-6. 
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'trope.'®^ In the essay "Metaphor as Rhetoric," Wayne Booth suggests that this 
broadened meaning of metaphor is widespread in modem rhetoric. Using the metaphor 
'We have here three different breeds of cat' as an example, Booth writes that 
"Classical rhetoricians ... would say the sentence contains no metaphors; dead 
ones are not just dead, they are no longer metaphors.... At the other extreme, 
some would claim that all my terms were metaphors, and they would seek, 
though not always find, philological evidence to prove that they were originally 
"motivated." Or they might, like Paul de Man, seek to show the inescapable 
metaphorical quality of all human discourse."®^ 
As Booth points out, this broadening of the meaning of 'metaphor' has extended the 
influence of metaphor far past the simple 'X is Y', 'Man is a Wolf. 'America is a 
melting pot' format that is often prescribed in textbooks or style manuals.^® The 
change, however, toward this broader meaning over the last centui-y has been gradual 
rather than sudden. Nietzsche was probably the first to revive a rather sophistic 
understanding of trope but referred to it as "metaphor." Nietzsche writes, 
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymnies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage 
seem to a nation fixed, canonic, and binding; truths are illusions of which one 
has forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors which have become 
Complaints of this nature can be found in David Cooper, Metaphor (Oxford: Basis Blackwell, 1986); 
and Eva Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 
Wayne Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric," On Metaphor, ed. S. Sacks (Chicago: Chicaao UP, 1979): 
49. 
Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric" 48. 
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powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now 
ate no longer of account as coins but merely as metal.®' 
The sophists, especially Gorgias, would have probably without reservation agreed to 
Nietzsche's understanding of metaphor (i.e. as trope) and its relationship to Uoith. 
Much like Nietzsche, they would have assumed that the beliefs humans take to be true 
are merely the end results of 'turns' of thought and language (.logos). Also like 
Nietzsche, Gorgias would have stressed that the influence of speech (logos) is 
unnoticed and illusionary, inviting humans to accept their metaphors as certain 
"reality."®® But, as Nietzsche argues, such truths are illusions or worn out metaphors 
"of which one has forgotten they are illusions."®® 
Unfortunately, though, rhetoricians have only fragments from which to puzzle 
over what the "older" sophists might have meant by 'trope.' Nietzsche, meanwhile, 
does not offer a comprehensive view of metaphor, only intriguing directions. So, we 
must turn to the what many see as the modem sophistic tradition in rhetoric. Indeed, I 
believe Donald Davidson in his essay "What Metaphors Mean" offers an explanation 
for metaphor that is closest to what the sophists might have meant by 'trope.' Like the 
sophists, Davidson points out that features of language, including metaphors, are 
essentially interpretive and situational in nature. He writes. 
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its 
interpretation reflects as much on die interpreter as on the originator... die act 
of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too understanding a 
®^ Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Falsity in the Extramoral Sense," Essays on Metaphor, ed. W. 
Shibles. trans. Mugge, M.A. (Whitewater, Wise.; Language Press, 1972): 5. 
®® Consigny, "Sophistic Freedom: Gorgias and the Subversion of Logos" 230. 
®^ Nietzsche, "On Truth and Falsity in the Extramoral Sense" 5. 
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metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as litde 
guided by rules.®® 
Critiquing the interaction view of metaphor as developed by Richards and Black, 
Davidson disputes the notion that metaphors create or carry a special cognitive content 
that makes them "non-literal." He writes 
I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is 
not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but 
because there is nothing there to paraphrase .... a metaphor doesn't say 
anything beyond its literal meaning (nor does its maker say anything, in using 
the metaphor, beyond the literal).®' 
Davidson's point is subtle but important. He argues that a metaphor does not contain a 
meaning that is somehow 'outside' our normal use of literal language. Rather, "a 
metaphor makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, 
between two or more things."®^ Moreover, Davidson points out that a finite meaning or 
cognitive content is not contained by the metaphor itself; instead, the 'meaning' of the 
metaphor is brought about by a reader's or listener's interpretation of the relationship 
between two or more contrasting concepts. Reinforcing this point, Davidson writes, 
"when we hesitate, it is usually to decide which of a number of metaphorical 
interpretations we shall accept."®^ As such, no special meaning or insight is transferred 
by the metaphor to listeners or readers; rather, each person who experiences a particulai-
metaphor interprets it in his or her own way, according to the rhetorical situation in 
Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," On Metaphor, ed. S. Sacks (Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1979): 29. 
91 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 32. 
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which the metaphor is used. Davidson points out, however, that we are always in this 
type of interpretive relationship with discourse, so it is hard to argue that metaphors are 
not another form of iiteral' language. Indeed, Davidson's concern is that if we accept 
that metaphors have a special cognitive content (other than their literal meaning), then 
we must also assume that metaphors are getting at something 'outside' our language, or 
that they are transcending our language in some way. He writes, "A consequence is that 
the sentences in which metaphors occur are true or false in a normal, literal way, for if 
the words in them don't have special meanings, sentences don't have any special 
truth."!"* 
How should we then understand metaphor? If metaphors are regular features of 
literal language, then they can be understood to be common, normal features of 
discourse, including scientific discourse. Indeed, Davidson claims that metaphors are 
distinguished by their use and not by a supposed special cognitive content that is 
brought about by an interaction between the words themselves. He notes that 
"Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that 
inspires or prompts the insight"®^ Moreover, Davidson writes, "metaphors... provide a 
kind of lattice... through which we view relevant phenomena."®^ In other words, 
metaphor invites interpreters to conceive and experience one thing in terms of another 
by urging perspectives or points of view that govern the way people interpret and 
discourse about their situations. For some people, a particular metaphor might seem 
meaningless or even absurd. For others, it might be interpreted to be a "truth" or 
"common sense." And for yet another group of people, the same metaphor might be 
Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 39. 
95 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 45. 
^ Davidson, "What Met^hors Mean" 43. 
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taken to be profound. Indeed, one often Hnds that the meaning of a metaphor, like art, 
is in the eye of the beholder. By bringing two or more concepts into contrast in a novel 
way, new metaphors often invite listeners or readers to interpret a situation differently 
than they might have before. More familiar metaphors, on the other hand, often offer 
enduring perspectives from which a person, even a culture, conceives and discourses 
about reality. 
Once a sentence is taken metaphorically, however, no finite meaning is 
transferred by the metaphor itself. Rather, it is up to the interpreter to "hunt out" the 
metaphor's implications. Thus, new metaphors have an open-ended nature that invites 
interpretation and reinterpretation. Stressing this point, Davidson writes, 
If what the metaphor make us notice were finite in scope and prepositional in 
nature, this would not in itself make trouble; we would simply project the 
content the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor. But in fact there is no 
limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and much of what we are caused 
to notice is not propositional in nature. When we try to say what a metaphor 
"means" we soon realize that there is no end to what we want to mention.^'' 
Consequently, by reinforcing the interpretive nature of metaphor and claiming literal 
status for it, I believe Davidson renews the sophistic notion of tropes as 'turns' in the 
logoi of the members of an audience. New metaphors, though they grab our attention, 
do not have a special cognitive content that somehow gets beyond one's literal language 
or rational account of reality (logos). Rather, their contrastive, open-ended nature urges 
'turns' in an interpreter's rational account, encouraging the listener or reader to interpret 
their situations from a particular perspective. Indeed, Davidson claims that new 
metaphors create meaning for an interpreter because they seem "patentiy false" in their 
Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 44. 
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contexts, urging interpreters to hunt out new literal meanings that are more appropriate 
to the context in which the metaphors are expressed.®® Reminiscent of Gorgias' 
rhetoric, Davidson claims that "absurdity or contradiction in a metaphorical sentence 
guarantees we won't believe it and invites us, under proper circumstances, to take the 
sentence metaphorically."^ 
In sum, when one assumes that change is the norm in human understanding, 
one then can say that metaphors are not exceptions or abnormalities that cause change in 
an otherwise stable scheme; rather they are a normal feature of discourse that come 
about because language, thought, and reality are inevitably undergoing change. 
Whether one adopts an "interaction" view of metaphors or an "interpretive/sophistic" 
view like the one I believe is offered by Davidson, the scholars that support these views 
agree that metaphors bring about change in human understanding by altering the way 
one conceptualizes reality. In other words, as Black and Davidson both note, a 
metaphor brings about changes in the way humans view their physical and social 
situations. The critical difference between the interaction and interpretive views of 
metaphor is the difference between the presumption of conceptual stability held by the 
former and a presumption of conceptual change held by the latter. In the interaction 
view, metaphors cause changes in an otherwise fixed set of beliefs (i.e. paradigm, 
schema, model) by creating special meaning, insight, or "ontological flashes" that get 
'outside' literal thought and language. The interpretive view of metaphor, on the other 
hand, suggests that metaphors are natural, contrastive features of a changing reality in 
which thought and language (logos) are inevitably in flux. Therefore, in the interpretive 
98 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 40. 
^ Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 40. 
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view, a new or emergent metaphor urges people to interpret their situation differently 
than they might have otherwise. 
Metaphor, Invention, and Conceptual Change in Science 
Now, let us address directly the main premise offered at the beginning of this 
chapter—that metaphors in scientific discourse can serve as a basis of invention for 
scientific arguments. In essence, when a metaphor is interpreted, I believe it invites the 
interpreter to conceptualize or re-conceptualize features of reality from a particular point 
of view. Or, as Burke claims, "For metaphor we could substitute perspective."^^^ Or, 
as Rorty claims, "A metaphor is ... a call to change one's language and one's life, 
rather than a proposal about how to systematize either."'O' But metaphors offer only a 
site of departure, a place from which to build an argument. They are not the argument 
itself. Toulmin also makes this point in a somewhat different way. He writes that 
scientific discovery is a matter of "coming to think" about phenomena in a "new 
way."102 Nevertheless, this change in perspective, as Toulmin notes, is only the first 
step in the development of new theories or descriptions of natural phenomena. After 
one experiences a change in perspective, he points out, it ultimately leads scientists to 
address the question, "What sort of demonstration will justify us in agreeing that, 
whereas this was not previously known, it can now be regarded as known?"'®^ if 
Toulmin is correct, then one can draw clear connections among scientific inquiry, the 
invention of scientific discourse, and metaphor. After all, changes in perspective, as 
Burke points out, are for the most part motivated by metaphors. Once a new 
•00 Burke, A Grammar of Motives 503. 
'01 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1991) 12. 
102 Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science 17-22. 
103 Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science 17. 
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perspective is embraced, arguments are then invented that interpret and explore the 
implications of the new metaphor that urges that perspective. 
If so, then what roles do metaphors play in the invention of scientific 
arguments? As I will show in the following analyses of the seminal texts of the 
quantum theory, metaphor tends to serve three main roles in the invention of scientific 
arguments. First, metaphors can become 'dominant' or 'root' metaphors that, as Burke 
points out, guide the way whole schools in the scientific community interpret reality. 
These metaphors more or less shape scientists' everyday interpretations of reality, even 
in ways in which they might not be aware. For example, the metaphor 'nature is a 
machine' was a powerful dominant scientific metaphor that emerged during the 
Renaissance and became the guiding perspective of Enlightenment science. Offering an 
example of one of this metaphor's first uses, Kepler wrote in 1605, "I aim to show that 
the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but to a clockwork.""" 
During the next century after Kepler many scientists came to assume implicitly that 
nature is a dispassionate, rigid, and inorganic machine that works according to 
impartial, predictable laws.i®^ Galileo, for example, argued that the motion of the 
planets followed mechanical laws as dictated by mathematics.'o® William Harvey 
reinterpreted the heart to be a mechanical pump, "a piece of machinery in which though 
one wheel gives motion to another, yet all the wheels seem to move simultaneously."'®^ 
And later, Descartes translated mechanism into a philosophy of nature— 
Quoted in Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 56. 
'05 Hugij Kemey, Science and Change, 1500-1700 O^ew York: McGraw-Hill. 1971). 
Kemey, Science and Change 144. 
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And I have been gready helped by considering machines. The only difference I 
can see between machines and natural objects is that the workings of machines 
are mostly carried out by apparatus large enough to be readily perceptible by the 
senses... whereas natural processes almost always depend on parts so small 
that they utterly elude our senses.'®® 
The dominant metaphor 'mechanism' was—and to some extent still is—such a strong 
influence on the way scientists conceptualized and talked about nature that it was often 
hard for post-Enlightenment scientists to interpret nature any other way. In fact, it is 
still common to hear one talk about Uie "workings of nature," "the forceful wind," "an 
energetic personality," or "a ball springing off a bat." Dominant metaphors, like the 
'mechanism' metaphor, often become so ingrained in the way scientists conceptualize 
reality and invent their arguments that these metaphors are sometimes held to be certain 
and immutable. In the end, though, these dominant metaphors, like 'nature is a 
machine,' 'nature is causal,' or 'nature is determinate,' only offer a temporal sense of 
stability to the scientific community, urging scientists of particular schools or eras to 
maintain more or less similar interpretations of nature. Lakoff and Johnson call these 
sorts of dominant metaphors, "metaphors we live by," suggesting that some metaphors 
are "pervasive in every day life, not just in language but in thought and action."'®' 
Second, metaphors often play an "emergent" role in the invention of scientific 
arguments. By emergent, I mean that 'doing science' often brings concepts into 
contrast in ways that create new metaphors. These emergent metaphors then urge 
scientists to interpret phenomena from a new or different perspective. For example, 
consider the metaphor 'light is a wave' developed by Christiaan Huygens in Traite de la 
Lumiere (1690). He wrote, "[light] spreads ... by spherical surfaces and waves: for I 
'08 Quoted in Kemey, Science and Change 156. 
'09 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 3. 
63 
call them waves from their resemblance to those which are seen to be formed in water 
when a stone is thrown into it." Through the perspective offered by this metaphor, 
Huygens proceeded to reinterpret the phenomenon of light in terms associated with 
waves, illustrating how 'light waves' create interference patterns when passing through 
two slits, much like water waves. Furthermore, he claimed that light, as a wave, must 
transverse in a medium (i.e. aether) much as waves move in water. The metaphor 'light 
is a wave,' therefore, became the basis of invention for Huygen's argument. Once he 
embraced the perspective offered by the metaphor, Huygens began developing 
demonstrations and other means of argument through which he might explore tlie 
implications of the metaphor and demonsu-ate its usefulness. 
Emergent metaphors create an incongruity in the body of scientific beliefs, 
urging the scientific community to address the implications of these metaphors through 
argumentation. On one hand, members of the scientific community might reject 
arguments based on an emergent metaphor as meaningless, absurd, or misguided, thus 
restoring harmony to their rational accounts of reality by denying the metaphor any 
status as truth or knowledge. This sort of rejection is common in science, as in other 
intellectual disciplines. Sometimes, though, despite the seeming falseness or absurd 
truth of a metaphor, as Davidson calls it, scientists might embrace an argument invented 
through an emergent metaphor because it fills a gap, solves a problem, allows them to 
make do in a way that their previous beliefs could not. Other scientists, then, might 
apply the metaphor to other related phenomena, reinterpreting things once known from 
a new perspective. 
Of course, most emergent scientific metaphors do not guide the invention of 
major theoretical works or form the basis of whole schools of thought. Usually they 
offer small 'turns,' or changes, to the rational accounts of members of the scientific 
community, leading to the development of typical scientific contiibutions. Indeed, a 
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vast majority of scientific discourse is designed to make these sorts of small changes to 
the beliefs of others. Physicists David Bohm and David Peat argue this point in 
Science, Order, and Creativity. They suggest that "metaphorical play" is necessary to 
creativity in science. Indeed, the mere activity of doing science, Bohm and Peat claim, 
inevitably brings metaphors forward. They write, 
Within this play it is not to be taken for granted that new things must always be 
different or that they can never in any significant way be related to what came 
before. Indeed, it might be suggested that the more different things are, the 
greater may be the importance in seeing how they are similar, and likewise, the 
more similar things are, the greater may be the value in perceiving their 
differences. "0 
Bohm and Peat criticize the Kuhnian notion that revolutions occur in any sort of 
either/or procedure in which incommensurable paradigms (or metaphors) sti'uggle for 
complete dominance. Rather, they stress that the pluralism created by the give and take 
among different scientific beliefs and theories that urges concepts to play with one 
another in ways that gradually change scientists' perspectives and lead to new theories. 
They argue that metaphors come about naturally because the activities of science create 
a "metaphorical play," that inevitably spins off new metaphors and thus leads the way 
for the development of new descriptions of reality.'" 
Third, if they are successful, the final role scientific metaphors serve in 
invention is to become "dead" metaphors that make up the accepted features of scientific 
discourse and thus scientists' lexicon. Eventually, metaphors turn into standard, 
relatively unnoticed, features of scientific discourse that provide the constituent 
"®David Bohm and David Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity (New York: Bantam, 1987) 49, 
''' Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 49. 
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concepts used to develop scientific arguments. Some more prominent examples of 
scientific dead metaphors might include atoms, cells, electrons, time, space, gravity, 
photons, aether, and so on. At some point, all these concepts were newly emergent 
metaphors; but as they gained acceptance and usage by the scientific community they 
lost their supposed "figurative" status. In other words, as Davidson notes, metaphors 
die when their novelty fades away and they become a regular part of how one interprets 
and talks about reality.is the heart really a pump? Are humans actually primates? Is 
the earth orbiting the sun? Is light a form of radiation? These dead metaphors are the 
basis of scientists' and our accounts of reality. In fact, it is hard to conceptualize tlie 
heart, humans, earth, or light in ways that avoid these metaphors. We rely on diese 
dead metaphors and they've proven their usefulness toward explaining our physical and 
social contexts. So, they are held to be literal and true with only periodic challenges. 
Interestingly, though, it is also important to recognize that all the concepts mentioned in 
this paragraph have undergone changes in meaning for decades, even centuries. 
Though some have experienced rapid change in meaning and others slow change, all 
these dead metaphors have been reinterpreted over time to suit the needs of the people 
and communities who used them. 
The analyses of the scientific texts of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr in the 
following three chapters, therefore, will be based on the premise that metaphors are the 
creative impetus that urge both scientific inquiry and the invention of scientific 
discourse into motion. When interpreted, scientific metaphors often lead to new 
perspectives and thus 'turn' the rational accounts, or logos, of members of the scientific 
community, inviting diem to invent arguments that offer new explanations for 
phenomena. Interpreting and employing a new metaphor, however, is not an isolated 
1 '2 DavidsOT, "What Metaphors Mean" 43. 
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event. It invariably urges a broader turn in beliefs by creating new ways from which to 
make sense of reality. Moreover, as Burke points out, some metaphors potentially lead 
to whole movements in science in which whole sets of beliefs are reinvented to cohere 
with the perspective offered by a new metaphor. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have developed an understanding of scientific metaphor that 
stresses the interpretive nature of metaphors in scientific discourse. I believe the 
relationship between metaphor and invention is crucial to understanding how metaphors 
are used in scientific discourse. In passing, other scholars have also noted this 
relationship between metaphor and the invention of scientific arguments, but few have 
explored the implications of such a close connection between metaphor and the 
development of scientific theories and descriptions. In the following three chapters, I 
will shift from this chapter's rather theoretical discussion of scientific metaphor to 
analyses of actual metaphors in the texts of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr. I will show that 
the metaphors that emerge in these texts invited these scientists to adopt a quite novel 
perspectives toward reality and then invent arguments that explored the implications of 
each new metaphor. 
''3 Builce, Permanence and Change 95. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMERGENCE OF A DOMINANT METAPHOR IN PHYSICS: 
MAX PLANCK'S 'QUANTUM' METAPHOR 
A New Scientiflc Truth does not triuoiph by convincing its 
opponents and making tbem see the light, but rather because its 
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is 
familiar with it 
Max Planck 
To this point I have discussed the theoretical basis for an "interpretive" view of 
metaphor that is in line with the modem sophistic tradition in rhetorical theory. I have 
argued that metaphor, understood broadly as a device for interpreting one's physical 
and social situation from a particular perspective, plays a basic role in the invention of 
scientific arguments. Indeed, this relationship between metaphor and invention in 
scientific discourse is the significant issue that serves as the focal point for the 
remainder of this study. 
But how does the previous two chapters' rather abstract discussion of metaphor 
and invention lend itself to the analysis of actual scientific texts? To address this 
practical question, in this chapter I will first develop a bridge between theory and 
analysis by explaining how the interpretive view of metaphor, discussed in the previous 
chapter, can be used to interpret scientific texts. Specifically, my aim is to illustrate a 
methodology that allows us to look at scientific texts as historical artifacts that offer 
insight into the invention of scientific theories. Then, in the remainder of this chapter. I 
will use diis methodology to analyze Planck's original 1900 paper in which he first 
developed the "quantum metaphor" that serves as a basis for the invention of arguments 
in the quantum theory. 
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Metaphorical Analysis 
To start us out, let me first point out that rhetoricians of science often approach 
scientific articles differently than historians, philosophers, and sociologists. Typically, 
when historians, philosophers, and sociologists research the genesis of a particular 
theory or movement in science, they more or less consider the important texts of that 
movement to be final products that sum up the scientists' efforts. In effect, the texts are 
treated as conclusive statements of fact and not as mechanisms through which the 
scientists invented their ideas. Consequently, these scholars focus on reconstructing the 
historical narrative that led up to the final development of a scientific achievement 
expressed in the final text Rarely, however, do historians, philosophers, and 
sociologists address the written composition of the scientific text in an analytical or 
critical way. Rather, diese scholars are typically concerned with the so-called content or 
ideas that the final scientific text expressed. Rhetoricians of science, on the other hand, 
view scientific texts as artifacts unto themselves that can illuminate the process that 
went into the development of particular theories. Therefore, a close analysis of the final 
text, it is assumed, can lead to an understanding of how the scientific text and the 
beliefs it expressed were invented.' In other words, rhetoricians approach scientific 
texts with the assumption that the rhetoric of a particular text can offer a means through 
which the genesis and continuation of a particular movement in science can be further 
understood. 
For these reasons, rhetoricians of science often find that close analyses of 
scientific articles can yield valuable information toward reconstructing how a particular 
theory was invented. For example. Miller in her analysis of the work of Watson and 
Crick's original papers on the DNA double-helix structure shows how the rhetorical 
' Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 12-16. 
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concept of kairos illuminates the reasoning behind the rhetorical choices that went into 
developing Watson and Crick's theory and arguments.^ Likewise, Gross's rhetorical 
analysis of Newton's Opticks shows how Newton adjusted his rhetorical strategies in 
order to develop a theory of light that allowed "fellow physicists to believe that an 
adherence to the new did not entail a fundamental rejection of the old.^ Indeed, these 
sorts of studies apply various rhetorical analysis methodologies to seminal scientific 
texts to illustrate not only the persuasion strategies that went into the presentation of 
important dieories but also the invention strategies that were evident in the development 
of the arguments in which these theories were expressed. Of course, other historical 
and philosophical factors are an important part of these analyses, but the texts 
themselves form a critical focal point for rhetorical analyses. 
In the following rhetorical analyses of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr's original 
quantum theory texts, I will use metaphorical analysis to illuminate how these particular 
texts and the ideas they contain were invented through the interpretation of metaphors. 
Given the assumption that the interpretation of metaphors leads to the invention of 
scientific arguments, it stands to reason that an analysis of the metaphors within these 
scientific texts would illustrate, in part, how these scientists came to view and discourse 
about natural phenomena differendy than they might have before. Also, by drawing out 
the "dominant" or "root" metaphors that underiie scientific movements, including the 
quantum theory, one can illustrate how movements in science rise, endure, and 
eventually fall. In a sense, one can trace what Burke calls "fertile metaphors" through 
the documents of science, observing how particular metaphors become relevant and 
useful to the society in which they are used. In the end, I believe such analyses do more 
2 Miller, "Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science" 310-327. 
^ Gross, "On the Shoulders of Giants: Seventeenth-Century Optics as an Argumentation Field" 1-17. 
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than tell us about scientific discourse: they illustrate through texts how scientists invent 
their arguments and how these arguments then change the beliefs of the scientific 
community. 
To analyze metaphors in scientific texts from an interpretive view, one can 
follow four basic steps. First, the analysis must be thoroughly contextualized through a 
description of the rhetorical situation in which the metaphor was introduced or used. 
Because the interpretation of new metaphors leads to changes in perspective, it is 
important that the theories and beliefs of the scientific community prior to the 
emergence of a new metaphor be understood and explained. Only then can one 
distinguish and illuminate die change brought about through the introduction of a new 
metaphor to the scientific community. An analysis can be "contextualized" through the 
reconstruction of the historical narrative in which the metaphor was used. This can be 
accomplished through a review of relevant historical events, correspondences among 
scientists, memoirs, and secondary historical or philosophical sources that discuss the 
text being analyzed. 
Second, through a close reading of the text being analyzed, the dominant and 
emergent metaphors are identified. As Lakoff and Johnson point out, metaphors only 
periodically take on the typical 'X is Y' or 'America is a melting pot' foimat; instead, 
metaphorical concepts typically form consistent patterns or perspectives that encompass 
whole sets of words. For example, Lakoff and Johnson point out that the metaphor 
'time is money' is exhibited in various forms like "How do you spend your time?" 
"That flat tire cost me an hour," or "You're running out of time."'' In essence, the 'time 
is money' metaphor is a basic metaphor that characterizes a whole system of metaphoric 
phrases that create a coherent perspective. In scientific texts, one can find similar 
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 8. 
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entailments from a simple metaphor. For example, the phrase 'nature is a machine' is a 
simple metaphor that is exhibited in various forms through Kepler's 'the celestial 
machine is a clockwork' or Harvey's 'the heart is a pump,' or Descartes' 'God is a 
Divine Engineer.' Indeed, the basic metaphor 'nature is a machine' is essentially a 
simple expression for an entire coherent system of metaphorical concepts. As such, one 
can identify and gather together these metaphorical concepts through a close reading of 
one or more texts and use them to identify a particular perspective brought about 
through the interpretation of an emergent or dominant metaphor. 
Third, once the emergent or dominant metaphors have been identified, one tlien 
analyzes the collective perceptive that the metaphors and their system of metaphorical 
concepts bring about The purpose of this analysis is to show how an emergent or 
dominant metaphor served as a basis of invention for the argument expressed in the 
analyzed text. Because my three analyses of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr's papers below 
illuminate the changes in perspective brought about by the interpretation of scientific 
metaphors, I will be particularly interested in showing how the perspectives offered by 
new metaphors, especially the quantum metaphor, contrasted with the prior beliefs of 
the scientific community. I will bring the emergent metaphors in these texts into 
contrast with the previously developed historical narrative to illustrate how the new 
perspectives expressed by Planck, Einstein, and Bohr violated the scientific orthodoxy 
of their day. Then, I will show how these metaphors and the perspectives they created 
served as a starting place for the invention of the text being analyzed. 
Finally, the significance of the emergent or dominant metaphors is discussed 
within die broader historical narrative in which the analyzed text is situated. Given the 
fact that metaphors invite other scientists to change their perspectives and beliefs about 
nature, one can show how particular metaphorical concepts fit or formed the basis of 
entke scientific movements. In essence, this final step elaborates on the future of 
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particular metaphors through a discussion of their future interpretation by other 
scientists. With this fourth step completed, an analysis attempts to show how particular 
metaphors invited scientists to argue for stability or change in the theories and beliefs of 
the scientific community. 
Overall, the purpose of a metaphorical analysis, like any rhetorical analysis, is to 
illuminate the rhetoric of a particular text. The three texts analyzed in this study will be 
discussed separately with the idea that each analysis can stand alone; however, together 
I believe these analyses allow one to trace particular quantum theoiy metaphors as they 
emerge in the scientific community over time. Consequently, a comprehensive study of 
these metaphors at three different time periods in the development of die quantum 
theory provides a good illustration of how new beliefs emerge, gain influence, and 
eventually dominate the beliefs of the scientific community. 
Max Planck and the Quantum Mystery 
Let us first analyze Planck's 1900 paper in which the possibility of a quantum 
interpretation of nature was first indicated. Planck's initial genesis of the quantum 
theory, like the development of many dieories in science, presents us with a mystery. 
Traditionally, Max Planck has been given credit for introducing the 'quantum postulate' 
in a December 14,1900 speech to the German Physical Society. Yet, in the mydiology 
of science, it has often been suggested that Planck took the first step of the quantum 
theory quite by accident, and that he did not realize the radical nature of his claims until 
years later.^ 
Planck's quantum postulate is the centerpiece of much of quantum physics. It 
suggests that energy must be divided into discontinuous or discrete bundles called 
^ This assertion can be found in numerous histories of quantum theory. Kuhn, however, offers the 
most thorough discussion of the issue in Thomas Kuhn, Black-Body Theo)y and The Quantum 
Discontinuity (New York: Oxford UP, 1978). 
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'energy quanta.'® In a more generalized form, the "quantum hypothesis" prescribes that 
physicists must interpret natural phenomena in discontinuous terms; however, the 
quantum hypothesis also suggests that the discreteness of nature is so nearly 
infinitesimal that human senses typically perceive natural phenomena to be continuous. 
For example, to people walking on a beach, the sand all around them appears to be 
something continuous; however, if they looked more closely, they would see that the 
body of sand at their feet consists of discrete grains, making the sand discontinuous. In 
a sense, one might say that these grains of sand are the "quanta" of the beach. Of 
course, this analogy is rather elementary, but its simple quality hints at the fundamental 
nature of the quantum hypothesis. When the quantum hypothesis is used to interpret 
phenomena like energy or light, which appear to be continuous, descriptions of a 
quantum reality start to become rather complex. 
The mystery concerning the development of the quantum theory is whether 
Planck realized the importance of this discontinuity when he 'discovered' the quantum 
postulate. Seeking to dispel the doubts about Planck's work, Nobel physicist Max 
Bom, a friend and colleague of Planck, emphatically defended Planck's initial 
development of the quantum theory. He wrote, 
Planck was perfecdy clear about the importance of his discoveiy.... His modest 
and reluctant way of speaking about his work has caused the impression that he 
did himself not quite believe in his result. Therefore, the opinion spread, 
especially outside Germany, that Planck "did not seem to know what he had 
done when he did it," that he did not realize the range of his discoveiy.'' 
® Polkingborne, The Quantum World 6. The most accessible account of the quantum theory is in 
Pagel's The Cosmic Code. 
' Max Bom, "Max Karl Ernst Ludwig Planck," The World of the Atom, ed. H, Boorse, and L. Motz 
(New York: Basic Books, 1966): 473. 
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More recently, though, in a meticulous work on the origin of the quantum theory, 
Thomas Kuhn claims that Planck did not recognize the importance of his 'discoveiy.' 
Kuhn argues that "Planck himself did not publicly acknowledge the need for 
discontinuity until 1909, and there is no evidence that he had recognized it until the yeai-
before."® 
So, we have a mystery. Who originated the quantum hypothesis? Any reader of 
the history of science soon finds that it is abundant with these sorts of who-done-it 
mysteries. Did Galileo or Newton discover inertia? Did Newton or Leibniz discover the 
calculus? Did Lorentz, Poincare, or Einstein discover the relativity? Though we often 
settle on one scientist for the accolades, it is often hard to pin down where a particular 
movement in physics started. Indeed, one thing we do observe in the history of science 
is that new beliefs and new theories rarely arrive in clear, undeniable arguments. 
Rather, new beliefs seem to emerge hesitantly in the papers of different scientists. Only 
later, when scientists are honored for their work, do historians and other scientists start 
sparring over who 'found' what and where. As mentioned in the last chapter, though, 
the problem with these debates is that they assume that there is one and only one thing 
to be 'discovered.' Yet, when one looks critically at the historical texts of science and 
the arguments in which so-called 'discoveries' were expressed, it soon becomes 
apparent that the invention of scientific theories and beliefs is a richly complex endeavor 
that includes a great amount of creativity, trial and error, interpretation, and social 
interplay. In the midst of this tangle, there is rarely evidence of a flash of insight in 
which one physicist steps forward, never to look back. Historian Gerald Holton points 
out that this complexity is especially true of the seminal works in science. He writes. 
® Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and The Quantum Discontinuity 140. 
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There we are more likely to see plainly the illogical, nonlinear, and therefore 
"irrational" elements that are juxtaposed to the logical nature of the concepts 
themselves None of these elements fit in with the conventional model of 
the scientist;.. and yet they play a part in scientific work.^ 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will use metaphorical analysis to Uluminate 
the quantum hypothesis as a metaphor that emerges innocuously in Planck's 
December 14,1900 paper, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the 
Normal Spectrum."'® Interestingly, I will show that the quantum postulate is for the 
most part a parenthetical feature of Planck's argument for an energy distribution law. 
Indeed, I will argue that he invented his overall argument in this paper through a 
perspective offered by a quite different metaphor, 'energy spectrum is an entropic 
phenomenon.' The quantum postulate is certainly not the focus of his paper, no less a 
call for a fundamental theoretical change in physics. And yet, as I will show, the subtle 
emergence of the quantum postulate as a new metaphor in Planck's work illustrates 
how new ways of interpreting reality in science often come about through metaphors 
that spin out of the normal activity of 'doing science.' I will show that new metaphors 
emerge naturally as a result of scientific inquiry, because the mere act of doing science 
puts beliefs into contrast, urging scientists to adopt new perspectives toward 
interpreting phenomena in nature. 
Rhetorical Situation 
Before analyzing Planck's paper, let us first look at the rhetorical situation in 
which Planck and his argument were immersed. If we were to cast Planck's 
development of the quantum postulate into the popular revolution myth of the histoiy of 
® Holton, Thematic Origins of Science 8. 
Reprinted and translated in D. ter Haar, The Old Quantum Theory (New York: Peraamon, 1967) 82-
90. 
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science, we would need to refer to it as an almost unnoticed shot in the dark. Little 
attention was paid to Planck's December 14,1900 paper in which he first suggested 
that energy could be considered discontinuous or "quantized." It was only five years 
later that scientists—most notably an unknown patent clerk, Albert Einstein—began to 
take notice. Even Planck himself reports that he was troubled by the discontinuous 
quality of his new postulate and that he struggled for years to reform his 'quantum of 
action' into classical physics. He writes in his Scientific Autobiography: 
My futile attempts to fit the elementary quantum of action somehow into the 
classical theory continued for a number of years, and they cost me a great deal 
of effort. Many of my colleagues saw in this something bordering on a tragedy. 
But I feel differently about it. For the thorough enlightenment I thus received 
was all the more valuable." 
Planck's quantum postulate was indeed an assertion that called on scientists to interpret 
phenomena in nature very differendy. Previous to the quantum hypothesis, physicists 
conceptualized reality in more or less 'continuous' terms, assuming that nature and the 
universe are ultimately a continuum. Even the limited number of nineteenth centuiy 
physicists who believed in atomistic dieories of nature assumed that a medium, an 
"aether," permeated 'empty' space, joining all of the universe into a seamless, 
continuous Being.Atomism, however, was a concept under heavy fire in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Highly influendal empirical positivists like Ernst Mach, 
Wilhelm Ostwald, and Pierre Duhem argued very persuasively that atoms were merely 
metaphysical illusions that did not exist because they could never be obsei-ved.'^ 
Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949) 45. 
'2 Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity 355. 
Gillespie, The Edge of Objectivity 500-503. 
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Therefore, even the mUd quality of discreteness in nature represented in atomic theories 
of nature was considered skeptically by a majority of the physics community. 
To nineteenth centuiy physicists, then, the continuity of nature was mostly 
unquestionable, and it seemed to manifest itself directly in the mechanical 'laws' of 
classical physics. For example, Newton's laws, or formulas, of motion were 
constructed from his differential and integral calculus in which functions are 
represented by infinitesimally small increments (i.e. continuous).''' Therefore, motion 
of any kind, including related concepts like energy, were assumed to be inherently 
continuous because the calculus, which had proven remarkably useful, dictated that 
they must be so. Seeming to only reaffirm nature as a continuum, Maxwell's equations 
and his theories of electromagnetic radiation (light) were based on wave functions, 
implying that light is made up of continuous waves, not particles. Indeed, Maxwell's 
equations were so persuasive that late in the nineteenth century, many physicists 
believed that the field of physics was closing in on a unified theory for physics that 
would be developed along purely continuous concepts. Stressing this continuity of 
nature, Mach, Ostwald, and Duhem's arguments against atomism were probably in part 
emboldened by the increasing evidence, offered by Newton's and Maxwell's theories, 
that implied nature is continuous. 
So, the lack of attention paid to Planck's quantum postulate is for the most part 
understandable when one considers the rhetorical situation into which it was 
introduced. In the late nineteenth century, completion of the physics enterprise was on 
the minds of scientists, not large-scale change. Encouraged by Maxwell's coupling of 
the theories of electricity and magnetism in the 1860s, many physicists were inclined to 
N.M Bligb, The Evolution and Development of the Quantum Theory (London: Edward Arnold, 
1926) 12. Also see Armin Hennann, The Genesis of Quantum Theory (Cambridge: MIT P, 1971) 
1-3. 
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believe that the three remaining divisions of physics (i.e. electromagnetism, 
thermodynamics, and mechanics) would soon come together into one unified theory of 
the continuum.'5 So, rogue arguments were often dismissed out of hand if they did not 
obviously fit prevailing theories. In fact—and I believe this was true of Planck's 
quantum postulate—a great majority of scientific readers were not prepared to entertain 
beliefs that violated the so-called 'absolute' theories of classical physics. They were 
more likely to assume that even obvious violations of theories would soon be renovated 
to fit classical theories. An example of the confidence of nineteenth century physicists is 
offered in the following 1903 quote by Albert Michelson: 
The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all 
been discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of 
their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly 
remote.'® 
Similarly, Lord Kelvin was known to publicly express the opinion that physics was 
more or less a completed field of study in which only more accurate measurements of 
known phenomena were needed.'' Moreover, one of Planck's professors in 1875 
urged him not to study physics, because it was assumed that the recent 'discovery' of 
thermodynamics had for the most part completed the framework of theoretical 
physics.'® 
Maxwell's theories of electromagnetism explained successfully how light behaves like a wave. Light 
occurs in the "visible" part of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Albert Michelson, Light Waves and Their Uses (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1903) 23-24. 
Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory 0*Jew York: Vintage, 1992) 13. 
J.L. Heiltaron, The Dilemmas of an Upright Man: Max Planck as Spokesman for German Science 
(Bericeley: U of California P, 1986) 10. 
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Physics, however, was not dead, just overwhelmingly empirically oriented. 
Like Kelvin and Michelson, a great number of physicists believed that the real effort of 
the discipline should be concentrated on developing experimentally exact and certain 
measurements of all phenomena. However, as physicists developed experimental 
methods to sharpen the accuracy of their measurements, they began to experience and 
identify new phenomena that could not be immediately accounted for by classical 
physics. For example, in the late 1890s alone, experimental physicists identified X-rays 
(1895), radioactivity (1896), the electron (1897), and radium (1898). Also, an outsider 
in the physics community, Ludwig Boltzmann, began using statistical means to more 
productively calculate the thermodynamic properties of fluids and gases. Seeming to 
contradict the ideal of certainty in physics, Boltzmann's statistical methods for 
calculating thermodynamic phenomena proved strangely more accurate than 
conventional mathematics. Boltzmann's outsider status, however, was created by his 
arguments for an atomistic theory of thermodynamics. Mach and Ostwald were his 
most ardent critics, persuading many physicists in the late nineteenth century to 
discount Boltzmann's theories and his methods. 
The tacit assumption of a natural continuum and the dominance of empiricism 
were both powerful influences in the existence of the three prevailing theoretical 
divisions of the discipline—electromagnetism, thermodynamics, and mechanics. 
Heavily reliant on continuous 'wave' interpretations of light-related phenomena, 
electromagnetism was the study of electricity, magnetism, and light. Thermodynamics 
was the study of heat and energy with a heavy emphasis on fluid gases and liquids. 
And finally, mechanics (or dynamics) was the study of matter in motion. Indeed, the 
names of two of these divisions alone signaled die most significant scientific triumphs 
of the nineteenth century: electro-magnetism combined the fields of electricity and 
magnetism, and tiiermo-dynamics combined the fields of heat and motion into a theory 
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of mechanical energy. Given the trend in which major divisions of physics were being 
combined, it was thus assumed that eventually the remaining three divisions would be 
finally collapsed into one universal theory of physics. Then, Planck developed the 
quantum postulate. 
Max Planck and Black Body Radiation 
By the late 1890s, Planck was a theoretical physicist in Berlin with a good 
reputation. For nearly twenty years, he had published prolifically in the area of 
thermodynamics and by 1897 was known to be one of the major authorities on classical 
thermodynamics.!® His specialty was theoretical research on 'entropy' (the second law 
of thermodynamics) and he was a developer and advocate of theories of 
thermodynamics that rejected atomism and supported assumptions of an absolute 
continuum in gases and liquids. This position put him into direct conflict with 
Boltzmann's atomistic theories of thermodynamics. Throughout the latter half of the 
1890s, Planck and his assistant, Ernst Zermelo, debated with Boltzmann publicly about 
whether physicists should accept an 'absolute' or 'probabilistic' interpretation of 
entropy in thermodynamics. Put plainly (and far too simply), entropy is the amount of 
'disorder' in a system. In the debate with Boltzmann, Planck championed the traditional 
interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy of a 
system always increases (i.e. moves toward disorder). Boltzmann argued that entropy 
of a system almost always increases, forcing one to talk about entropy in probabilistic 
terms. Eventually, but only late in 1900, Planck conceded to Boltzmann's atomism and 
interpretation of entropy. 
Planck's debates with Boltzmann are important because the topics covered in 
their arguments carried over into a completely new project that Planck began in 1897. 
Heilbron, The Dilemmas of an Upright Man 13. 
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Almost as a diversion from his research on the second law of thermodynamics, Planck 
began working on the perplexing problem of 'black body radiation' that had been a pet 
project of Gustav Kirchhoff, the retiring professor who Planck was hired to replace at 
the University of Berlin. In his autobiography, Planck reports that he was initially 
attracted to the black body radiation problem because he believed it might lead to 
"something absolute... and since I had always regarded the search for the absolute as 
the loftiest goal of scientific activity, I eagerly set to work.'"o Black body radiation is 
created by heating a partially evacuated cavity (usually a cube) that is bounded by 
perfectly reflecting walls. Inside the heated cavity, electromagnetic radiation (light) 
proceeds to reflect to and fro off the walls. At any constant temperature, the system 
comes to equilibrium and the radiation develops an energy spectrum that includes 
electromagnetic radiation from the radio to the visible to the ultraviolet ends of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. At high enough temperatures. X-rays are emitted. 
This experiment may sound strange, but it replicates a rather common 
experience,2i If we were to heat a piece of metal, say a rod of iron, to 100 degrees 
Celsius, the electromagnetic radiation emitted would be in the infrared region. We 
would then feel heat created by the radiation hitting our skin, but we would not see the 
radiation because the wavelength would be too large and thus outside the humanly 
visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum. If we tiien continued to heat the iron rod to 
hotter and hotter temperatures, it would eventually emit radiation from higher frequency 
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. First, the iron would glow red, signaling that it 
was emitting low level visible radiation—in addition to infrared. At hotter temperatures, 
it would emit white light, because white light is a combination of all parts of the visible 
Planck, Scientific Autobiography 34-35. 
Gamow, Thirty Years That Shook Physics 9-10. The thought experiment discussed here is an 
adaptation of Gamow's example. 
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spectrum. And at extremely high temperatures, it would begin emitting ultraviolet 
radiation in addition to all the lower frequencies in the spectrum from radio to infrared 
to visible radiation. With each rise in heat, the frequency of the radiation and its energy 
(E) would also rise, accounting for the damage that ultraviolet radiation can cause to the 
skin. 
Capturing Planck's attention, Kirchhoff had shown that the 'energy spectrum' 
created by heating a black body was completely independent of the type of material 
heated. In other words, whether one is heating iron, coal, or any other black body 
material, the energy spectrum of the emitted radiation would be the same series of 
infrared, red, white light, and ultraviolet colors. Kirchoff s conclusion was important 
because it showed that the energy spectrum does not rely on the type of heated material 
being used to create the electromagnetic radiation; therefore, he concluded, the energy 
spectrum is an independent (i.e. "absolute" in classical physics) phenomenon of nature. 
Kirchhoff named this independent phenomena the "normal spectral energy distribution" 
(called "energy spectrum" from now on). As stated earlier, the complete dependence of 
the energy spectrum on temperature, not the material, attracted Planck to this curious 
black body phenomena, because he believed it might lead him to discover something 
absolute.22 
In most ways, however, the black body radiation problem was not in Planck's 
normal area of research. Though it dealt with heat and energy—central concerns of 
thermodynamics—most physicists of his day believed that black body radiation would 
be explained as an electromagnetic phenomenon, because light played such a prominent 
role in the energy spectrum. Planck reports that when he began his research on the 
problem aU the physicists at the time were exclusively attempting to explain black body 
22 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 34-35. 
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radiation through Maxwell's equations of lighL^^ Though at first he also attempted to 
use Maxwell's equations, he soon realized that "an essential link was missing, without 
which the attack on the core of the endre problem could not be undertaken 
successfully."2'' After several failures of his own, he reports, "I had no other alternative 
than to tackle the problem once again—this time from the opposite side, namely, from 
thermodynamics, my own home territory where I felt myself to be on safer ground."25 
The new direction seemed to show almost immediate results; and, in the spring of 1900 
Planck reported to the German Physical Society that he had used concepts from 
thermodynamics to develop a theory of black body radiation that proved the validity of 
"Wien's law," a previously derived formula for the energy spectrum.^^ However, as 
Planck was proofing the final text for the article, data from new experiments on black 
body radiadon emerged that seemed to contradict his theory. It was soon evident to 
Planck that his theory and Wien's formula for the energy spectrum were seriously 
flawed. 
The experiments on black body radiation that called into doubt Wien's formula 
and Planck's theory were conducted by two highly respected experimenters, Heinrich 
Rubens and Ferdinand Kurlbaum.27 Against all expectations, they showed that the 
black body 'intensity distribution' of the energy spectrum was shaped like a bell curve 
rather than as a continuously rising line. In other words, Rubens and Kurlbaum 
showed that higher frequencies of radiation (ultraviolet or above) aie not accompanied 
23 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 38. 
2'* Planck, Scientific Autobiography 37. 
25 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 37. 
2® Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 83-84. 
2'' Friedrich Hund, The History of Quantum Theory (London: Harrap, 1974) 25. 
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by an ever-increasing level of energy. Rather, at higher and higher frequencies, the 
energy level of radiation levels off and then goes toward zcvo?^ This result, by the 
way, reflects experience because it explains the limited existence and energy of 
ultraviolet rays and X-rays. In fact, if Wein's formula, based on classical concepts, 
was correct, materials at any heat would emit dangerous energy levels of ultraviolet 
radiation and X-rays. Therefore, according to classical physics, looking at our heated 
iron rod at any temperature except absolute zero should immediately bum our eyes and 
skin with high energy ultraviolet radiation and X-rays.^^ Of course, this does not 
happen. 
Planck went back to work with the new data, and in October 1990 through 
mainly trial and error, he developed a formula that fit Rubens and Kurlbaum's new 
experimental data. In a paper to the German Physical Society on October 19, he 
proposed that the radiation followed the formula 
j ( V ,T) = AV3/exp (B V/T)-l 
V is frequency 
T is temperature 
A and B are unknown constants 
Confirmation of Planck's new formula was almost immediate. He wrote in his 
autobiography, "The very next day, I received a visit from my colleague Rubens. He 
came to tell me that after the conclusion of the meeting he had that very night checked 
my formula against the results of his measurements, and found a satisfactoiy 
concordance at each point."^ 
28 Gamow, Thirty Years that Shook Physics 10-11. 
Gamow, Thirty Years That Shook Physics 17. 
30 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 40-41. 
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Nevertheless, even Planck believed that his formula was the result of "lucky 
intuition" and was not complete until he could explain why it worked.^' He set about 
attempting to derive the formula from other theoretically "proven" proofs. But every 
attempt to explain the formula through his own beliefs about thermodynamics failed. 
So, in an "act of desperation," he completely reconsidered his beliefs about 
thermodynamics and began to reconceive the black body problem in terms of 
Boltzmann's interpretations of entropy and probability.^^ This noteworthy change in 
Planck's beliefs toward atomism and probabilistic interpretations of entropy was an 
outright abandonment of his previous theories. And yet, Planck reports that after a few 
weeks of applying Boltzmann's methods to the black body problem, "clearness began 
to dawn on me," and he had the theoretical description he was seeking. 
Planck's 1900 Quantum Paper 
Planck's December 14,1900 paper, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution 
Law of the Normal Spectrum," which I will now analyze, is often considered the origin 
of the quantum theory even though Planck did not coin the terms 'energy quanta' or 
'quantum of action' in this article. The article breaks with classical mechanics because it 
introduces a constant "h" that necessitates energy to be considered 'discontinuous' 
rather than continuous. One of the arguments Planck makes in this paper—one that is 
familiar to any physics undergraduate—is that energy (e) is equal to the product of a 
constant (h) and the frequency (V) of the radiation, or e = hV. The h in this relation is 
called "Planck's constant." The relation, e = hV, is often called the "quantum 
postulate." Interestingly, though, when the position and stress on particular metaphors 
31 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 41. 
32 Max Planck letter to Robert Williams Wood, October 7,1931. Reprinted in Annin Hermann, The 
Genesis of the Quantum Theory, trans. C. Nash (Cambridge: MIT P, 1971) 23. 
Max Planck, The Origin and Development of the Quantum Theory (Oxford; Clarendon, 1922) 9. 
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in Planck's 1900 quantum paper are studied, it becomes apparent that he did not see the 
quantum postulate as the focus of the paper, nor does he even hint that his idea of an 
'energy quanta' is a call for major change in the field of physics. Instead, as I will 
show, Planck's notion that 'energy is discontinuous' is primarily a parenthetical 
development that spins out of Planck's metaphorical use of concepts from Boltzmann's 
thermodynamics to invent a theory of black body radiation and the energy spectrum. 
Toward this end, I will first summarize Planck's paper, identifying and marking the 
placement of metaphors. Then, I will analyze particular 'clusters' of metaphorical 
relationships in more depth to show how Planck creates and employs metaphors in his 
paper. 
Overall, Planck's 1900 quantum paper, like most papers to the German 
Physical Society, is rather short. He begins by reminding the audience of the 
conclusions of his October 1900 paper in which he introduced the original version of 
his distribution formula for the energy spectrum. He states, 
in my opinion, the usefulness of this equation was not based only on the 
apparently close agreement of the few numbers, which I could then 
communicate, with the available data, but mainly on the fact that it gave a veiy 
simple logarithmic expression for the dependence of entropy of an in-adiated 
monochromatic vibrating resonator on its vibrational energy. This formula 
seemed to promise in any case the possibility of a general interpretation.^'* 
For Planck's audience, 'entropy'—itself a newer but mostly dead metaphor 
(i.e. 'closed systems are entropic') from thermodynamics^^—probably did not have an 
Max Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum," The Old 
Quantum TTieory, ed. D. ter Haar (New Yoiic; Pergamon, 1967): 82. 
Clausius in 1854 coined the term "entropy" as a metaphor. He wrote "I propose, accordingly to call 
S the enuopy of a body, after the Greek word 'transfomiation.' I have designedly coined the word 
entropy to be similar to 'energy,' for these two quantities are so analagous in their physical 
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obvious relationship to electromagnetic radiation. So, by suggesting that he would 
interpret the behavior of the 'energy spectrum,' an electtomagnetic phenomenon, 
through the meanings associated with 'entropy,' a concept from thermodynamics, 
Planck created a new metaphor for the audience by bringing these two concepts into 
contrast. Entropy, as Planck proceeds to define it plainly for his audience, "means 
disorder." However, Planck then argues, if one is to apply the concept of entropy to the 
energy specmun, one needs to assume that the energy that makes up the energy 
spectrum is in an equilibrium state of maximum entropy.^® Also, Planck points out— 
this is a crucial point—in order for his October 1900 formula to work, one must also 
assume, as Boltzmann suggested, that there is a proportional relationship between 
'entropy' and 'probability.'^^ In making this claim, Planck shows his complete 
conversion to the probabilistic-based understanding of entropy of Boltzmann while 
abandoning his own former position that entropy always increases in a closed system. 
In this rather complex introduction to his paper, Planck thus introduces two 
metaphors with which he proposes to invent his theory of black body radiation. First, 
he associates the energy spectrum with entropy, thereby creating a metaphor 'energy 
spectrum is an entropic phenomenon.' Through this metaphor, Planck suggests that 
one can view electromagnetic energy in terms that are commonly used in 
thermodynamics. Indeed, this metaphor forms the basis of invention for his argument 
by inviting a quite novel perspective from which Planck could then reinteipret the 
behavior of heated black bodies from a thermodynamic point of view. He claims that 
this association between the 'energy spectrum' and 'entropy' will allow him to offer a 
significance, that an analogy of denomination seemed to be lielpful." Quoted in Gillispie, The Edge 
of Objectivity 398. 
36 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 82. 
37 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of tlie Normal Spectrum" 83. 
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"general interpretation" or theory of the energy spectrum and black body radiation. 
Planck then introduces a second metaphor 'entropy is probabilistic' when he argues that 
in order for one to see the energy spectrum in terms of thermodynamics, entropy must 
be viewed in terms associated with 'probability.' In other words, he adopts 
Boltzmann's meaning for entropy, rather than its traditional meaning in classical 
physics. 
These two metaphors, especially 'energy is an entropic phenomena,' more or 
less form the basis of invention for Planck's tiieory of the energy spectrum and black 
body radiation. For Planck, to view the energy spectrum as an entropic phenomenon 
becomes highly significant as a way of interpreting and conceptualizing the behavior of 
black bodies. This metaphor thus changes his perspective in a way that allows him to 
view the black body phenomenon quite differentiy than he and others had before. 
Recognizing what Davidson calls "a novel or surprising likeness" between the two 
contrasting concepts, he embraces the metaphor and searches out its implications. 
However, in doing so, he establishes a broader contrastive relationship between the 
meanings typically associated with the energy spectrum and the meanings associated 
with thermodynamics. Interestingly, his audience, more than likely, would have 
assumed such a connection to be false, but Planck does not ask them to search out the 
implications of the metaphor for themselves. Instead, he himself interprets the 
implications of the metaphor for them, using the point of view offered by the metaphor 
as a means for inventing his theory. Indeed, for the most part, he hopes to show his 
audience that the ends (a working theory) justify the unorthodox use of concepts drawn 
from thermodynamics to reinterpret the black body phenomenon. 
However, his use of another metaphor, Boltzmann's 'entropy is probabilistic,' 
to create a new metaphor, 'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' was most 
likely a confusing move for his audience, especially since most of them probably 
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dismissed Boltzmann's theories in tlie first place. In essence, Planck uses a newer 
metaphor to create anodier new metaphor, thus layering one interpretation onto another 
interpretation and increasing significantly the complexity of his argument. Perhaps a 
non-scientific example would best illustrate the problem that develops. Imagine 
someone states metaphorically that 'time is money' but then suggests that this metaphor 
is useful only if one also embraces the metaphor 'money is fire.' The layering of the 
metaphors complicates the interpretation considerably because the speaker would be 
asking the listener to hunt put the meaning of one metaphor through interpretations of 
another metaphor. And yet, when Planck claims that the 'energy spectrum is an 
entropic phenomenon' only if one accepts that 'entropy is probabilistic,' he creates this 
sort of higher level of complexity for his audience. In spite of this complication, 
though, Planck claims in his paper that only an acceptance of Boltzmann's 
understanding of entropy allows one to develop an explanation for the energy 
spectrum. TTiis application, he claims, leads to "the clarity and uniqueness of the given 
prescription for the solution of the problem."^^ 
In the body of the paper, Planck brings forward two hypotheses that he claims 
are due to the relationship between Boltzmann's notion of entropy and the energy 
spectrum. These two hypotheses form the heart of the 1900 quantum paper. Supporting 
the first hypothesis, he derives a formulaic representation of the relationship between 
entropy and probability (something Boltzmann had not fully been able to do). The 
formula he derives is^^ 
38 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 83. 
39 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 86. Boltzmann 
had argued that S " InW, but never derived the formula or developed the consumt k which bears his 
name. 
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S = k InW 
S is the entropy of the system 
k is a constant (Boltzmann's constant) 
W is the probability of that a particular state exists 
This is essentially a formulaic expression for Boltzmann's metaphor 'entropy is 
probabilistic.' Plugging this relation into his October 1900 formula, Planck shows that 
the formulaic relationship between entropy and probability allows his October black 
body distribution law to calculate accurately the energy spectrum. Also, Planck 
illustrates, the relation allows him to derive the important constant k (called 
"Boltzmann's constant"). Arguing that the accurate derivation of this constant is proof 
of the absoluteness of his formula, Planck then claims that his use of thermodynamic 
concepts to interpret the energy spectrum offers a valid thermodynamic-based theoiy of 
black body radiation.*'® 
As he argues for the first hypothesis, though, Planck introduces a second 
hypothesis that he claims is brought about by the relationship between the energy 
spectrum and entropy. Planck shows, almost casually, that an acceptance of 
Boltzmann's relationship between entropy and probability also urges one to adopt the 
discontinuity, or atomism, that was the centerpiece of Boltzmann's atomistic 
thermodynamics.'" Reinforcing this point, Planck argues that the body of energy that 
makes up the energy spectrum must be divisible into "energy elements" or 
"discontinuous" quantities, much as a gas is divisible into atoms or molecules.''- Or, as 
this relationship between energy and discontinuity soon came to be known, energy is 
'quantized.' Planck introduces this hypothesis in the following passage: 
''® Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 87-88. 
Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 84. 
'•2 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectfum" 84. 
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If E [Energy] is considered to be a continuously divisible quantity, this 
distribution is possible in infinitely many ways. We consider, however—this is 
the most essential point of the whole calculation—E to be composed of a very 
definite number of equal parts and use thereto the constant of nature 
h = 6.55xl0"2'' erg sec. This constant multiplied by the common frequency V 
of the resonators gives us the energy element e in erg, and dividing E by e we 
get the number P of energy elements which must be divided over N resonators. 
If the ratio is not an integer, we take for P an integer in the neighborhood.''^ 
What makes this passage extraordinary is that Planck almost naively associates energy 
with discontinuity, creating in his work a seemingly unnoticed new metaphor, 'energy 
is discontinuous,' that implies a fundamental violation of the classical belief in a 
continuum in nature. This unexpected 'quantum metaphor' comes about because 
Boltzmann's entropy metaphor, which posits that systems are made up of atoms or 
discrete quantities, urges Planck to also assume that energy must now be viewed as 
discontinuous. Indeed, what we see is that the quantum metaphor more or less emerges 
parenthetically out of Planck's broader argument for his theory of the energy spectrum. 
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that Planck recognizes necessity of the 'energy is 
discontinuous' relation. He illustrates this recognition by unmistakably arguing for the 
discontinuous nature of energy when he expresses the formula for which this paper is 
famous. Planck states the fundamental equation of the quantum theory when he writes, 
"This constant [h] multiplied by the common frequency V of the resonators gives us the 
energy element e in erg." The formulaic expression for this relation is the following: 
43 Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Disuibution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 84. 
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e = hV 
e is energy 
h is "Planck's constant" 
V is the frequency of the electromagnetic radiation 
The constant h in this relation forces one to view energy as divisible into discontinuous 
quantities of hV. The relation e = hV is essentially a formulaic expression for the 
quantum metaphor 'energy is discontinuous.' 
Interestingly, though, the stress and placement of this emergent 'quantum' 
metaphor, 'energy is discontinuous,' in Planck's paper seems to suggest that it was the 
result of a means to an end on Planck's part, not a proposed major theoretical change. 
Planck pays relatively little attention to the metaphor itself, and it is certainly not the 
focus of the paper. Kuhn, who offers one of the closest readings of Planck's works, 
even claims that the relation e = hV was a mysterious "ad hoc" hypothesis, and that 
Planck's lack of emphasis on this "energy elements" hypothesis is evidence that he did 
not truly realize that he had proposed that energy is discontinuous.''^ Indeed, Kuhn's 
claim seems to be supported late in the paper by Planck's statement that the "core of the 
whole theory presented here" is that "The probability of any state is proportional to the 
number of corresponding complexions, or, in other words, any definite complexion is 
equally probable as any other complexion."''^ In this statement, Planck claims that his 
derivation of Boltzmann's relationship between entropy and probability is the main 
point of his theory. Clearly, as shown by this statement, Planck believes that the core 
of his theory is his derivation and usage of Boltzmann's relationship S = k InW to 
explain the energy spectrum, not the quantum relationship e = hV. Indeed, the 
^ Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and The Quantum Discontinuity 108, viii. 
A complexion is a single sate of the system in Boltzmann's thermodynamics. Planck, "On Uie 
Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 87. 
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metaphor 'energy is discontinuous' is only, as Kuhn points out, an ad hoc and 
seemingly parenthetical part of Planck's overall argument. 
To sum up at this point, in Planck's paper, one can observe the development of 
two important new metaphors in physics. The first new metaphor, 'energy spectrum is 
an entropic phenomenon' urges Planck to reconceptualize the energy spectrum in teirns 
of another slightly older metaphor, Boltzmann's 'entropy is probabilistic.' Planck uses 
this first new metaphor to guide the invention of his argument, illustrating for the 
audience the valuable conclusions brought about when the energy spectrum is 
interpreted through concepts associated with thermodynamics. Recasting the energy 
spectrum in terms of Boltzmann's entropy metaphor, he associates the energy spectmm 
with a cluster of concepts that define Boltzmann's meaning of entropy like 
"probability," "equilibrium," "statistics," "randomly," "disorder," "complexions," and 
"stationary states." Planck's second new metaphor invites the audience to 
reconceptualize 'energy' through terms associated with 'discontinuity' because, as 
Planck implies, an acceptance of Boltzmann's entropy metaphor urges one to assume 
that the energy spectrum is made up of discrete energy elements. As Planck recognizes, 
the presumption of atomism tiiat is the basis Boltzmann's theoiy of tiieiTnodynamics 
urges a redefinition of energy into atomistic or discontinuous terms. Therefore, he 
discusses energy through a cluster of atomistic terms like "discrete," "energy 
elements," "integer," "equal parts," "independent," and "complexions." 
Two Metaphors, Two Roles 
Let us now return to our mystery about the origin of the quantum theory. When 
one reads Planck's 1900 quantum paper, it seems rather obvious, as Kuhn points out in 
great detail, that Planck did not fully discern the importance of his quantum relation 
e = hV. However, considering Planck's reinterpretation of the meaning energy into 
terms like "energy elements," and "integer" and his use of metaphorical phrases like 
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"[The total Energy is] to be composed of a very definite number of equal parts," it 
seems equally obvious that he did develop some sort of discontinuous, or quantum, 
meaning for energy. Planck was, as Bom claimed, perfectly clear that the relation 
E = hV is important when he claimed that it represented "the most essential point of the 
whole calculation."''^ However, he also obviously did not see it as the most important 
part of the paper. It seems as though both Bom and Kuhn are right and wrong in some 
measure. 
I believe metaphorical analysis allows us to illuminate Planck's work in a way 
that avoids this 'discovery' debate between the 'he did' and 'he did not' factions 
represented by Bom and Kuhn. What we find is that the two significant metaphors in 
his argument, 'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' and 'energy is 
discontinuous,' play two quite different roles in his argument. The first, in which he 
reinterprets the behavior black body radiation through thermodynamics, serves as a soil 
of lens through which Planck interprets the black body phenomenon from a different 
perspective or point of view. He then uses this metaphor as a basis for the invention of 
his theory of the energy spectrum. The second metaphor, the quantum metaphor, 
however, seems to emerge naturally out of the invention of his theory. Indeed, for 
Planck, the notion that 'energy is discontinuous' is at best an unseen metaphor that he 
uses more as an obvious statement of fact rather than a claim that brings two concepts 
into contrast Let us look more closely at how each of these metaphors is used in 
Planck's argument. 
The Invention of the Argument 
In the last chapter, I suggested that new metaphors often urge scientists to 
embrace new ways of interpreting their physical and social situations, including natural 
Planck, "On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum" 84. 
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phenomena. When one comes across a metaphor, it urges one to hunt out the possible 
implications of the metaphoric contrast between the two or more concepts involved, 
seeking potential meanings within the immediate rhetorical situation. And yet, the 
metaphor itself only provides a perspective from which one can then develop an 
argument It is not the argument itself. Therefore, an interpreter uses the metaphor as 
the basis of an argument, allowing the metaphor to, as Rorty states, "change one's 
language and one's life... rather than systematize either."''^ 
In Planck's work, we see that he used his 'energy spectrum is an entropic 
phenomenon' metaphor as a basis for inventing the argument in his 1900 quantum 
paper. The metaphor created the perspective from which he reconceptualized and 
reinterpreted the black body problem; meanwhile it also established a contrastive 
relationship between the energy spectrum and entropy that contained likenesses he was 
urged to resolve. Therefore, Planck became the interpreter of a metaphor that he himself 
invented. Exploring the implications of the metaphor, he used it to recast die black body 
phenomenon into thermodynamic teims, showing how the likenesses between the 
energy spectrum and entropy led to a broader understanding of the black body 
phenomenon. This metaphor, however, was not a particularly new one for Planck by 
December 1900. For a few years he had already been using 'energy spectrum is an 
entropic phenomenon' to interpret the black body phenomenon. Indeed, many of his 
papers from 1897 to 1900 were developed through applications of concepts from 
thermodynamics, especially entropy, to explain the energy spectrum. During this time 
period, the metaphor urged Planck to embrace a quite different perspective toward the 
energy spectrum phenomenon than the perspectives with which other scientists 
Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others 13. 
96 
interpreted the black body phenomenon. Reflecting this difference in perspective 
between himself and other scientists, Planck writes in his autobiography, 
While a host of outstanding physicists worked on the problem of spectral 
energy distribution, both from the experimental and theoretical aspect, every 
one of them directed his efforts solely toward exhibiting the dependence of the 
intensity of the radiation on the temperature [using Maxwell's theories].... As 
the significance of the concept of entropy had not yet come to be fully 
appreciated, nobody paid any attention to the method adopted by me, and 1 
could work out my calculations completely at my leisure, with absolute 
thoroughness, without fear of interference or competition.''® 
His interpretation of this new metaphor urged him to approach the black body problem 
from a quite different perspective than Maxwell's theories of electromagnetism would 
have supported. Nevertheless, with each successful application of the metaphor toward 
interpreting the black body phenomenon from 1897 to 1900, he became further 
convinced of its usefulness. In a sense, it 'turned' his rational account {logos) of the 
black body phenomenon so that he began to conceptualize and talk about the energy 
spectrum quite differently than he had before. 
It was, however, only when he embraced the 'entropy is probabilistic' 
metaphor that he could then invent the argument in his December 1900 quantum paper. 
He had "until then not bothered about the connection between entropy and probability," 
but he found it to be the only way in which his October 1900 formula could account for 
the data offered by Rubens and Kurlbaum.''® This final turn was a crucial one, and a 
very difficult one for Planck to make. Convinced that his foitnula represented an 
48 Planck, Scientific Autobiography 38. 
Planck, Scientific Autobiography 37. 
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absolute, however, he used the 'entropy is probabilistic' metaphor to reinvent many his 
previous assumptions about black body radiation and even his beliefs about 
thermodynamics in general. In a letter, he wrote, 
I had been wrestling unsuccessfully for six years (since 1894) with the problem 
of equilibrium between radiation and matter and I knew that this problem was of 
fundamental importance to physics; I also knew the formula that expresses the 
energy distribution in normal spectra. A theoretical interpretation therefore had 
to be found at any cost, no matter how high... I was ready to sacrifice every 
one of my previous convictions about physical laws.^" 
In fact, this sacrifice of some of his dearest beliefs is exactly what happened when he 
adopted the perspective offered by Boltzmann's 'entropy is probabilistic' metaphor. 
Realizing that his own beliefs were not consistent with his formula, he came to see the 
situation from Boltzmann's point of view. By abandoning his own long-held beliefs 
about entropy and adopting Boltzmann's metaphorical relationship between entropy and 
probability, he could then invent a working argument that explained the energy 
spectrum. 
Indeed, throughout the short history of the development of his theory of the 
black body phenomenon, we observe that Planck reinterpreted and adapted his rational 
account {logos) in order to shape his explanations of the energy spectrum to fit his 
physical and social situation. The development of the theory itself was an effort that 
required him to be continually returning to the 'energy spectrum is an entropic 
phenomenon' metaphor for guidance, seeking out possible courses through which he 
could develop a working theory. In the early stages of his efforts, he applied his rather 
"classical" beliefs from thermodynamics—advocated by the broader scientific 
50 Planck letter to Robert Williams Wood. Quoted in Hermann, The Genesis of Quantum Theory 23. 
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community—toward reinterpreting the concept of the energy spectrum. But then in 
1900, when Rubens and Kurlbaum's new physical data called his original theories into 
question, he adapted his argument to his rhetorical situation by accepting Boltzmann's 
arguments for atomism and probability. Thus, he altered and shaped his beliefs 
throughout the invention process, maintaining the perspective offered by the metaphor 
while changing his previous beliefs in its wake. 
I find it interesting that there is little evidence that the metaphor 'energy 
spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' or 'entropy is probabilistic' themselves caused 
any sort of shift that one might call a change in Planck's "paradigm" or "schema." 
Rather, Planck gradually adjusted his beliefs, language, and understanding of the black 
body phenomenon, using these two metaphors to ultimately invent a theory that 
appropriately described the data available. Indeed, considering Planck's thorough 
background in thermodynamics, it would have been only natural that he would be 
inclined to mterpret most problems from a perspective offered by a theoretical context 
from thermodynamics. In fact, Planck's papers on black body radiation that preceded 
the 1900 quantum paper were all consistent with his overall rational account of nature in 
which his beliefs about thermodynamics played a significant role. Only in the final 
December 1900 paper did he show a significant change in beliefs by adopting 
Boltzmann's 'entropy is probabilistic' metaphor. However, even as he embraced 
Boltzmann's metaphor, he still preserved the greater body of his inteipretation of black 
body radiation and his beliefs about physics in general. Instead of a paradigm shift, I 
believe we observe in Planck's work a gradual change in his rational account {logos) of 
nature due to his interpretations of the metaphors, 'energy spectrum is an entropic 
phenomenon' and 'entropy is probabilistic.' This change was situated into a broader 
physical and social rhetorical context in which Planck was immersed. 
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In the case of the 'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' metaphor, I 
believe we see the way in which metaphors invite "turns' in scientists' rational accounts 
(logos) of nature and thus serve as the basis for the invention of scientific discourse. 
Each metaphor that Planck either created or accepted urged him to change his rational 
account and thus think and talk about the energy spectrum in a different way. The 
metaphorical relationship between the energy spectrum and entropy, therefore, became 
the basis of Planck's bgos of the black body radiation problem. The metaphor created a 
perspective that he accepted, and it formed die basis of invention for his 1900 quantum 
paper. 
The Emergence of a New Dominant Metaphor 
Perhaps of more interest—though less important to the invention of Planck's 
argument—the 'energy is discontinuous' metaphor plays a rather mai'ginal role in the 
1900 quantum paper. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this metaphor did not serve as the 
basis for the invendon of Planck's argument. If anydiing, the quantum metaphor 
emerged rather innocuously as a parenthetical outcome of the development of his theory 
of the energy spectrum. Nevertheless, the metaphor was created quite naturally because 
Planck had already embraced a point of view (Boltzmann's thermodynamics) that urged 
him to reinterpret many of his former beliefs into terms associated with atomism. 
Whether or not Planck realized the importance of his new metaphor is really 
unimportant and, frankly, not something we could determine anyway. What is 
important is that the metaphor emerged in a very clear and undeniable foi-m, because 
Planck's usage of the metaphor 'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon'—altered 
by Boltzmann's atomism—invited him to change his rational account of the black body 
phenomenon in a way that implied discontinuity. Indeed, his logos had been so 
'turned' by the central metaphor of his argument that the so-called quantum postulate 
must have seemed like a natural consequence of his overall argument. Planck, 
100 
therefore, more or less states 'energy is discontinuous' as an obvious fact, not a 
questionable assertion. 
As discussed in the last chapter, Bohm and Peat refer to this sort of creative act 
as the result of "metaphorical play" in which new metaphors, and thus new 
perspectives, are created when scientists bring different concepts into contrastive 
relationships.^' Bohm and Peat argue that these metaphorical relationships are the basis 
of creativity in science because metaphors emerge out of the activity of doing science 
itself. As such, without fanfare, Planck reinterpreted the meaning of 'energy' to be 
consistent with his changed logos, or rational account, of the black body phenomenon. 
While developing his argument, he reinvented the traditional "continuous" account of 
energy by associating energy with atomistic or discontinuous terms. Indeed, once he 
had accepted Boltzmann's atomistic thermodynamics, the discontinuous nature of 
energy probably seemed like an obvious consequence of his argument, not a radical 
new concept Therefore, the obviousness of the connection between energy and 
discontinuity is most likely the reason why Planck did not address this argument further 
in his December 14, 1900 paper. 
The reason I have singled this metaphor out for discussion, of course, is 
because it eventually became a dominant metaphor in modem physics, not because it is 
the focus of Planck's paper. In his argument, the quantum metaphor takes on an 
embryonic quality, almost unseen widiin the argument that Planck wanted to make. In 
Permanence and Change, Burke suggests that a metaphor has a way of "revealing 
hitherto unsuspected connectives" between concepts.^- Indeed, it appears as though 
Planck's interpretation of the metaphors 'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 48-52. 
52 Burke, Permanence and Change 90. 
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and 'entropy is probabilistic' urged the quantum metaphor forward as one of these 
"unsuspected connectives." It was after Einstein interpreted the quantum metaphor in 
Planck's 1900 quantum paper that it was initially used to develop a dramatically new 
way of conceptualizing reality. Two decades later, this metaphor could be considered 
the dominant metaphor of modem physics. In Planck's paper, however, the quantum 
metaphor plays only a marginal role. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have used metaphorical analysis to illustrate the emergence of 
the quantum hypothesis in Planck's 1900 quantum paper. We see that the interpretation 
of metaphors often urge a turn in one's rational account in subtle ways. Planck's 
'energy spectrum is an entropic phenomenon' metaphor urged him to propose the 
absurd, 'energy is discontinuous.' And, even he expressed a distaste for the 
discontinuity brought about by the quantum postulate. In 1915, he wrote to Paul 
Ehrenfest that "For my part, I hate discontinuity of energy even more than discontinuity 
of emission."53 
If so, how does conceptual change in science occur when one of the instigators 
of change does not recognize or even rejects the results of his arguments? Ironically, 
this situation occurs frequently in the history of science. One scientist develops a 
metaphor that other scientists interpret in new ways that might not have be apparent to 
the metaphor's originator. These other scientists then embrace the perspective urged by 
the new metaphor and begin to see known phenomena from a different point of view. 
In the case of the quantum metaphor, it was not noticed until 1905 and did not gain 
widespread recognition until 1908.^'' As we will see in the next chapter, Einstein 
Quoted in Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 158. 
Kuhn, Black-Body Theory and The Quantum Discontinuity 144. 
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interpreted the meaning of the quantum metaphor far more broadly that Planck would 
have anticipated. Einstein's interpretation of the quantum metaphor urged him to rethink 
his beliefs about light, thus creating the notion of "light quanta." Planck, ironically, 
became one of the most significant detractors of Einstein's new quantum interpretation 
of light. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METAPHOR AND INTERPRETATION: 
ALBERT EINSTEIN'S NEW PERSPECTIVE 
All these fifty years of conscious brooding have brought me no 
nearer to the answer to the question "What are light quanta?" 
Nowadays every Tom, Dick, and Harry thinks he knows it, but he 
is mistaken. 
Albert Einstein 
Though one might say that Planck developed the 'energy is discontinuous' 
metaphor, or 'energy quanta,' that became the centerpiece of the quantum theory, it was 
only when Einstein, an unknown patent clerk at the time, explored the likenesses and 
contrasts implied by the 'quantum' metaphor that it came into its own. Unlike Planck, 
Einstein imderstood that the quantum postulate need not be restricted to energy alone 
but could be used to interpret other phenomena.' In his "1905 light quanta" paper, 
"Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of 
Light,"2 Einstein wrote, "We wish to demonstrate in what follows that Planck's 
derivation of the elementary quanta is to a certain degree independent of his theory of 
'black radiation.'"^ Indeed, it is in this passage that we see one of the first, if not the 
first, unqualified expressions of a 'quantum' perspective of nature. Of Einstein's 1905 
light quanta paper, Kuhn writes "In a sense, it announces the birth of the quantum 
theory."'' 
' Jeremy Bernstein, Einstein (New York, Viking Press, 1973) 192. 
2 Albert Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of 
Light," Annalen der Physik 17 (1905): 132-148. Translation in H.A. Boorse and L. Motz, eds.. The 
World of the Atom (New York: Basic Books, 1966) 544-557. 
3 Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Light" 
547. 
Kuhn, Black Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 170. 
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Ironically, Planck, who was by then editor of Annalen der Physik in which the 
light quanta paper appeared, was unconvinced by Einstein's argument until years later. 
Even as late as 1913 in a recommendation for Einstein for membership in the Royal 
Prussian Academy of Sciences, Planck apologetically stated, "That he may sometimes 
have missed the target in his speculations, as, for example, in his hypothesis of light 
quanta, cannot really be held against him."^ Planck, as mentioned before, believed that 
the discontinuity implied by his quantum metaphor would prove to be a mathematical 
means to an end. He then spent years unsuccessfully attempting to reconcile it with 
classical physics. Einstein, however, embraced the concept of energy quanta with 
enthusiasm. He wrote to his friend Konrad Habicht in 1905, "I promise you four 
papers in exchange [for your thesis]... the first... is very revolutionary."® Interestingly, 
the 'revolutionary' paper he was referring to was his article on light quanta, not his 
famous article on special relativity that was also among these four.^ Published later in 
1905, the light quanta paper contained a rather novel explanation of electromagnetic 
radiation that inttoduced a 'corpuscular,' or quantum, interpretation of the behavior of 
light For much of his life, Einstein pondered the question of light quanta, and it was 
his work on light quanta and the "photoelectric effect" that won him the Nobel Piize in 
1922.8 
^ Quoted in Bernstein, A Comprehensible World 120. 
® Banesb Hoffiman, Albert Einstein: Creator and Rebel (New York, Plume, 1972). 
Hoffman, Albert Einstein: Creator and Rebel 43. 
8 Many people mistakenly assume that Einstein received the Nobel Prize for his theories of Relativity. 
He actually received it for his work on the Quantum Theory of Light. However, the circumstances 
surrounding the award were mysterious. Much has been made about the peculiarity of the 
announcement of the Nobel Prize for Einstein. The wording from the Nobel committee went as 
follows: The prize "is awarded to the person within the field of physics who has made the most 
important discovery or invention/to Albert Einstein being most highly deserving in the field of 
theoretical physics, particularly for his discovery of the law pertaining to the photoelectric effect." 
Quoted in Bernstein, -4 Comprehensible World. The photoelectric effect was a minor part of 
Einstein's body of work by 1922 which included all his great works on Relativity and Quantum 
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In this chapter, I will show how new metaphors in science urge scientists to 
reinterpret their beliefs and invent new arguments. When one analyzes the metaphors in 
Einstein's 1905 light quanta paper, it becomes obvious that he interpreted the 
implications of Planck's quantum metaphor far more broadly than Planck would have 
allowed. This act of interpreting the quantum metaphor, 'energy is discontinuous,' I 
will show, invited Einstein to change his perspective and come to see the phenomenon 
of light from a different point of view. In other words, the quantum metaphor urged a 
'tum' in Einstein's rational account in such a way that a belief in light quanta became 
for him a necessary consequence of Planck's metaphor. 
Rhetorical Situation 
The rhetorical situation of Einstein's brilliant scientific works of 1905 is 
probably best revealed by considering the young Einstein himself. His life is as 
paradoxical as his work. In 1905, after a few frustrating attempts to receive his 
doctorate, Einstein took a position as a 'Technical Expert" at the Swiss Patent Office in 
Bern. Though he had published a few interesting papers on statistical thermodynamics 
from 1902 to 1904, he was at age 26 an unknown in the field of physics who was 
unable to find an academic position. Einstein's understanding of physics was mostly 
self-taught, because he was unsatisfied by the content of his courses at the Zurich 
Polytechnic Institute. During this time, he began to study on his own the works of 
Maxwell, Mach, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Lorentz.' In doing so, he developed a great 
respect and mastery of Maxwell's equations and electromagnetic theory of light. Also, 
he was inspired by the statistical, or probabilistic, approach to thermodynamics that he 
Theories of Light. Some historians believe the committee decided that Einstein deserved the Prize 
for bis overall work but did not want to award it based on the still controversial theory of relativity. 
' Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 214. 
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had learned from reading Boltzmann's Gas Theory.Moreover, he strongly believed 
and advocated Mach's positivist empiricist philosophies of science which stressed the 
use of "observable" and non-metaphysical evidence to develop theories. 
Recognition of these important themes in Einstein's beliefs is critical, because it 
is sometimes hard to regard him as anyone other than the consummate theoretical 
physicist. But to gain an understanding of his early work, one should first recognize 
that his way of approaching physics changed dramatically over the course of his life. 
Holton, who is probably the most thorough historian of Einstein's work, claims that 
Einstein's life can be understood as "a pilgrimage from a philosophy of science in 
which sensationism and empiricism were at the center to one in which the basis was a 
rational realism."'• Indeed, as a young physicist in 1905, Einstein saw himself as an 
experimentalist and a strict empiricist who spumed any scientific argument not based on 
observables.'2 Only two decades later, though, Einstein's view of science was quite 
different. Illustrating this change, Werner Heisenberg recalled that in 1926 he 
mentioned to Einstein that all quantities should be defined as "observables," to which 
Einstein replied "But you don't seriously believe that none but observable magnitudes 
must go into a physical tiieory?" Taken aback by this renunciation of strict empiricism. 
Heisenberg then pointed out to Einstein that his tiieory of relativity—in which Einstein 
used a discussion of clocks and rods to redefine Newton's metaphysical definitions of 
absolute time and space—succeeded because it relied purely on obsei-vable means. To 
which an older Einstein replied, 
'0 M.J. Klein, "Thermodynamics in Einstein's Tliouglit," Science 157 (1967) 509-516. 
" Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 237. 
'2 Anton Reiser, Albert Einstein (New York: Boni, 1930) 52. 
107 
Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning but it is nonsense all tiie same... But 
on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable 
magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite happens. It is the theory which 
decides what we can observe. 
In 1905, Einstein would have probably replied to Heisenberg's assertion quite 
differently. At that time, he was highly persuaded by the positivist empiricist movement 
in German science, especially as expressed by Mach.''' In his Autobiographical Notes, 
Einstein reported that he was "profoundly influenced" by Mach's TTie Science of 
Mechanics (1897),'5 In this text, Mach offered a comprehensive tteatise on positivist 
empiricism that challenged Newton's Principia on philosophical grounds. Mach argued 
that all human comprehension of nature is based solely on sensations; therefore, 
'metaphysical' concepts such as absolute time and space needed to be eliminated from 
science, because they presumed incorrectly that a hidden reality exists beneath 
sensation.Because absolute time and space played a central role in Newton's 
theories, Mach disputed that mechanics must be the foundation of scientific knowledge 
as many nineteenth-century physicists assumed.'^ 
As a self-professed Machian himself, the younger Einstein was skeptical of 
what Mach often called "scientific dogma." He was therefore, both fascinated by and 
critical of Maxwell's theory of light Maxwell in the middle nineteenth-century had 
'3 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971) 63. 
Gerald Holton's brilliant essay "Mach, Einstein, and the Search for Reality" argues this point in 
great detail. See Helton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 237-277. 
Einstein, Autobiographical Notes (Lasaile, III.: Open Court, 1979) 21. 
Hoffinan, Albert Einstein: Creator and Rebel 78 
This summary is paraphrased from Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 239-240. 
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proven rather conclusively that light is an 'electromagnetic' wave that travels through an 
omnipresent medium called 'aether.''® His theories were especially important because 
he developed a set of equations that linked the disparate scientific studies of light, 
electricity, and magnetism into one unified theory of electromagnetism. By Einstein's 
day, physicists were as sure of Maxwell's theory of light as today's scientists are of the 
theory of relativity. Einstein, too, was convinced of the formulaic aspects of Maxwell's 
theories; but he was troubled by one aspect of Maxwell's theories that he could not 
resolve." He asked himself what a wave of light would look like if an observer were 
traveling alongside it at the speed of light. To such an observer, Einstein reasoned, the 
wave pattern of light would seem to disappear. The problem, as physicist Jeremy 
Bernstein writes, is that 
the Maxwell equations... do not provide for such a possibility, and hence either 
they must be wrong or it must not be possible for a material observer to move 
with the speed of light. From the point of view of classical physics either 
alternative seemed absurd.20 
Thus, through interpreting this simple thought experiment, Einstein concluded that 
there was something fundamentally wrong with Maxwell's wave theory of light, even 
if the equations at its core worked. Einstein resolved the speed of light issue in his 1905 
paper on special relativity—something we will not discuss here—but his 1905 light 
quanta paper was also developed in part to answer the question of what light "looks 
like" if it cannot be a wave. More than likely, the notion of 'light waves' in Maxwell's 
Gillespie, The Edge of Objectivity 473. The need for a medium like the aether was assumed because 
wave-like phenomena, like water-waves or sound, require some medium, like water or air, to carry 
them. It was assumed therefore, that light as a wave would have an almost undetectable medium in 
which it travelled. Einstein in is 1905 Special Relativity paper denied that an aether exists. 
Bernstein, Einstein 38. 
Bernstein, Einstein 38. 
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theories struck Einstein as yet another unobservable, metaphysical construct that went 
against Mach's empiricist principles. 
Nonetheless, the seemingly flawless success in application of Maxwell's 
equations had already conferred on them by 1905 the status of certainty in the scientific 
community. Even strict empiricists had been won over to Maxwell's theory when, in 
the 1880s, German physicist Heinrich Hertz confirmed Maxwell's equations—and by 
association his theory—by generating electromagnetic radio waves and showing that 
they quantifiably exhibited the wave-like behavior specified by Maxwell.^' However, 
as Hertz was conducting his experiments to confirm electromagnetic waves, he 
identified a strange, unexplainable phenomenon that soon became known as the 
'photoelectric effect.' Put simply, the photoelectric effect occurs when light suikes a 
metal surface, inducing what are now called 'electrons' to be emitted from the metal. 
By itself, die photoelectric effect did not call Maxwell's theory of light into question, 
but attempts to explain it through wave function equations continued to fail. In 1902, 
Philipp Lenard added to the mystery by showing that the velocity of the electrons 
released from the metal did not depend on the intensity of the light, only on its 
frequency (color).22 Lenard's results seemed to contradict Maxwell's theories, which 
suggested that light of more intensity (more waves and thus more energy) should cause 
each electron to be emitted at a higher velocity. Moreover, the frequency of the light, 
according to Maxwell's theories, should not have been relevant to the velocity of the 
electrons at all. Against all expectations, Lenard showed that frequency was relevant 
and intensity was not. When Einstein's 1905 light quanta paper is analyzed later in this 
chapter, we will return to the photoelectric effect. 
Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity 493-494. 
22 Friedrich Hund, The History of Quantum Theory (London: Harrap, 1974) 43. 
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Finally, despite Mach's polemics against atomism, Einstein was persuaded by 
the statistical thermodynamics of Boltzmann in which atomism played a prominent part. 
Kuhn writes that "Einstein... began instead to develop a statistical thermodynamics 
applicable not only to gases, the main concern of earlier workers, but to other states of 
aggregation as well."23 By 1905, he had published three papers on statistical 
thermodynamics in which he enhanced Boltzmann's probabilistic theories of 
phenomena at the molecular level. During this period, he began to view matter as 
essentially atomistic, and in 1905 Einstein published his theory of "Brownian motion" 
which offered some of the first phenomenological evidence for die existence of atoms 
and molecules. Of Einstein's work in thermodynamics, Kuhn writes. 
That Einstein nevertheless felt the need to go farther is an example of his 
extraordinary ability to discover and explore problematic interrelationships 
between what otiiers took to be merely factual generalizations about natural 
phenomena.''' 
The same could also be said of all three of Einstein's 1905 papers. 
To sum up at this point, it is important to recognize a few important contextual 
themes in Einstein's early work. First, he preferred to develop his arguments through 
'observable' means of measurement rather than metaphysical ones. For example, his 
use of clocks and rods to discuss time and space were attempts to employ only 
observable means of measurement that avoided Newton's metaphysical understandings 
of absolute time and space. Second, all his arguments were grounded on the results of 
empirical 'events' or experiments, real or conceptual, rather than on scientific laws or 
principles.25 This Machian focus on observable evidence often encouraged him to 
23 Kuhn, Black Body Radiation and Quantum Discontinuity 171. 
2"* Kuhn, Black Body Radiation and Quantum Discontinuity 176. 
25 Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 242. 
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challenge "dogmatic" theoretical frameworks with little hesitation, especially theories 
that relied on metaphysical constructs like those of Newton and Maxwell. Third, he 
was persuaded by atomic theories of matter, and, like Planck, accepted Boltzmann's 
thermodynamics. This background in statistical thermodynamics would have made 
Planck's 1900 quantum paper readable and of particular interest to Einstein. Finally, as 
a young, little-known physicist, he showed a cavalier attitude toward scientific 
formalism and was eager to apply new and untested beliefs to long-studied phenomena. 
This willingness and abiUty to transgress scientific orthodoxy showed up consistently 
in his reinterpretations of basic concepts from physics (e.g. time, space, simultaneity, 
light) that were assumed to have formal, stable, and seemingly unquestionable 
meanings. 
Einstein's 1905 Light Quanta Paper 
Einstein's interpretation and expression of Planck's quantum metaphor in the 
1905 light quanta paper, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and 
Transformation of Light," reflects many of the contextual themes just discussed. The 
paper itself is perhaps best known for two reasons. First, it introduced the concept of 
'light quanta,' which later took on the label 'photons.' Second, it offered an 
explanation of the photoelectric effect that eventually won Einstein his Nobel Prize. 
More important, though, the paper interpreted Planck's concept of 'energy quanta' in a 
way that offered a fundamental challenge to Maxwell's theory of electromagnetic 
radiation. The paper also illustrated the first use of the quantum metaphor to describe a 
phenomena other than black body radiation, suggesting that the quantum metaphor 
could be used to interpret other aspects of nature. 
As in the introductions of his other famous 1905 papers on relativity and 
Brownian motion, Einstein begins his light quanta paper by calling the readers' 
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attention to a conflict or incongruity in the body of scientific beliefs.^^ Einstein writes, 
"There is a profound formal difference between the theoretical representations of gases 
and other ponderable bodies which physicists have constructed and Maxwell's theoiy 
of electromagnetic processes in so-called empty space."^^ The incongruity Einstein 
identifies is the difference between the 'discontinuous' theories of particles (gas 
molecules, atoms, electrons) and 'continuous' theories of waves (light, x-rays, 
aether). In other words, Einstein points out that particle descriptions of gases, 
represented by atomic thermodynamics, are conceptually incompatible with the wave 
descriptions of electromagnetic radiation, represented by Maxwell's equations of light. 
In making this seemingly obvious distinction for his readers, Einstein simply 
restates the contrastive relationship between electromagnetism and thermodynamics that 
was originally created by Planck's 1900 metaphor 'energy spectrum is an entrcpic 
phenomenon.' Unlike Planck, though, Einstein more critically explores the implications 
of this metaphoric relationship by stressing the fundamental differences between 
continuous (electromagnetism) and discontinuous (thermodynamics) accounts of 
phenomena. Specifically, he points out that in theories of electromagnetism, or light, 
"energy must be considered a continuous spatial function.''^^ In other words, as a 
wave-like phenomenon, light must distribute its energy "continuously throughout an 
ever-increasing volume of space."^® Quite the opposite, Einstein points out, a volume 
of particles—say a confined group of gas molecules—has a collective energy that "can 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 193. 
Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Liaht" 
544. 
Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Light" 
544. 
29 Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Light" 
544. 
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bieak up into arbitrarily many, arbitrarily small parts.''^" Therefore, unlike light, a 
system of particles distributes energy discontinuously in space. 
Essentially, by developing this simple but fundamental contrast, Einstein points 
out to the readers that energy takes on two seemingly contradictory meanings 'energy is 
continuous' and 'energy is discontinuous' that depend on whether one is talking about 
the energy of waves or the energy of particles. In other words, Einstein illustrates for 
his readers that the meaning of energy is supported by two irreconcilable metaphors: 
either 'energy is continuous' as in a wave or 'energy is discontinuous' as in a system of 
particles. Indeed, these paradoxical meanings for 'energy,' identified by Einstein, are 
significant because they suggest completely opposite interpretations of nature that posit 
either continuity or discontinuity. By stressing the opposition between these two 
"heurisdc points of view," Einstein draws the readers into his argument by illustrating 
the paradoxical meaning of energy in rather simple terms. This approach was common 
to all three of Einstein's major 1905 papers. Holton writes, "Each begins with a 
statement of formal asymmetries or other incongruities of a predominantly aesthetic 
nature (rather than, for example, a puzzle posed by unexplained experimental facts)."^' 
Interestingly, the asymmetry or incongruity that Einstein addresses in the 1905 light 
quanta paper is quite simply brought about by his recognition that physics community 
relies on two incompatible metaphors (continuous and discontinuous) to describe the 
energy phenomenon. 
Having established an intriguing problem in physics, at the end of his 
introduction to the 1905 light quanta paper Einstein identifies the problem he will 
address in the rest of the article. He writes, 
Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Lisht" 
544. 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 193. 
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in spite of the complete experimental verification of the theory of diffraction, 
reflection, refraction, dispersion, and so on, that the theory of light that operates 
with continuous spatial functions may lead to contradictions with observations 
if we apply it to the phenomena of the generation and transformation of light.^-
In other words, Einstein suggests to his readers that, despite the success of Maxwell's 
wave theory of light, in some cases they contradict experimental observations. To solve 
this problem, Einstein then develops a new metaphor, 'light is quantized,' that he 
believes will resolve the contradictions between theory and experiment. He writes, 
It appears to me, in fact, that the observations on "black-body radiation," 
photoluminescence, the generation of cathode rays with ultraviolet radiation [the 
photoelectric effect], and other groups of phenomena related to the generation 
and transformation of light can be understood better on the assumption that 
energy in light is distributed discontinuously in space. According to the 
presently proposed assumption the energy in a beam of light emanating from a 
point source is not distributed continuously over larger and larger volumes of 
space, which move without subdividing and which are absorbed and emitted 
only as units [Italics mine].^^ 
In this passage, Einstein clearly states for his readers the basis of his new "heuristic 
point of view" concerning light. Though he does not mention Planck at this point, 
Einstein employs Planck's 'energy is discontinuous' metaphor and suggests that one 
can then use it to explain light in discontinuous terms. Indeed, with little hesitation, 
Einstein in this passage suggests that if one accepts Planck's quantum metaphor, then 
32 Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about liie Creation and Transformation of Light" 
544-545. 
Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Transformation of Liaht" 
545. 
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one is urged to also accept the notion that light is discontinuous, or quantized. In 
making this claim, he clearly interprets Planck's quantum metaphor more broadly and 
uses it as a focal point of his argument. Whereas Planck may not have fully considered 
the implications of his claim that energy is made up of "a very definite number of equal 
parts," Einstein sees it as a starting place for reinterpreting phenomena associated with 
energy. Or, in other words, the metaphor 'energy is discontinuous' serves as the basis 
of invention for Einstein's argument concerning the behavior of light. 
Einstein begins the body of his paper by stating rather directly that "We wish to 
demonstrate in what follows that Planck's derivation of the elemental^ quanta is to a 
certain degree independent of his theory of 'black radiation."'3'' To prove to his readers 
that the concept of quanta is independent of black body radiation, Einstein uses 
Planck's notion of energy quanta to calculate the mass of a hydrogen atom—a 
seemingly unrelated phenomenon to black body radiation. It is here where he most 
clearly signals his willingness interpret the quantum metaphor beyond the limited role 
that it played in Planck's paper. Einstein uses his calculation of the mass of the 
hydrogen atom to disassociate the quantum metaphor from Planck's explanation of die 
black body phenomenon. This strategy is important because it then allows Einstein to 
suggest to his readers that the quantum metaphor creates a new point of view that is 
independent of Planck's argument, thus opening the door for applications to other 
phenomena. 
Securing the independence of the quantum metaphor, Einstein then goes on to 
argue that Planck's application of concepts from Boltzmann's statistical 
thermodynamics to explain the energy spectrum calls for a redefinition of light into 
atomistic terms. He argues that in order for Planck's formula to legitimately use 
Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about tlie Creation and Transformation of Liaht" 
547. 
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concepts from thermodynamics, light would need to be treated as a gas-like entity made 
up of individual particles. Einstein writes, 'The entropy of monochromatic radiation 
[light] of sufficiently small density varies with volume like the entropy of an ideal 
gas."35 Or, to generalize, Einstein here implies that Planck's quantum metaphor 
suggests that light is made up of particles. Therefore, the entropy of a quantity of light, 
made up of light quanta, varies much like the entropy of a quantity of ideal gas, made 
up of atoms. Indeed, this implication was one that Planck only indirecdy recognized in 
his 1900 quantum paper. Planck had implied that the use of Boltzmann's 
thermodynamics suggested that energy must be viewed as discontinuous, but for some 
reason he was not prepared to see energy fully in discrete terms. As such, the idea that 
the energy spectrum was made up of small corpuscles of light, not waves, was 
completely foreign to Planck. 
Let us regroup at this point. In the body of his paper, Einstein pursues two 
rhetorical strategies in which metaphors play a central role in inventing his argument. 
First, he shows that Planck's metaphor, 'energy is discontinuous,' can be applied to 
areas of physics other than studies of black body radiation. Planck's quantum 
metaphor, therefore, forms the basis of the invention of Einstein's new 'heuristic point 
of view' concerning light. Einstein's second strategy is more subtle, but it affirms his 
reinterpretation of the meaning of light. He points out that one cannot use beliefs—as 
Planck had—from atomistic thermodynamics without also accepting the broader set of 
beliefs that go along with them. By using Boltzmann's formulas to solve the black 
body radiation problem, Planck had implied that the radiation or light that made up the 
energy spectrum must be redefined in particle terms. Einstein merely points out this fact 
and uses it as further evidence that his light quanta argument is valid. Planck certainly 
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never expected this application of his new quantum metaphor; but as Burke says, "the 
metaphor always has about it precisely this revealing of hitherto unsuspected 
connectives." Einstein's light quanta metaphor is the result of one of these unsuspected 
connectives. His light quanta hypothesis suggests that light is corpuscular, like atoms, 
rather than strictly wave-like. Indeed, it is at diis point that Einstein interprets Planck's 
quantum metaphor far beyond its usage in the 1900 quantum paper. 
Late in the paper, after reviewing Boltzmann's relation of probability and 
entropy (as developed by Planck), Einstein directly applies formulas from 
thermodynamics to light, illustrating the corpuscular nature of light. He finalizes his 
argument by writing, 
Monochromatic radiation [light]... behaves in thermodynamic theoretical 
relationships as though it consisted of distinct independent energy quanta of 
magnitude (Rp/N)V.... If then as far as the dependence of entropy on volume 
goes, monochromatic radiation (of sufficiently small density) behaves like a 
discontinuous medium consisting of energy quanta of magnitude (Rp/N)V.36 
[My Note; The relation (Rp/N)V is equivalent to Planck's hV.] 
These statements dramatically draw Einstein's two rhetorical strategies togeUier by 
redefining light according to Planck's metaphor, 'energy is discontinuous,' and 
Boltzmann's theories of particle-like ideal gases. This rhetorical move is decisive 
because Einstein shows that if one accepts the perspective created by Planck's quantum 
metaphor, then one must also accept a new metaphor, "light is quantized." This point is 
basically the core of Einstein's argument. 
The remainder of Einstein's 1905 paper on light is devoted to three 'obsei-vable' 
applications of his light quanta metaphor to phenomena that resisted explanation by 
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Maxwell's classical theories. The most important of these three is the explanation of the 
photoelectric effect As explained earlier in this chapter, the mystery surrounding the 
photoelectric effect was why frequency (color) and not intensity was related to the 
velocity of an electron emitted from a metal. Einstein's reinvention of light into 
quantum terms, however, described this phenomenon easily. He writes, "The simplest 
explanation is that a quantum transfers all its energy to a single electron."^^ In other 
words, Einstein reasoned that light strikes the metallic surface in particle-like energy 
"bundles" (hV), either knocking the electron out of the metal or reflecting harmlessly 
away. A light quanta of low frequency, therefore, would not have enough energy to 
knock out an electron and thus would bounce off the metal (e = hV). Einstein's 
explanation also showed why higher intensities of light kick out more electrons rather 
tiian electrons at higher and higher velocity. Higher intensity means more photons are 
kicking out individual electrons at specific quantum levels of velocity. 
Employing his new metaphor 'light is quantized' to invent an explanation of the 
photoelectric effect, Einstein attempts to prove to his readers through 'obseivable' or 
empirical means that his new point of view is appropriate to the behavior of light in 
nature. For a scientist, Einstein's explanation of the photoelectric effect through the 
light quanta metaphor is surprisingly simple and seemingly plausible; yet it offers a 
description of the photoelectric effect that was unacceptable to Maxwell's theory of 
light. Indeed, because it violated Maxwell's theories, Planck and other scientists of his 
day thought Einstein had gone off in the wrong direction by arguing that light could be 
considered discontinuous. Kuhn claims that "for the entire period between their 
introduction in 1905 and the discovery of the Compton effect in 1922, very few 
theoretical physicists besides Einstein himself believed that light-particles provided a 
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basis for serious research."'® Ironically, throughout his life, Einstein considered the 
concept light quanta, or photons, to be one of his greatest scientific accomplishments. 
Einstein's New "Heuristic Point of View" 
Einstein's interpretation of Planck's 'energy is discontinuous' metaphor more 
or less formed the basis of invention for his 1905 paper in which he reconceptualized 
light into discontinuous, or quantum, terms. Interpretation, as Davidson points out, is 
what gives meaning to metaphors. To summarize, Davidson states, "[A metaphor's] 
interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator.... the act of 
interpretation is itself a work of the imagination."^^ indeed, Davidson suggests that "a 
metaphor makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, 
between two or more things."^ But, as he also claims, a metaphor does not contain 
some special meaning or insight that somehow transcends or gets 'outside' literal 
language. Rather, as Davidson notes, "the sentences in which metaphors occur are true 
or false in the normal, literal sense, for if the words in them don't have special 
meanings, sentences don't have special truth."'*i Essentially, therefore, the meaning of 
a metaphor is dependent on the interpretation of the listener or reader, not on an 
"interaction" or "ontological flash" that delivers special meaning or insight. Or, as 
Davidson states, "Generally, it is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we 
accept it as a metaphor and start to hunt out the hidden implications."''^ So, considering 
the importance of continuity to classical physics, the association of 'energy' with 
Kuhn, Black Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 182. 
39 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 29. 
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'discontinuity' in Planck's 1900 quantum paper would more than likely have first 
struck Einstein as false in Davidson's sense. However, given the supportive role that 
the quantum metaphor played in Planck's black body argument, Einstein, as an 
interpreter of the text, might have been urged to work through the implications of the 
contrast the quantum metaphor created between energy and discontinuity. Seeing the 
value of the quantum metaphor, Einstein eventually embraced his interpretation of its 
meaning and thus came to view 'light,' an energy-related phenomenon, from a quite 
different perspective. 
Much in this way, a scientific metaphor can go beyond its originator's intent or 
even understanding. As an interpreter of the quantum metaphor, Einstein was entitled to 
search out the "hidden implications" of the metaphor from his own rational account 
(logos) of reality. In essence, the act of interpreting the metaphor itself urged him to 
adopt a different point of view, or perspective, that wairanted a reshaping of his 
previous beliefs to fit the point of view the quantum metaphor suggested. For Einstein, 
unlike Planck, the quantum metaphor implied a fundamental discontinuity in energy-
related phenomena that went far beyond the domain of the black body problem. Indeed, 
Davidson seems to suggest that this crossing of domains is a common feature of 
metaphors. As Davidson notes. 
But in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and much 
of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character. When we 117 
to say what a metaphor "means," we soon realize there is no end to what we 
want to mention.''^ 
And indeed, the 1905 light quanta paper illustrates that Einstein quite cleai'ly inteipreted 
the meaning of the quantum metaphor far more broadly than Planck would have 
Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean" 44. 
121 
accepted. Einstein turned from a passive acceptance of a classical description of 'energy 
as continuous' to a more unorthodox description in which energy was held to be 
discontinuous. In doing so, he opened the door to a fundamental rethinking of energy-
related phenomena into concepts associated with discontinuity. 
It is important, though, to recognize that the quantum metaphor by itself does 
not contain some discovered truth or fact that Planck stumbled across and Einstein 
happened to recognize. Rather, when Einstein came upon the metaphor, his 
interpretation urged him to more or less adopt a new point of view concerning energy 
that cohered with many of his other beliefs, especially atomism and statistical 
thermodynamics. Therefore, when he interpreted the metaphor, 'energy is 
discontinuous,' Einstein searched out its implications through other concepts that were 
already part of his rational account (logos) of reality. Specifically, as someone 
interested in atomism, thermodynamics, and empirical research, Einstein interpreted the 
metaphor by conceptualizing it into his broader understanding of discrete paiticles and 
empirical observations of the discontinuous nature of energy. Thus, for Einstein, the 
quantum metaphor became a guiding, or emergent, metaphor that invited to him rethink 
many of his previous beliefs about continuity in nature, especially concerning light. The 
act of interpreting the metaphor urged him to see things from a different perspective. 
Or, to put it another way, it 'turned' his rational account (logos) in such a way that he 
interpreted energy-related phenomena differentiy than he did before. 
Indeed, the "emergent" metaphors 'energy is discontinuous' and 'light is 
quantized' formed the basis of invention for various parts of Einstein's light quanta 
argument Whereas Planck had invented his argument from a perspective offered by tlie 
'energy spectrum is an en tropic phenomenon' metaphor, Einstein centered the 'energy 
is discontinuous' metaphor that was a parenthetical feature of Planck's argument in the 
1900 quantum paper. Through his inteipretation of this metaphor and the point of view 
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this interpretation offered, he could then invent a new description of light that was 
consistent with this 'energy quanta' metaphor. In other words, the two metaphors 
'energy is discontinuous' and 'light is quantized' offered a consistent perspective, or 
"heuristic point of view" as Einstein called it, from which he could then invent a 
coherent argument for light quanta. Indeed, once he had shown that Planck's constant h 
could be viewed as "independent" of the black body theory, he could then proceed to 
use the implications of die quantum metaphor to reinterpret light into discontinuous or 
atomistic terms. Moreover, in the last part of the paper, he used the idea of 'light 
quanta' to invent a description of the photoelectric effect, illustrating how his 'light is 
quantized' metaphor allowed him to offer a description of the light phenomenon that 
succeeded where continuous, or wave, theories of light seemed to fail. 
Interestingly, though, Einstein did not seek to disprove the continuous 
description in the 1905 light quanta paper. Instead, he merely suggested that 
experimental observations of energy and light often led to contradictions with 
Maxwell's wave theories. But, to Einstein, the potentially flawed or incomplete status 
of Maxwell's theories probably in some measure justified an attempt to explain light 
from a new point of view. Once he had embraced a new "quantum" perspective, the 
quantum metaphor itself formed the basis for what could be held to be rational, logical, 
or true. As such, the 'logic' of the quantum metaphor removed the ambiguities from 
explaining light in discontinuous terms. Nevertheless—and I think this is a cmcial 
point—Einstein did not attempt to discredit or reconcile wave theory of light with his 
own quantum theory of light. In fact, he wrote rather clearly that "the wave theory... 
has proved to be correct in representing purely optical phenomena and will probably not 
be replaced by any other theory."'''' At first, this quote is puzzling, because it seems to 
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suggest that light is a wave in some situations and a particle in other situations. No 
doubt, this inconsistency was one of the reason's Einstein's theory was dismissed by 
people like Planck. Einstein, however, seemed to believe that he was offering a new 
"heuristic point of view" for light and not a comprehensive theory. Later, in 1909, he 
was to return to his light quanta hypothesis and try to reconcile the wave and particle 
descriptions of light. We will discuss this attempt in a moment. 
If my understanding of Einstein's interpretation and usage of the quantum 
metaphor is correct, then his invention strategy for the 1905 light quanta argument 
becomes rather clear. The inability of Maxwell's wave theory of light to completely 
explain light suggested to Einstein that theories based on the assumption that energy 
and light are continuous were flawed or incomplete. Reflecting this conclusion, 
Einstein stated in his introduction, "the theory of light that operates with continuous 
spatial functions may lead to contradictions with observation if we apply it to the 
phenomena of the generation and transformation of light.'"'^ Since for the young 
Einstein, the real priority was to explain phenomena empirically, he was willing to 
skeptically question theories if such a challenge might lead to a more accurate account 
of a phenomenon. For this reason, like Planck, he was willing to employ concepts 
from thermodynamics, like atomism and enu-opy, to explain the behavior of light even 
though the connection between electromagnetism and thermodynamics was not 
obvious. To head off his readers' doubts about his application of the quantum 
metaphor, however, Einstein argued for the independent status of Planck's 
constant h.'^^ In doing so, he created rhetorically an either/or choice for his audience 
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between the notion of an elementary quanta and a seemingly flawed or incomplete wave 
theory of light. So when, later in the paper, Einstein offered plausible descriptions of 
three different light-related phenomena using his concept of light quanta, it probably 
seemed as though his results justified his unorthodox conclusions even though they 
challenged the completeness of Maxwell's theories. 
Conflicting Dominant Metaphors 
The discussion brings me to an issue on which I will conclude. If Einstein's 
light quanta hypothesis is held to be an obvious truth by today's scientists, why did the 
physicists of Einstein's day reject it for almost two decades? Interestingly, acceptance 
of the quantum postulate (e=hV) alone was not a direct prerequisite for acceptance of 
the concept of light quanta. Otherwise, the Einstein's theory of light quanta would have 
been embraced somewhere around 1913 when the quantum theory took center stage in 
the scientific community. However, until 1922, as Kuhn points out, Einstein was one 
of very few scientists who believed in light quanta. 
One could point to a few historical factors that might have impeded acceptance 
of Einstein's argument—like World War I or the fact that Einstein was an unknown 
patent clerk in Bern until 1908—but I believe much of our answer can be found in 
Einstein's 1905 light quanta paper itself. In the introduction, Einstein suggests that tlie 
wave theory of light will never be replaced.'*^ And yet, the remainder of his paper treats 
light as essentially discontinuous and particle-like, not explaining how the wave-like 
features of light fit into his new "heuristic point of view" concerning light. Indeed, by 
the end of the paper, it seems as though Einstein is pursuing a particle or quantum 
theory of electromagnetism in which the wave-like behavior of light is presumed to fit 
into a broader corpuscular interpretation. I imagine most physicists would have found 
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his argument for light quanta difficult to accept because his evidence for a corpuscular 
theory was not weU-established.'^® First, his use of the quantum metaphor would have 
been questionable to his readers. To many physicists, it was at best a minor ad hoc 
constant that filled a gap in Planck's formula for the energy spectrum.''^ Second, in 
spite of the success of his light quanta hypothesis toward explaining the photoelectiic 
effect and two other scientific anomalies, the overwhelming body of empirical evidence 
favored Maxwell's wave theories. Indeed, even the measurements of the photoelectric 
effect were rather imprecise, leaving the question open as to whether Maxwell's 
tiieories eventually would explain it^o 
Most importantly, though, in this 1905 light quanta paper, Einstein knowingly 
or unknowingly discerns a future aspect of quantum mechanics that would change 
physics completely—the wave-particle duality of light. In 1909, Einstein returned to his 
studies on light and argued that electromagnetic radiation exhibits both wave-like and 
particle-like behavior. He reported, 
I already attempted earlier to show Uiat our current foundations of the radiation 
formula have to be abandoned... It is my opinion that the next phase in die 
development of theoretical physics will bring us a theoi^ of light that can be 
interpreted as a kind of fusion of the wave and the [particle] theory... [The] 
wave structure and [the] quantum structure... are not to be considered mutually 
incompatible.^' 
Kubn, Black Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 195, 200, 222. 
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Einstein believed in 1909 that at some point the wave and particle theories of light 
would be reconciled into one theory^t the time, though, he did not realize the full 
significance of this duality. It was in 1923, when Louis de Broglie published his 
argument for the wave properties of matter that the importance of the wave-particle 
duality was more fully understood. In many ways, de Broglie's explanation of matter 
through Einstein's understanding of the of wave-particle duality of light led to the 
development of quantum mechanics. 
Indeed, the problem with Einstein's 1905 light quanta paper is that it seems to 
support two fundamentally different interpretations of light based on two seemingly 
contradictory dominant metaphors in physics. The first metaphor, 'light is a wave,' 
urges one to view light as essentially continuous. The second metaphor, 'light is 
quanta,' on the other hand, urges a discontinuous (particle) interpretation of light. For 
the most part, these two interpretations of the light phenomenon are completely at odds 
with each other and seem to contradict. Few physicists would have given up the highly 
successful perspective offered by the 'light is a wave' metaphor for 'light is quanta' 
based on Einstein's rather questionable argument. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that Einstein's 1905 light quanta paper for the first time brings continuous (wave) and 
discontinuous (particle) interpretations of reality into direct contrast. In doing so, 
Einstein set two competing dominant metaphors from classical physics into direct 
conflict. According to classical physics, one of these two metaphors would eventually 
overcome the other. But, as Niels Bohr pointed out in 1927 in the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, both perspectives of reality are necessaiy to gain a 
comprehensive view of the behavior of matter and light. I will analyze Bohr's argument 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NIELS BOHR AND THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION: 
NEW METAPHORS FOR A QUANTUM REALITY 
Tbis violent reaction on the recent development of modem physics 
can only be understood when one realizes that here the foundations 
of physics have started moving; and that this motion has caused the 
feeling that the ground would be cut from science. At the same 
time, it probably means that one has not yet found the correct 
language with which to speak about the new situation. 
Werner Heisenberg 
If one wanted to identify to a specific time when a new scientific metaphor 
became a prominent feature of the body of scientific beliefs, the introduction of the 
'quantum theory of the atom' in 1913 would be a solid candidate. In 1913, a young 
Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, introduced many members of the scientific community to 
the 'energy is quantized' metaphor by offering a nuclear description of the atom that 
employed quantum relations.' The 'Bohr atom' itself was quite simple. It proposed that 
electrons orbit in discrete stationary states around the nucleus of an atom. Electrons 
then jump closer or further away from the nucleus in discrete 'quantum jumps' from 
orbit to orbit. Each jump, Bohr argued, would then be accompanied by the emission or 
absorption of radiation in the form of a quantum unit of energy, hV. Bohr's atom 
became the centerpiece of what is now often called the "old" quantum theory, and it 
convinced many physicists that Planck's 'energy is discontinuous,' once considered an 
ad hoc assertion, provided a promising perspective from which to invent new theories 
of atomic phenomena. By the early 1920s, however, Bohr's quantum theory of the 
atom, which Einstein called the "highest form of musicality in the sphere of thought," 
seemed to be reaching the limits of its ability to account for atomic phenomena.^ 
' Niels Bohr, "On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules," Philosophical Magazine 26 (1913): 1-
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Historian Abraham Pais writes, "It had become increasingly obvious that all was far 
from well in physics.... the Bohr-Sommerfleld quantum rules appeared quite often to 
be highly successful, yet, in a deep sense, they were paradoxical, as Bohr well knew."^ 
It was an older Bohr in 1927 who set out to explain these paradoxes in the form 
of the "Copenhagen interpretation" of the quantum theory. With the Copenhagen 
interpretation, Bohr and a group of physicists that included Werner Heisenberg, 
Wolfgang Pauli, and Max Bom offered the first comprehensive account of the quantum 
theory that finally broke ties with classical physics. In this chapter, I will analyze 
Bohr's 1927 speech, "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic 
Theory,"'' in which he introduced the Copenhagen interpretation. Using metaphorical 
analysis, I will illustrate how Bohr introduced the metaphors 'reality is complementaiy' 
and 'physics is uncertain' into physics and used them to couple two dominant 
metaphors from classical physics (i.e. wave and particle interpretations) into a 
dramatically new interpretation of reality.^ Also, I will show how Bohr used the new 
perspective offered by the 'complementarity' and 'uncertainty' metaphors to challenge 
fundamental tenets of classical physics like causality, objectivity, and certainty. Finally, 
I will illustrate how he offered these new metaphors as the basis of invention for 
descriptions and theories in quantum mechanics. 
Rhetorical Situation 
In the spring of 1926, the physics community faced a dilemma. Two 
profoundly different theories of quantum physics had emerged that offered seemingly 
^ Pais, Neils Bohr's Times 269. 
Reprinted in Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
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contradictory interpretations of reality. ITie first, matrix mechanics, was introduced in 
the summer of 1925 by Heisenberg. Stressing a particle-based understanding of matter, 
matrix mechanics preserved implicitly the metaphor 'energy is discontinuous' that had 
become an accepted part of quantum theory since Bohr's 1913 quantum theory of the 
atom. Indeed, by 1925, many other phenomena had been reinterpreted into "quantum" 
terms, so one might even say that the broader metaphor 'nature is discontinuous' better 
represented the quantum metaphor. The second theory, wave mechanics, was 
introduced by Erwin Schrodinger in the spring of 1926. To physicists' surprise, it 
appeared to reclaim the concept of continuity from classical physics by asserting that 
matter is completely made up of bundles of "matter waves." The fundamental 
differences between tiiese two theories were evident in their mathematics. Matrix 
mechanics relied on an algebraic approach tiiat emphasized quantum discreteness. Wave 
mechanics, on the other hand, used differential calculus to develop continuous wave 
functions, thereby stressing continuity.® Thus, the greatly different mathematics on 
which both theories were based seemed to lead to two irreconcilable perspectives from 
which to interpret reality. Further complicating the dilemma, in the summer of 1926 
Schrodinger showed that his wave mechanics and Heisenberg's matrix mechanics 
offered essentially identical results despite their fundamental conceptual differences. 
Though matrix mechanics offered highly accurate descriptions of phenomena at 
the atomic level, Schrodinger's wave mechanics was gratefully welcomed by the 
physics community. Wave mechanics avoided the tedious matrix algebra of 
Heisenberg's theories by employing more familiar methods that used differential 
equations.' Indeed, many physicists thought Schrodinger's dieoiy of wave mechanics 
® Max Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1966) 271-272. 
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was a form of a deliverance because they could then avoid learning the complicated 
matrix mathematics.® More important, though, for many physicists, wave mechanics 
strongly indicated that the quantum theory's reliance on discontinuity might eventually 
prove to be wrong. Historian Max Jammer writes "Those who in their yearning for 
continuity hated to renounce the classical maxim natura nonfacit saltus acclaimed 
Schrodinger as the herald of a new dawn."® Einstein, who had grown less satisfied 
with the notion of discontinuity in any absolute sense, wrote to Schrodinger on April 
26,1926, "I am convinced that you have made a decisive advance with your 
formulation of the quantum condition, just as I am equally convinced that the 
Heisenberg-Bom route is off the track."'o 
Thus, the physics community found itself at an impasse, because matrix and 
wave mechanics suggested profoundly different ways of describing quantum reality 
that nevertheless led to the same results. Matrix mechanics implied that reality was 
essentially discontinuous, continuing in the tradition of the "old" quantum theory." 
Stressing this discontinuous nature of phenomena, Heisenberg's arguments for matrix 
mechanics showed that one could describe particles, specifically electrons, in terms of 
matrices of momentum and position. The rows and columns of the matrices were 
believed to actually correspond to the discrete energy states in which particles would be 
found." Schrodinger's arguments for wave mechanics, however, suggested that waves 
are the substance of matter, and that particles are merely stable aggregates of waves. In 
® Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 43. 
® Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics 271. 
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other words, wave mechanics assumed that particles, such as electrons, are made up of 
linear harmonic oscillator wavefunctions.'^ Schrodinger wrote, "Our wave packet holds 
permanently together, does not expand over an ever greater domain in the course of 
time,"'3 Moreover, Schrodinger believed that the wave nature of matter in his theories 
would eventually expose quantum theory to be a new development in the tradition of 
classical physics. If so, he argued, the discontinuity observed by in atomic phenomena 
would be due to a finite number of discrete nodes in the matter waves, similar to the 
nodes in a vibrating string.'"* 
By late 1926, the advocates of matrix mechanics and wave mechanics had both 
set about attempting either to prove the other side wrong or to reconcile the other theory 
into their own. The major figures of the scientific community divided into two rather 
clear factions. Heisenberg, Pauli, Bom, and Paul Dirac became the advocates for 
matrix mechanic's discontinuous description of reality. Schrodinger, Einstein, Planck, 
and de Broglie argued for the continuous description supported by wave mechanics. 
Conspicuously undecided, Bohr offered numerous criticisms of Heisenberg's matrix 
mechanics, but also did not accept Schrodinger's continuum assertions either. At some 
points, the debate grew somewhat bad-tempered with Schrodinger stating publicly in 
response to Heisenberg's theory "I was discouraged if not repelled." Heisenberg, 
responding to Schrodinger's theory, wrote to Pauli, "The more I ponder about the 
physical part of Schrodinger's theoiy, the more disgusting it appears to me."'^ 
•2 Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 285. 
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Despite the bad feelings between both factions, however, by the summer of 
1926, it seemed as though an answer were possible. The most significant attempt to 
reconcile matrix mechanics and wave mechanics was made by Bom. Though an 
advocate of quantum discontinuity, he began publishing papers on wave mechanics in 
which he argued that the waves in Schrodinger's theories were actually "probability 
waves" rather than matter waves. Bom claimed that one could only find the position of 
a discontinuous particle by using Schrodinger's wave formulas to calculate the 
probability that it would appear in a specific place in a wave function. Historian Pais 
suggests that Bom developed his concept of probability waves after reading an 
unpublished work in which Einstein claimed that light quanta move in a 'ghost field' 
that determines the probability that it will follow a particular path."^ Seeming to confirm 
Pais' suggestion. Bom stated in his Nobel speech. 
Again an idea of Einstein's gave me the lead. He had tried to make die duality of 
particles—light quanta or photons—and waves comprehensible by interpreting 
die square of the optical wave amplitudes as probability density of the 
occurrence of photons. This concept could at once be carried over to the 
[Schrodinger] \|/-function: l\|/|2 ought to represent the probability density for 
electrons (or other particles)." 
Essentially, then. Bom showed that Schrodinger's equation still could lead to a 
discontinuous, particle-based interpretation of nature. However, in order for his 
'probability wave' theory to work. Bom realized that he needed to reinterpret other 
aspects of physics. His arguments for probability waves, he claimed, also challenged 
classical notions of causality and determinism. He argued that 
Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 287. 
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In the first place it is clear that the dualism, wave-corpuscle, and the 
indeterminateness essentially involved therein, compel us to abandon any 
attempt to set up a deterministic theory. The law of causality, according to 
which the course of events in an isolated system is completely determined by 
the state of the system at time t = 0, loses its validity, at any rate in the sense of 
classical physics.'^ 
Supporters of wave mechanics like Einstein, Schrodinger, and Planck adamandy 
rejected the indeterminism and acausality of Bom's dieory. In a December 4,1926 
letter to Bom conceming probabilistic wave mechanics, Einstein wrote rather 
guardedly: 
Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is 
not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us closer 
to the secrets of the 'old one.' I, at any rate, am convinced that He is not 
playing at dice.'^ 
Later, Einstein became the most ardent and formidable critic of theories that adopted 
views in which probability played an important role, especially the Copenhagen 
interpretation. Schrodinger and Planck also never accepted the abandonment by 
quantum mechanics of determinism and causality. 
Originally, Bohr kept his distance from the debate between matiix and wave 
mechanics, working mainly through his protdg^s, like Heisenberg, Pauli, and Dirac, at 
the Copenhagen Institute. By the winter of 1926, however, he and the other members 
of the Copenhagen school began working toward a new comprehensive theory of 
Max Bom, "Wave Corpuscles," eds., H. Boorse, and L. Moiz (New York: Basic Books, 1966): 
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quantum mechanics. Several challenges faced Bohr and the members of his institute at 
Copenhagen. First, they needed to resolve the notion of 'indeterminacy' in Bom's 
theory of probability waves. Indeed, Bom's arguments for statistical interpretations of 
wave mechanics became a central feature of the Copenhagen Institute's understanding 
of quantum mechanics.^" Another challenge was the growing sense that somehow both 
matrix and wave mechanics offered equivalent but wholly independent ways to talk 
about reality. Physicists observed that electrons—the common object of study at this 
time—could behave as waves and particles; however, electrons did not exhibit both 
wave and particle properties at the same time. Indeed, physicists found it a'oubling that 
the wave and particle properties electrons exhibited seemed to depend primarily on how 
physicists chose to observe them. Electrons could exhibit the diffraction pattern 
commonly associated with particles or the interference pattern typically associated with 
wave. However, electrons could not exhibit both diffraction and interference patterns 
simultaneously. Paradoxically, electrons seemed to show the same ineconcilable 
particle-wave duality that Einstein had ascribed to light in 1905 and later in 1909. 
Bohr's 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation Lecture 
Holton writes that Bohr's 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation lecture "marked a 
turning point in the road from which our view of the intellectual landscape, in science 
and other fields, will forever be qualitatively different from that of earlier periods."-' 
Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of this lecture to the development of 
quantum mechanics and modem physics in general. In essence, it introduced what 
Bohr called "a general point of view" from which physicists could interpret natural 
phenomena in way diat was dramatically different than that offered by classical 
Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 288-289. 
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physics.22 As a result, Bohr's Copenhagen Interpretation lecture initiated a large-scale 
change in the way physicists conceptualize reality. 
The organization of Bohr's lecture can be broken down into three main parts 
that I will use to structure my analysis. In the first part, Bohr begins with a short 
introduction in which he states his purpose in broad terms. In the second part, he uses 
the quantum metaphor, 'nature is discontinuous,' to invent and introduce the concept of 
'complementarity,' a central feature of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. In this part of his argument, he also uses the quantum metaphor to argue 
that the "point of view" created by the quantum theory and complementaiity implicitly 
undermines classical physics' reliance on 'causality,' 'objectivity,' and 'certainty.' And 
in the final part, Bohr employs the concept of complementarity to invent explanations of 
several important paradoxes facing quantum mechanics. In this last part, he also 
introduces a new interpretation of 'uncertainty' in physics and then uses it to redefine 
the nature of inquiry in physics, namely measurement and prediction, into ternis that are 
appropriate to a "complementary" theory of reality. In this analysis of Bohr's lecture, I 
will specifically concentrate on how Bohr inU-oduces complementarity as a new 
dominant metaphor for quantum mechanics and then uses this metaphor as the basis of 
invention for the rest of his argument in which he describes reality and the discipline of 
physics from a radical new perspective. 
Introduction 
The inttoduction of the lecture conceals its important purpose. Bohr explains 
that he had been asked to offer "an account of the present state of die quantum 
theory."23 Alluding to a "remarkable recent development," he hints that his original 
purpose has changed when he suggests that 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 52. 
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I shall try, by making use only of simple considerations, and without going into 
any details, of technical mathematical character, to describe to you a certain 
general point of view... which I hope will be helpful in order to harmonize the 
apparently conflicting views taken from different scientists.^'' 
This disarming remark understates the formidable purpose that Bohr had set out for 
himself. However, he hints at the significance of his "general point of view" when he 
states at the end of the introduction, "We have perhaps more occasion than ever at eveiy 
step to be remindful of the work of the old masters who have prepared the ground and 
furnished us with our tools.''^^ 
Nature is Complementary 
The body of Bohr's paper begins by calling attention to a fundamental 
difference between the quantum theory and descriptions of reality developed by 
classical physics. Bohr writes, "The quantum theory is characterized by the 
acknowledgment of a fundamental limitation in the classical physical ideas when 
applied to atomic phenomena."^^ Bohr explains that the differences between the 
quantum theory and classical theories of physics are brought about because the 
quantum postulate at the core of quantum descriptions of reality violates tiie basic ideals 
of classical physics. Reinforcing this point, he states that the quantum theory's 
essence may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes 
to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or ratiier individuality, 
completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck's 
quantum of action.^' 
2'' Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 52. 
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In making this statement, Bohr reiterates the dominant 'quantum' metaphor that had 
served as the basis for the invention of arguments in the "old" quantum theory from 
1905 to 1926. It is noteworthy, though, that only two decades after the novel usage of 
the quantum metaphor in Einstein's 1905 paper, Bohr employs the quantum metaphor 
with absolute confidence as though it were a matter of common knowledge. Indeed, for 
Bohr and a great majority of his audience, the quantum metaphor, had become a 
dominant metaphor in their rational accounts (logoi) of phenomena at the atomic level. 
As a dominant metaphor, therefore, the quantum metaphor offered a more or less 
similar perspective from which Bohr and his audience interpreted, talked about, and 
conceptualized reality at the atomic level. By reiterating the metaphor itself, he seems to 
stress that the point of view it offers has led to success in spite of its violation of the 
classical theories. 
Despite the success of the quantum theory, though, Bohr goes on to claim diat 
the introduction of the quantum postulate has created a problematic "situation... of a 
peculiar nature, since our interpretation of the experimental material rests essentially on 
classical concepts."28 In other words, Bohr seems to suggest that the cunent lack of 
"harmony" in physics has developed because the point of view urged by the quantum 
theory seems to conflict with concepts retained from classical physics diat were being 
used to describe the behavior of natural phenomena. Essentially, Bohr points out to his 
audience that the physics community has been interpreting and explaining phenomena 
from two very different "points of view" or perspectives that are in conflict with each 
other. The first perspective, urged by the quantum metaphor, 'nature is discontinuous,' 
suggests that reality is essentially quantized, thus violating the notion of a continuum in 
classical physics. However, as Bohr points out, the second perspective—that of 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 53. 
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classical physics and the continuum—had become so ingrained in the concepts 
physicists use to describe phenomena that theories and descriptions invented through 
the quantum metaphor seem to contain "peculiarities." 
In making this distinction between the "classical" and "quantum" points of 
view, Bohr suggests that there is a fundamental difference between classical and 
quantum interpretations of reality that must be resolved. Bohr, then, identifies what he 
believes is the conflict's source, and he offers a solution. He states, 
[The quantum postulate] implies a renunciation as regards the causal time-space 
co-ordination of atomic processes. Indeed, our usual description of physical 
phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be 
observed without disturbing them appreciably 
In other words, Bohr claims that the quantum postulate urges a renunciation of the 
traditional notion of "causality" in physics. In making this claim, Bohr identifies for his 
audience the essential distinction between the quantum and classical "points of view." 
Classical physics relies on the notion that "changes in state" at the atomic level behave 
in a strictiy causal way; whereas, in quantum physics, causality, at least in the classical 
sense, is not a required feature of atomic description.^o Bohr points out, however, that 
the "usual" descriptions of phenomena rely on the presumption of causality to develop 
so-called "objective" and "certain" accounts of reality in which the experimenter is 
assumed to be completely separate from the observed phenomenon. 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 53. 
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In essence, Bohr illustrates that the differing perspectives of the quantum theory 
and classical physics are based on two different dominant metaphors that are essentially 
incompatible: quantum theory relies on the dominant metaphor 'nature is discontinuous' 
while classical physics relies on the dominant metaphor 'nature is causal.' Recognizing 
that the perspectives offered by these two metaphors are incompatible, Bohr claims that 
acceptance of the perspective urged by the quantum metaphor implies that one should 
then renounce the classical perspective in which 'causal' interpretations of phenomena 
are overwhelmingly dominant. Interestingly, though, Bohr does not challenge the 
concept of causality in classical physics by arguing against it directly. Rather, he 
attempts to show that its renunciation is a rational implication of the quantum postulate 
itself. He states. 
Now, the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena 
will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. 
Accordingly an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be 
ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.^! 
Furthermore, he states, "If in order to make observation possible we permit certain 
interactions with suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to the system, an 
unambiguous definition of the state of the system is no longer possible."^^ jn making 
these claims, Bohr suggests that the quantum postulate implies that two fundamental 
ideals of physics, "independent observation" (objectivity) and "unambiguous 
definition" (certainty), are ultimately unfounded. If so, Bohr claims, "there can be no 
question of causality in the normal sense of the word."^^ Therefore, Bohr's challenges 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 54. 
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the notion of causality in physics by suggesting that two of its most important 
implications, objectivity and certainty, are untenable. Moreover, he seems to be 
suggesting at this point in the lecture that if one can show that objectivity and certainty 
are unfounded, then the classical notion of causality too is impossible to defend. 
Needless to say, Bohr's argument early in the body of his lecture is extremely 
complex, but I believe his claims become more accessible when viewed metaphorically. 
Bohr exposes two tenets of classical physics, 'objectivity' and 'certainty,' to be 
essentially metaphors that urge physicists to develop 'causal' descriptions of reality. As 
dominant metaphors of classical physics, objectivity ('physics is objective') and 
certainty ('physics is certain') urge physicists to conceive of their relationship to 
phenomena from a particular point of view in which causality is a dominant feature of 
any description of nature. Bohr suggests that the "point of view" offered by the 
quantum metaphor invalidates these two metaphors, 'physics is objective' and 'physics 
is certain,' and thus also challenges the 'nature is causal' metaphor that foms the basis 
of classical interpretations of reality. To support his assertions, Bohr points out that the 
quantum metaphor implies, as stated above, that "any observation of atomic phenomena 
will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected;" thus the 
quantum metaphor discredits any attempt to interpret phenomena from an "objective 
point of view."^'' Also, because these interactions will always disturb the phenomenon 
being observed, the quantum metaphor implies that "an unambiguous definition of tiie 
state of the system is no longer possible," denying physics will ever be "certain."^^ 
Therefore, he suggests Uiat tiie inability of physicists to be 'objective' or 'certain' in tlie 
classical sense implies a renunciation of the causal understanding of reality itself. In 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 54. 
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other words, he argues that how one interprets the behavior of 'natural phenomena' is 
dramatically changed by the acceptance of the quantum metaphor. From the perspective 
urged by the quantum metaphor, natural phenomena cannot be properly interpreted as 
causal, and physicists, as agents, must be inevitably understood to be a part of the 
phenomenon they are studying. 
Having renounced classical understandings of causality, objectivity, and 
certainty as untenable in the quantum theory, Bohr then turns to the solution that he 
believes will quiet the disharmony in physics. He states, 
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space-time 
co-ordination [meaning: particle behavior] and the clami of causality [meaning: 
wave behavior], the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as 
complementary but exclusive features of the description... Indeed, in the 
description of atomic phenomena, the quantum postulate presents us with the 
task of developing a "complementarity" theory.^^ 
Interestingly, Bohr does not suggest that the quantum metaphor, 'nature is 
discontinuous,' should replace the dominant metaphor of classical physics 'nature is 
causal.' Rather, he introduces a new dominant metaphor for quantum mechanics that he 
claims is brought about by the nature of the quantum theory itself. In the passage 
above, the metaphor Bohr introduces to serve as the basis of quantum mechanics is 
'nature is complementary.' Put concisely, the concept of "complementarity" in quantum 
mechanics suggests that if physicists observe one feature of a phenomena (e.g. its 
particle-like properties) another feature will be excluded from being observed (e.g. its 
wave-like properties). However, both of these 'complementary' accounts are necessary 
Bohr, Atonuc Theory and The Description of Nature 55. The bracketed text in this quote is taken 
from Pais' Niels Bohr's Times 315.1 believe it is helpful toward understanding what Bohr is 
ccHnparing. 
142 
to develop the broader explanation of a particular phenomenon. For the most part, Bohr 
argues that interpreting nature in 'complementary' terms urges physicists to 
dramatically change the way they describe phenomena, because it suggests that reality 
is essentially pluralistic. By introducing the notion of complementarity into physics, 
Bohr suggests that in quantum mechanics, unlike in classical physics, a clear 
description of a phenomenon does not rely on, as Holton writes, "simplification and 
reduction to a single, directly comprehensible model, but an exhaustive overlay of 
different descriptions that incorporate apparently contradictory notions."^'' The 
implications of the 'nature is complementary' metaphor, therefore, suggest that the 
wholeness of nature can only be characterized through antithetical points of view. Also, 
complementarity denies that one absolutely true description is possible; instead, 
physicists need to invent theories in which complementary points of view are used 
describe a particular phenomenon.^® 
Essentially, by developing the concept of complementarity, Bohr broadly 
interprets and then generalizes the wave-particle dualistic nature of phenomena that 
Einstein first illustrated in the behavior of light in his 1905 and 1909 papers on light 
quanta. Unlike Einstein, though, Bohr suggests that the wave-particle dualism itself is a 
aspect of nature that physicists need to embrace. He states, "The two views of the 
nature of light are rather to be considered as different attempts at an interpretation of 
experimental evidence in which the limits of the classical concepts is expressed in 
complementary ways."^' Likewise, Bohr argues, matter is subject to complementarity. 
He notes, 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 102. 
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we have consequently in the question of the nature of matter... to face an 
inevitable dilemma which has to be regarded as the very expression of 
experimental evidence. In fact, here again we are not dealing with contradictory 
but with complementary pictures of phenomena.'*® 
Indeed, for Bohr, 'nature is complementary' becomes die dominant metaphor of 
quantum mechanics, urging physicists to interpret and conceptualize reality in a 
pluralistic way that is very different than classical physics. Moreover, the 
complementarity metaphor serves as the basis of the "generalized point of view" that 
Bohr mentioned in the intt-oduction to the lecture. 
Later in his lecture, Bohr uses the complementarity metaphor to invent a 
comprehensive interpretation of quantum mechanics in which matrix mechanics and 
wave mechanics are understood to be complementary to one another. Bohr writes 
the two formulations of the interaction problem might be said to be 
complementary in the same sense as the wave and particle idea in the description 
of the free individuals. The apparent contrast in the utilization of the energy 
concept in the two theories is just connected witii this difference in the starting-
point.''^ 
Indeed, this coupling of matrix mechanics and wave mechanics into a "complementary" 
theory of quantum mechanics is the most important conclusion of the 1927 Copenhagen 
Interpretation lecture. In making this claim, Bohr argues that the wave-paiticle duality 
of phenomena is a prevailing feature of reality that resists any attempts to reconcile one 
interpretation of a particular phenomena into the other.''^ 
'•0 Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 56. 
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Physics is Uncertain 
In the remainder of the 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation lecture, Bohr explores 
the implications of the complementarity metaphor for his audience and illustrates the 
"generalized point of view" the metaphor offers. One of the most striking implications, 
Bohr points out, is that if 'nature is complementary' then the study of physics will 
ultimately be always "uncertain." Thus, he argues, physics will need to rely on 
statistical interpretations that always calculate "probabilities" or "possibilities," not 
certainties. He explains this point in the following passage: 
It must not be forgotten, however, that in classical theories any succeeding 
observation permits a prediction of future events with ever-increasing accuracy, 
because it improves our knowledge of the initial state of the system. According 
to the quantum theoiy, just the impossibility of neglecting the interaction with 
the agency of measurement means that every new observation inuoduces a new 
uncontrollable element... it must be realized that we are dealing with an 
abstraction, from which not unambiguous information concerning the previous 
or future behavior of the individual can be obtained. 
The "uncontrollable element" Bohr identifies is brought about by the fundamental role 
that complementarity plays in quantum mechanics. Whereas the dominant metaphor 
'nature is causal' from classical physics urges one to assume that physics is ideally 
'objective' or 'certain,' the dominant metaphor 'nature is complementary' of quantum 
mechanics urges one to assume that physics is inevitably 'uncertain' and thus reliant on 
statistical descriptions of reality. 
As such, Bohr argues, an unambiguous description of reality is impossible to 
attain in quantum mechanics. Bohr argues that the 'uncertain' nature of quantum 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 67-68. 
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mechanics is brought out "most strikingly" in the "uncertainty relations" that had been 
developed by Heisenberg earlier in 1927. To illustrate, Bohr starts out by deriving 
Heisenberg's formulaic representation of the uncertainty relation."*^ 
ApAq ^ h and AEAt ^  h 
Ap is the uncertainty of knowing position 
Aq is the uncertainty of knowing momentum 
AE is the uncertainty of knowing the energy 
At is the uncertainty of knowing the time duration 
h is Planck's constant 
Bohr points out that these formulas essentially set a limit on physicists' abilities to 
measure a particular phenomenon, because they establish what physicists can and 
cannot observe.''^ The formulas prescribe that if one knows the exact position of a 
particle (uncertainty (Aq) = 0), then the uncertainty of knowing the momentum of the 
particle goes to infinity (Ap = ») and vice versa. In other words, the closer physicists 
come to measuring the position of an object, the less certain they can be about its 
momentum; and, the closer they come to measuring its momentum, the less certain they 
can be about its position. Pagels writes. 
What the Heisenberg uncertainty relation asserts is that it is impossible to build 
an apparatus for which the uncertainties so calculated, over a lai'ge series of 
measurements, fail to obey the requirement that the product of uncertainties, 
(Ap) X (Aq), is greater than or equal to Planck's constant h.''^ 
The uncertainty relation, as Bohr points out, illustrates the complementai-y nature of 
quantum mechanics because one cannot know an object's position and momentum 
simultaneously, thus leading to 'uncertainty' that can be addressed only through 
statistics. Pauli, who was instrumental in developing the uncertainty relations, 
^ Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 58-59. 
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described the uncertainty relations best when he wrote, "One can look at the world with 
the p-eye and one can look at it with the q-eye but when one would like to open both 
eyes, one gets dizzy."'*' 
Using the complementarity metaphor to invent a description of Heisenberg's 
uncertainty relation, Bohr more or less creates another new metaphor, 'physics is 
uncertain' to replace the metaphors 'physics is certain' and 'physics is objective' that 
relied on the classical concept of causality. As a metaphor, the uncertainty relation 
introduces to descriptions of phenomena a fundamental indeterminacy that suggests that 
the classical ideals of 'certainty' or 'objectivity' in physics ai'e unattainable. Bohr points 
out that it was often assumed in classical physics that one could, given a 'certain' set of 
measurements, determine unambiguous information concerning the previous or future 
behavior of an object''® In quantum mechanics, however, the interaction of the agent 
with the phenomenon inevitably changes the state of the system. Therefore, one of the 
implications of this 'uncertainty' metaphor—a critical one for physics—is that 
observers cannot be independent of phenomena, or objective, because their attempt to 
observe an aspect of a phenomenon (e.g. its momentum or position) unavoidably 
changes the state of the system.''^ In other words, the 'interaction' of the observer with 
the observed is unavoidable, and as Bohr says, "our knowledge of the position after 
observation nevertheless will be affected by an uncertainty.''^^ Indeed, Bohr points out 
that reconceiving physics as uncertain or indeterminate redefines the relationship of 
'•7 Quoted in Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 304. 
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physicists and their experimental apparatus with phenomena.^' Holton illustrates this 
result of quantum mechanics when he writes, 
When you ask, "What is light?" the answer is: the observer, his various pieces 
and types of equipment, his experiments, his theories and models of 
interpretation, and whatever it may be that fills an otherwise empty room when 
the'light bulb is allowed to keep on burning. All this, together, is light.^' 
Moreover, Nobel physicist Pagels writes that "the Copenhagen interpretation maintains 
that if we look closely at the world—at the level of atoms—then its actual state of 
existence depends in part on how we choose to observe it and what we choose to 
see."^3 
To sum up at this point, in his 1927 Copenhagen interpretation lecture Bohr 
introduces a new dominant metaphor, 'nature is complementary' to succeed the 
dominant metaphor of classical physics 'nature is causal.' As a dominant metaphor, 
complementarity becomes the basis of invention for the remainder of Bohr's argument 
and, later, arguments in quantum mechanics. In the last parts of his lecture, Bohr 
illustrates the value of the complementarity metaphor by using it to invent explanations 
of several stubborn theoretical paradoxes—most notably Heisenberg's uncertainty 
relations and the wave-particle duality of light and matter—that had been tormenting the 
discipline of physics. Bohr also argues that a renunciation of causality from classical 
physics also urges a renunciation of classical notions of objectivity and certainty that are 
brought about by a causal point of view. Instead, Bohr claims, in quantum mechanics, 
one should develop explanations of phenomena in terms of a second new metaphor, 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 67. 
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'physics is uncertain,' leaving aside classical notions of objectivity, certainty, and 
causality. 
Renouncing Classical Physics 
With little doubt, Bohr's argument in the 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation 
lecture was extremely complex. Moreover, understanding the lecture itself was not 
aided by Bohr's infamous ability to make his lectures confusing. After hearing Bohr 
repeat the Copenhagen Interpretation lecture at the 1927 Solvay conference, Paul 
Ehrenfest, while enthusiastic about Bohr's argument, wrote back to his graduate 
students, "Once again that awful Bohr incantation terminology. Impossible for anybody 
else to summarize."^'* Much of Bohr's career after 1927 was spent claiifying and 
deepening the somewhat unfmished understanding of complementarity he offered in the 
Copenhagen Interpretation lecture. 
Despite its complexity, however, I believe in Bohr's lecture we witness clearly 
the introduction of a new dominant metaphor, 'nature is complementary' that still more 
or less forms the basis of invention for arguments in quantum mechanics. Moreover, 
we witness the introduction of 'complementarity' as a metaphor that Bohr believed 
would create a "general point of view" through which the discipline of physics itself 
could be successfully reconceptualized. Dominant metaphors, as discussed in chapter 
two, shape the way scientists interpret and discourse about natural phenomena. Indeed, 
as Burke asks in Permanence and Change, "are we not coming to see that whole works 
of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than the patient repetition, in 
aU its ramifications of a fertile metaphor?"^^ Dominant metaphors—"fertile metaphors" 
as Burke calls them—seem to offer enduring perspectives that guide not only how one 
Quoted in Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 312. 
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talks about nature but also how one interprets and conceptualizes reality. Or, as Lakoff 
and Johnson suggests, these metaphors are ones "we live by," organizing and shaping 
the beliefs of a community while inviting various interpreters to view situations from 
similar perspectives. These metaphors become so ingrained in the way humans live 
their lives that they, as Lakoff and Johnson claim, "structure how we perceive, how we 
think, and what we do,"^® Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson note that some dominant 
metaphors become such an integral part of a culture that they shape thought and speech 
"in ways we are hardly ever conscious of."^' Indeed, in science, some metaphors like 
'nature is a machine,' 'nature is an organism,' 'nature is God's divine creation,' ov 
'nature is evolutionary' take on this dominant role, guiding the way whole schools or 
scientific movements conceptualize reality and invent theories to explain nature. 
By developing complementarity as a new dominant metaphor for quantum 
mechanics in his 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation lecture, Bohr more or less challenged 
the rational basis of physics itself. To most Western physicists, at least since Aristotle's 
time, nature was assumed to be a monolithic whole that ultimately engendered "one" 
absolute truth. Therefore, Aristotle and generations of natural philosophers and 
scientists after him presumed there to be only one correct lexicon for describing, 
knowing, and conceptualizing nature.^^ Others lexicons thus were assumed to be 
distorted, flawed, or somehow inaccurate because they did not perfectly reflect the 
certain truth that lay hidden beneath the movements of nature. So, Bohr's suggestion 
that reality not only could be described in contradictory ways but also must be 
described in contradictory ways was quite novel. In a sense, the notion that 'nature is 
56 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 4. 
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complementary' challenged the rationality of classical physics at a core level by 
suggesting that one absolute description of nature was ultimately unattainable. 
Consequently, Bohr argued, opposing, or complementary, descriptions of reality 
needed to be inevitably brought into antitiietical relationships to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of nature. 
Interestingly, Bohr suggested that complementarity was wananted by the 
"nature of the quantum theory" itself.^® Recognizing the importance of the recurring 
paradoxes created by the quantum theory, Bohr interpreted the contrastive features of 
his rhetorical situation and created a metaphor to address them. Specifically, the 
complementarity metaphor was a broader interpretation of Einstein's and de Broglie's 
claims that light and matter exhibit a dualistic behavior that exhibits both wave-like 
qualities and particle-like qualities. Einstein and de Broglie assumed, however, that 
these frustrating paradoxes would ultimately be resolved in favor of a synergy of both 
interpretations. Quite differendy, Bohr came to interpret this wave-particle duality as 
"complementary" and thus, to use Rorty's phrase, the new metaphor developed into "a 
call to change one's language and one's life, rather than a proposal about how to 
systematize either."®® Once he embraced the perspective offered by the metaphor, Bohr 
was then able to reinterpret his beliefs about quantum physics from a quite different 
point of view that was completely foreign to classical physics. 
What makes Bohr's invention of the complementarity metaphor unique is that 
he essentially couples dominant metaphors from classical physics and then uses this 
coupling to invent an argument that challenges classical physics itself. Whereas in 
classical physics only one "absolute" or "final" description would have been acceptable. 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 55. 
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Bohr suggested that physicists can legitimately view phenomena (i.e. light, electrons) 
as "waves" or "particles" despite the fact that these opposing descriptions of reality— 
invented through the metaphors 'light/electron is a wave' or iight/electron is a 
particle'—^inevitably exclude each other. Therefore, neither description can be folded 
into the other to invent one final description of a particular event. Bohr argued that the 
quantum postulate itself enforces this pluralistic interpretation of reality by creating a 
"peculiar indeterminacy" that neither description of a phenomenon alone can resolve. 
Essentially, each complementary metaphor urges a different interpretation of reality that 
complements but also excludes the other. Nevertheless, both points of view (wave and 
particle) are needed to develop a broader rational account (logos) of the behavior of 
nature. Indeed, each perspective can be seen as an individual logos of its own that only 
offers a partial interpretation of the entire situation. Complementary scientific metaphors 
encourage different perspectives, leading to paradoxical interpretations of the behavior 
of a phenomenon. 
The metaphor 'nature is complementary,' therefore, invited Bohr and other 
physicists to radically change the point of view from they interpreted their experiences 
with reality. Complementarity urged tiiem to invent their descriptions of phenomena 
and theories through the tacit assumption that reality is ultimately paradoxical and 
antithetical. This change in perspective was no doubt a significant one, but, as Bohr 
claimed, the notion of complementarity was ultimately one of the broader implications 
the quantum metaphor, 'nature is discontinuous,' itself. He points out that the quantum 
postulate "is completely foreign to the classical theories," hinting that the lack of 
harmony in the physics community was due to a fundamental conflict between the 
perspectives urged by the quantum metaphor and the basic concepts that guided 
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classical descriptions of nature.6' In a sense, this large assertion, one that die majority 
of his audience probably accepted, implied that the basis of classical physics was 
somehow incomplete or even flawed because it was incapable of explaining the 
paradoxes of quantum physics. So, by the time Bohr announced rather directly that 
"this [quantum] postulate implies a renunciation as regards the causal space-time co­
ordination of atomic processes,he had already established a basis from which the 
idea, even the necessity, of this sort of complete renovation became an avenue worth 
considering. 
Bohr then used this new complementarity metaphor to invent the argument in 
the 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation lecture, thus urging a dislodging of the basis of 
classical physics itself. Recognizing that classical ideals of objectivity and certainty 
were no longer tenable from the perspective offered by the notion that 'nature is 
complementarity,' he could then replace them with the idea that 'physics is uncertain.' 
Moreover, the classical notion that nature is stricdy 'causal' then became suspect in 
descriptions of atomic phenomena. In quantum physics, Bohr argued, paradox and 
uncertainty became expected features of reality. If anything, Bohr seemed to suggest, 
the complementarity metaphor offered a final 'turn' in which the basis of classical 
physics was at last abandoned in favor of a new complementary theory of quantum 
mechanics. The metaphor urged physicists to renounce classical concerns about 
causality, objectivity, and certainty that made the quantum theory seem peculiar. 
Meanwhile, the complementarity metaphor offered an alternative point of view from 
which to reconceive reality and the relationship of physicists to that reality. Indeed, 
Bohr saw the complementarity metaphor as only a starting place from which the 
Toulmin, Human Understanding 53. 
Bohr, Atomic Theory and The Description of Nature 53. 
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broader theory of quantum mechanics could then evolve. Essentially, Bohr's 
complementarity metaphor became the basis of invention for arguments in quantum 
mechanics. 
I believe Bohr deliberately introduced the complementarity metaphor, 'nature is 
complementary' as a dominant metaphor to serve as the basis of a "general point of 
view," or perspective, that he believed would harmonize the discipline of physics. As 
he fully recognized, though, the general point of view brought about by the 
complementarity metaphor called for a large-scale reconceptualization of nature and the 
discipline of physics. Even Bohr realized that his argument in the 1927 Copenhagen 
Interpretation lecture offered only the first crude steps toward a comprehensive 
interpretation of reality through quantum mechanics. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have used metaphorical analysis to illuminate the emergence of 
two profound metaphors, 'nature is complementary' and the subsequent 'physics is 
uncertain,' that form the basis of quantum mechanics. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the implications of these metaphors are still a matter of some debate 
among scientists and philosophers. As one might expect, the dramatic conceptual 
change urged by these metaphors led to a great amount of resistance in the scientific 
community. Einstein immediately saw the implications of complementarity and reacted 
in a way that was uncharacteristically hostile. He wrote to Schrodinger on 
May 31, 1928: 
The Heisenberg-Bohr tranquilizing philosophy—or religion?—is so delicately 
contrived that, for the time being, it provides a gentle pillow for the true believer 
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from which he cannot very easily be aroused. So let him lie there... But this 
religion has so damned little effect on me.^^ 
Like many physicists, Einstein was unwilling to accept an indeterminate and 
complementary interpretation of reality. He believed the complementary nature of the 
Copenhagen uiterpretation was, if anything, proof that quantum mechanics was still 
incomplete. Indeed, complementarity and uncertainty in various forms became the 
sources of contention over which Einstein and Bohr spent much of their scientific lives 
arguing. In his famous essay, "Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems 
in Atomic Physics," Bohr hints at their dynamic relationship when he states, "I have 
so-to-speak, been arguing with Einstein all the time, even in discussing topics 
apparently far removed from the special problems under debate at our meetings."^ 
Neither scientist ever swayed the other. 
Months before Einstein's death, Heisenberg went to visit him at Princeton. The 
following passage by Heisenberg illustrates perfectiy the different point of view 
brought about by Bohr's introduction of the complementarity metaphor: 
Einstein's whole interest was focused on the interpretation of quantum theoiy 
which continued to disturb him... At bottom, indeed, the difference between 
the two viewpoints lay somewhat deeper. In his earlier physics, Einstein could 
always set out from the idea of an objective world subsisting of space and time, 
which we, as physicists, observe only from the outside, as it were. The laws of 
nature determine its course. In quantum theory this idealization was no longer 
possible. Here the laws of nature were dealing with temporal change of the 
possible and the probable. But the decisions leading from the possible to the 
Einstein to Schrodinger, May 31,1928. Reprinted in Pizibram, Letters on Wave Mechanics. 
^ Niels Bolir, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New Yorlc: Science Editions, 1958) 66. 
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actual can be registered only in statistical fashion, and are no longer predictable. 
With this conception of reality in classical physics is basically undermined, and 
Einstein could no longer adjust himself to so radical a change. 
In conclusion, Bohr's complementarity metaphor is both perplexing and extraordinary 
because it seems to urge a completely new perspective toward reality that is foreign to 
the general aspirations of Western science. Conceptualizing natural phenomena as 
'complementary' urges scientists to conceive of reality in antithetical, probabilistic, and 
non-causal terms while renouncing the certain, deterministic, or causal arguments that 
have been used since Aristotle. Holton writes, "The consequence Bohr drew from these 
recognitions was of a rare kind in the history of thought: he introduced explicitly a new 
thema, or at least identified a thema that had not yet been consciously a part of 
contemporary physics."®® Indeed, the argument in Bohr's 1927 Copenhagen 
Interpretation speech is interesting because it is not logical or methodological in a way 
that would have been acceptable to classical physics. The argument is at its roots 
metaphorical. To those who refuse to accept the dominant metaphors at the heart of the 
Copenhagen interpretation, the arguments invented from the perspective it urges seem 
patently false and even absurd.®' To those who embrace the metaphor, however, its 
implications are profound. 
Werner Heisenberg, Encounters with Einstein (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983) 121-122. 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought 117. 
It is notable that Nobel physicist Richard Feynman suggests that Nature is just "absurd from the 
point of view of common sense." See Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and 
Matter (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 10. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Every theory of the universe should have in it the fundamental 
statement "This is not a universe." 
David Bohm 
F, David Peat 
Metaphor, as I have illustrated in this study, plays an important role in the 
invention of scientific arguments. I have shown how metaphors, especially "emergent" 
metaphors, bring concepts into contrast, urging scientists to adopt novel perspectives 
toward their beliefs and inviting them to develop new ways of conceptualizing and 
discoursing about nature. I have also shown that metaphors serve a constitutive 
function in scientific discourse by temporally acting as "dominant" or "root" metaphors 
that guide entire schools of scientific thought or by serving as "dead" metaphors that 
make up the scientific lexicon. With this view, metaphors can be understood to serve an 
integral role in scientific discourse, not merely an ornamental or stylistic role. Indeed, I 
believe it is impossible for scientists to do without metaphor, because the beliefs 
scientists take to be "scientific knowledge" are dependent more or less on discourse that 
is grounded and shaped by metaphoric words and phrases. Or, as I. A. Richards points 
out, "our pretense to do without metaphor is never more than a bluff waiting to be 
called."' 
Nevertheless, this argument that metaphors play an active, constitutive role in 
scientific discourse is not new. Rhetoricians have already done a fair amount of work 
toward identifying and clarifying the role of metaphor in scientific communication and 
theory building. My approach in this study, however, has differed from other 
rhetorician's views of scientific metaphor because 1 have stressed the "inteipretive" or 
1 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 92. 
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"hermeneutic" role of metaphor in the invention of scientific arguments. Quite 
diflTerently, other rhetoricians have been concerned with the supposed causal nature of 
metaphors in which words "interact" in ways that lead to new insights or even 
paradigm shifts. My argument has been that metaphors themselves do not cause 
conceptual change in science. Rather, scientists' interpretations of metaphors within 
particular contexts urge members of the scientific community to develop new ways of 
conceptualizing and discoursing about nature. As such, I have argued that new 
metaphors in scientific discourse are a natural consequence of scientists' attempts to 
explain and describe physical and social situations that are inevitably undergoing 
change. Indeed, as Bohm and Peat argue, the act of "doing science" naturally brings 
concepts into contrast, spinning off new metaphors that are used to discourse about 
nature. It is the interpretation of these metaphors that lead to new movements in 
science. 
What implications does this "interpretive" view of metaphor have for scientific 
discourse, scientific activities, and our understanding of the rhetoric of science? This is 
not an easy question to answer. Nevertheless, these sorts of questions are ones that 
rhetoricians should address if research in the "rhetoric of science" is to be constructive 
and meaningful to the disciplines of rhetoric and science. In this concluding chapter I 
will discuss the implications brought out by the preceding analyses of metaphor in the 
seminal texts of the quantum tiieory. My aim is to show that studies of metaphor in 
scientific texts lead not only to a better understanding of the rhetoric of science but also 
a greater understanding of science itself. Overall, I believe an awareness of the role of 
metaphor in scientific discourse allows us to illuminate texts and illustrate how 
scientists invent many of Western culture's beliefs about nature. 
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Implications for Research in the Rhetoric of Science 
My study of the seminal texts of die quantum theory appears to contribute to our 
understanding of the role and funcdon of metaphor in the emergence of theoredcal 
movements in modem physics. To this point, scholars like Black, Hesse, Rothbait, 
Peterfreund, MacCormac, and others have also argued that metaphors play a central 
role in scientific discourse; however, these scholars have typically been satisfied with a 
hightlighting of important metaphors in the lexicon of science. Therefore, tirey have 
concentrated on proving that scientific discourse is saturated with metaphoric words 
and phrases. In die end, like warriors touching their adversary for the sake of honor 
alone, these scholars have shown that scientists cannot eschew or ignore the so-called 
"literary" or "figurative" features of discourse. Going a few steps further, my study has 
explored scientists' use of metaphors to invent the beliefs and arguments that form the 
content of scientific theories. Whereas other scholars have illustrated the pervasiveness 
of metaphor in science, I have shown how scientists use metaphors as "interpretive" 
devices to guide in the invention of new beliefs and new ways of discoursing about 
nature. 
One implication of this study is that it illuminates the importance of metaphors 
as "constitutive" features of scientific discourse. For decades, rhetoricians have 
recognized the importance of metaphor as a constitutive feature in scientific discourse, 
but few have closely analyzed texts to illustrate how metaphors actually guide scientific 
movements and make up the scientific lexicon. By offering text-based evidence for the 
constitutive nature of scientific metaphor, my study has provided support for Kenneth 
Burke's claim that metaphors form die basis for entire schools of scientific diought. 1 
have used my analyses of the seminal works of die quantum theoi^ to illustrate dial 
metaphors, as Burke pointed out, change one's perspective, urging one to see 
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"something in terms of something else."2 So, for example, when Kepler argued in the 
sixteenth century that the 'universe is a machine' or when Harvey claimed that the 
'heart is a pump,' they indeed used metaphors as devices to invite scientists, including 
themselves, to see something (i.e. the universe, the heart) in terms of something else 
(i.e. a machine, a pimip). I have shown that once scientists embrace an "emergent" 
metaphor, like 'the universe is a machine,' the metaphor then serves as a device for 
viewing or interpreting natural phenomena from a new perspective. 
It is important, however, for rhetoricians of science to recognize that scientific 
metaphors do not serve an analogy-like function in scientific arguments. In other 
words, Kepler was not arguing that the universe is "like a machine," nor was Harvey 
suggesting that the heart is "like a pump." Rather, they were claiming that 'universes' 
and 'hearts' are 'machines' and 'pumps.' Consequently, when one closely analyzes 
scientific texts, as I have done in the previous three chapters, it soon becomes apparent 
that it is impossible to communicate beliefs about nature without using metaphors. For 
example, can we describe the human heart in terms that avoid the 'heart is a pump' 
metaphor? We are accustomed to describing the features and functions of the heart in 
terms of "valves," "arteries," "flow," and "circulation." These lexical teiTns are all 
r 
extensions of the 'heart is a pump' metaphor, and we would have a hard time doing 
without them. Indeed, the metaphor 'heart is a pump' itself is the literal language with 
which we describe and discourse about the heart. The use of a metaphor does not 
merely aid us in talking about the heart, it unavoidably constitutes the way we interpret, 
conceptualize, and describe the heart's features and functions. 
I believe this "constitutive" function of metaphor in scientific discourse opens 
important new avenues of research in the rhetoric of science. In my rhetorical analyses 
2 Burke, Grammar of Motives 503. 
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of the quantum theory papers of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr, I have shown how 
metaphors, especially the quantum metaphor, played this constitutive role in the 
development of modem physics. After its introduction by Planck, the quantum 
metaphor gradually became a dominant feature of these physicists' beliefs, influencing 
the way they interpreted the behavior of atomic phenomena and urging them to develop 
concepts and descriptions diat relied an inherent discreteness in nature. In essence, the 
metaphor itself shaped these scientists' interpretations of their experiences with nature, 
inviting them to develop theories tiiat were radically different than those of classical 
physics. What I have shown in my analyses of these physicists' texts is that the idea of 
a "quantized" reality, as Lakoff and Johnson might point out, became a metaphor that 
Planck, Einstein, and Bohr "lived by." The quantum metaphor went far beyond a 
convenient way to talk about nature: It became a constitutive means through which 
these physicists interpreted and conceptualized their experiences with atomic 
phenomena. On a broader scale, I believe other documents in the rhetoric of science can 
be interpreted through this kind of metaphorical analysis. 
A second implication of my study to research in the rhetoric of science is the 
close relationship it stresses between scientific metaphor and the invention of scientific 
arguments. Alan Gross in The Rhetoric of Science suggests, I diink conectly, that 
"from a rhetorical point of view, scientific discovery is properly described as 
invention."^ In my studies of the works of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr, we see how 
metaphors can form the basis of invention for scientific arguments by offering new 
perspectives from which scientists interpret nature. By inviting scientists to regard 
natural phenomena in "new ways," metaphors can serve as starting places for the 
invention of arguments that expound new ways of conceptualizing and discoursing 
^ Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 6-7. 
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about nature. However, as Stephan Toulmin points out, a new perspective is only the 
origination point for the development of new theories. Toulmin argues that once 
scientists adopt "new ways of regarding old phenomena," they must then answer the 
question "what sort of demonstradon will justify us in agreeing that, whereas this was 
not previously known, it can now be regarded as known?"'* And indeed, my study 
shows that this move toward rhetorical invention seems to be what happens when 
scientists interpret natural phenomena from the new perspectives created by metaphors. 
For example, when Kepler wrote "I aim to show that the celestial machine is to be 
likened not to a divine organism but to a clockwork," the issue was by no means settled 
in Kepler's favor. 5 Instead, his 'universe is a machine' metaphor was only the starting 
place for the invention of arguments that expounded this new way of discoursing about 
nature. This "fertile" metaphor, as Burke might call it, eventually served as a premise 
for the entire mechanism school of physics, offering a basis from which mechanistic 
descriptions and theories of nature were invented. 
In regards to the invention of arguments in modem physics, my studies of the 
works of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr illustrate how metaphors, specifically the quantum 
metaphor and the complementarity metaphor, served as a basis of invention for the 
seminal papers of the quantum theory and quantum mechanics. In his 1900 light quanta 
paper, Einstein argued that Planck's 'energy is quantized' claim can be considered 
"independent of his theory of 'black radiation.'"^ In making this crucial observation, 
Einstein recognized that die quantum metaphor invited one to conceptualize energy-
related phenomena, specifically light, in a way that violated the tenets classical physics. 
^ Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science 17. 
5 Quoted in Kearney, Science and Change 144. 
^Einstein, "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View about tlie Creation and Transformation of 
Light" 547. 
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He then interpreted the implications of the quantum metaphor, using the metaphor itself 
as a guide toward inventing his argument that light must be quantized. Indeed, 
Einstein's argument for a new "heuristic point of view about the creation and 
transformation of light" is an exploration of the implications for light of the quantum 
metaphor. Twenty years later, in the 1927 Copenhagen lecture, Bohr employed both 
the quantum metaphor and the complementarity metaphor to invent his argument for the 
Copenhagen interpretation, a radical new way of conceptualizing and discoursing about 
atomic phenomena. Essentially, these two metaphors, 'nature is quantized' and 'nature 
is complementary' formed not only the basis of invention for his 1927 lecture but also 
the basis of what Bohr calls a "general point of view ... [which] will be helpful in order 
to harmonize the apparently conflicting views taken by different scientists."' 
Demonstrating the usefulness of the complementarity metaphor to physics, Bohr used 
the 1927 Copenhagen Interpretation lecture to recast the quantum theoty and die 
discipline of physics into terms diat are brought about by the implications of the 
complementarity metaphor. In other words, he used the metaphor to invent an argument 
that illustrated how the quantum and complementarity metaphors urged physicists to 
reconceptualize nature into complementary terras. 
For rhetoricians of science, I believe tiiis fundamental link between scientific 
metaphor and the invention of scientific arguments is crucial to rhetorical research in the 
sciences. Traditional rhetoricians like Melia, McGuire, and FGnneavy have long 
suggested that rhetorical analysis cannot delve into the full depths of science because it 
cannot explain the so-called "content" of science. And yet, in my study, we see how 
physicists like Planck, Einstein, and Bohr used metaphors as a basis for inventing the 
content of science. Indeed, much as Toulmin claims, "discoveries" in science typically 
' Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature 52. 
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emerge when scientists see old phenomena in new ways. From a rhetorical point of 
view, metaphors are the devices through which these "new ways" or new perspectives 
come about. If I am correct, this view of the role of scientific metaphor in the invention 
of scientific beliefs and theories allows us to research the so-called "terra incognita" that 
Melia and others have tried to exclude from rhetoricians of science. 
A third implication of my study for rhetoricians of science is the importance of 
interpretation with regards to scientific metaphor. As mentioned previously, 
rhetoricians who study scientific metaphors have focused primarily on the supposed 
"causal" nature of metaphorical phrases. Scholars like Hesse, Black, Rothbart, and 
others have suggested that the words in a metaphoric phrase "interact" in a way that 
cause scientists to experience a change in beliefs. And, indeed, on the surface it may 
appear to many scholars that metaphors are the causal force behind the development of 
new scientific theories, because Western philosophy since Aristotle has typically 
viewed change, including conceptual change, as the result of some causal agent. 
Therefore, it might seem only natural to conclude that metaphors like the 'universe is a 
machine' or 'nature is quantized' somehow caused people to think and talk differently 
by creating a special meaning or flash of insight. 
However, my study of the seminal texts of the quantum theoiy shows that this 
"interaction" view of metaphor does not hold up when one looks closely at the way 
metaphors are employed in scientific texts and the way they work their way into the 
beliefs of the scientific community. In Planck's text, for example, the metaphor 'energy 
is discontinuous,' or 'energy is quantized,' went mostly unnoticed by Planck and his 
contemporaries. If this metaphor had caused some "flash of insight" in Planck or 
Planck's readers, then one would expect to see some sort of immediate reaction by 
these scientists. Instead, the quantum metaphor went relatively unnoticed for five years 
and only came into prominence eight years later. Therefore, it seems obvious that the 
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quantum metaphor did not have an "a ha!" or "eureka!" effect on scientists that 
Gerhardt and Russell suggest should occur when scientists Hrst develop new 
metaphors. Nor did the quantum metaphor seem to immediately create a new schema or 
paradigm through which Planck entered a new world or a new, incommensurable 
conceptual structure. Rather, it was only when Einstein and others began to interpret 
the implications of Planck's quantum metaphor that it gained an increasingly prominent 
role in physics. 
Indeed, my study seems to suggest that most rhetoricians who study scientific 
metaphors have the whole situation backwards. A new metaphor does not cause 
scientists to think and talk differentiy; rather, when scientists interpret the implications 
of a particular metaphor (i.e. they see something in terms of something else) they are 
then urged to invent arguments and theories that illustrate the usefulness of the 
perspective offered by the metaphor. In other words, the metaphor itself does not 
change scientists' world views or conceptions of nature; it only serves as a starting 
place for scientists themselves to start thinking and talking differently about nature. 
Therefore, I believe scientists' interpretive acts, not metaphors, are the agents of change 
in scientific beliefs. Though metaphors are essential, constitutive features of scientific 
discourse, they are only devices that invite, not impel, scientists to see things from 
particular perspectives. 
I believe this interpretive view of scientific metaphors is in line with the broader 
"hermeneutic" or "interpretive" movement in modem rhetorical theory. One of the flag 
bearers of this movement, Timothy Crusius, writes that "All rhetorical acts are also and 
irreducibly hermeneutical acts."® He also claims that "interpretation is equally 
significant in even the most straightforward and disinterested presentation of 'the facts' 
® Timothy Crusius, A Teacher's Introduction to Philosophical Henneneutics (Urbana, 111.: NCTE, 
1991) 53. 
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about any subject matter."' As Crusius points out, to use language is to put oneself in 
an interpretive stance in which the meanings of utterances is ultimately reliant on an 
interpreter. Another flagbearer of this movement, Thomas Kent, writes, "we put 
language to use—language does not use us—when we employ it to interpret the 
utterances of others, objects in the world, and even our own utterances."'® Indeed, 1 
believe emergent scientific metaphors, like other forms of discourse, put scientists into 
an interpretive relationship that invites them to view natural phenomena differentiy than 
they had prior to the metaphor. But, much as Kent points out about language in 
general, a metaphor does not "use" the scientist by causing a conceptual change; rather, 
scientists' interpretations of the implications of the metaphor bring about the conceptual 
change. If I am correct, this "interpretive" view of scientific metaphor explains why 
Planck did not originally recognize die significance of the quantum metaphor while 
Einstein did. The quantum metaphor did not cause a conceptual change by creating an 
ontological flash, a special meaning, or insight into reality. Instead, Einstein's 
interpretation of the implications of Planck's inadvertent metaphor and his subsequent 
invention of an argument for light quanta led ultimately to the "quantum" view of 
nature. 
Overall, potentially the most important implication of this study—and perhaps 
the least adequately explored issue in this dissertation—is the possibility of a 
"sophistic" view of the rhetoric of science. As discussed in chapter two, the sophistic 
tradition in ancient and modem rhetoric suggests a hermeneutic or inteipretive 
understanding of discourse. Sophistic rhetoric assumes that speakers and writers are 
inevitably thrown into a changing reality in which they must use language to interpret 
' Crusius, A Teacher's Introduction to Philosophical Henneneutics 53. 
Kent, Paralogic Henneneutics 16. 
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and influence their physical and social situations. Consequently, metaphors, including 
scientific metaphors, can be understood to be a natural linguistic response to a reality 
and a language that is undergoing change. In other words, as speakers use language to 
describe and theorize about their changing physical and social situations, they use 
metaphors to come to terms with situations in which concepts are continually being 
brought into contrast A metaphor urges a "turn" in one's beliefs, inviting the 
interpreter of the metaphor to view, talk about, and experience reality in a new way. 
I believe this sophistic approach to rhetoric of science offers a new way for 
rhetoricians to analyze and interpret scientific text. Rhetoricians of science have 
previously discussed interpretation and the invention of scientific theories in terms of 
neo-classical concepts like topoi or stasis theory. These neo-classical approaches, while 
appropriate under certain conditions, implicitly assume that the rhetor, or scientist, is 
actually looking for stable contextual patterns in reality that can then be used to develop 
arguments. Quite differently, to view the invention of scientific arguments in terms of 
sophistic rhetoric recognizes that arguments come about when scientists attempt to 
interpret the contrasts in nature that make up their physical and social situations. This 
view assumes that reality, nature, the passing show is inevitably in flux, creating 
contrasts that scientists attempt to explain. In essence, a sophistic view of scientific 
discourse suggests that scientists are always inventing new explanations for nature 
through metaphors because they are inescapably immersed in a physical and social 
situation that is changing and thus bringing once unrelated concepts into contrast. 
Nevertheless, my study, due to its concentration on metaphor and invention, 
has only explored one limited possibility for research that employs sophistic rhetoric to 
analyze scientific texts. And, this dissertation, admittedly, has not shown in any 
conclusive way that sophistic rhetoric offers a useful avenue for research in the rhetoric 
of science. But, I think this study offers a start in that direction. What I have tried to do 
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is to look at scientific texts through a sophistic/hermeneutic lens to .ee the way in which 
metaphors played a role in the invention of modem physics. In a broader sense, 
though, I believe this sophistic interpretation of the rhetoric of science offers an 
alternative to the rather realist or sometimes relativist analyses that come about through 
neo-classical approaches to the rhetoric of science. As with many starts in new 
directions, however, only further research will show whether this new area of research 
is fruitful. 
Conclusion: The Challenge of the Rhetoric of Modern Physics 
In the end, I believe modem physics offers rhetoricians one of their greatest 
challenges. It is a challenge that was laid out by Bohr himself. Bohr's biographer and 
friend, Abraham Pais, writes, "The language of science, more generally the ways in 
which we communicate—these were the themes on which Bohr focused in the Como 
lecture and for the rest of his life."" Indeed, both Bohr and Heisenberg spent much of 
their post-1927 efforts toward developing productive ways to talk about this strange 
"quantum reality" that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics seemed to 
describe. Much later, however, Heisenberg was to concede that perhaps the proper 
language for talking about quantum mechanics had not yet been developed.'-
As Bohr and Heisenberg recognized early on, language was and has proven to 
be one of the most troublesome issues in the continuing development of modem 
physics. Bohm and Peat, both modem quantum physicists, suggest that many of the 
present-day problems in today's physics community can be attributed to the inability of 
scientists to "engage in free play, unimpeded by rigid attachments to paiticulai' points of 
view."i3 They believe that the lack of a bridge between the theory of relativity and 
" Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 314. 
'2 Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy 167. 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 87. 
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quantum mechanics is due to the fact that there is "now no common, informal language 
that covers them both."''* Moreover, "Even within the quantum theory itself there is a 
serious failure of communication between the various interpretations."'^ These 
problems, Bohm and Peat suggest can be overcome by paying attention to language 
issues. They write, 
it is suggested that science will flourish in a more creative way if it allows a 
diversity of different theories to flourish. When communication between these 
different points of view is free and open, so that a number of alternatives can be 
held together at the same time, then it is possible to make new creative 
perceptions within science. What is proposed is not so much a proliferation of 
views along with their individual supporters, but rather a unity of diversity.^^ 
In this study, I have attempted to develop and employ but one among many possible 
approaches through which rhetoricians can productively talk about the way language is 
used in science. I suspect, as Bohm and Peat do, that many of the dilemmas and 
complexities of physics are seated in the overly rigid rhetorical techniques scientists 
employ to argue for their beliefs. After all, discussing a quantum reality will always be 
difficult if, as Rorty claims. 
In our culture, the notions of "science," "rationality," "objectivity," and "truth" 
are bound up with one another.... We tend to identify seeking "objective" truth 
with "using reason," and so we think of the natural sciences as paradigms of 
rationality. We also think of rationality as a matter of following procedures laid 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 85. 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 86. 
Bohm and Feat, Science, Order, and Creativity 83. 
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down in advance, of being "methodological." So we tend to use 
"methodological," "rational," "scientific," and "objective" as synonyms.'^ 
Ironically, lessons learned from die history of the quantum theory and the Copenhagen 
interpretation itself seem to urge us away from this understanding of science. And yet, 
one need only read the coverage of science in newspapers or turn on the television to 
see that many people in our culture, including scientists, sdll assume these criteria 
determine what is 'scientific' and what isn't. 
Unfortunately, I believe Bohr's important but subtie emphasis on the 
significance of language in quantum mechanics has gone mosdy unnoticed in the 
philosophical struggle that has developed in die wake of the Copenhagen interpretation. 
In applicadon, the success of quantum mechanics is unquesdoned. It has opened 
amazing paths toward understanding light, matter, and die inner workings of atoms. 
However, like a Faustian contract, it calls on physics to abandon Western science's 
traditional attempt to discover die absolute trudi about an objective reality diat is 
independent of human interpretadon. From Einstein undl present day, a good number 
of scientists have resisted or mostly ignored diis side of quantum mechanics.'® As 
physicist Steven Weinberg writes. 
It is truly surprising how litUe difference all diis makes. Most physicists use 
quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to woiry 
about the fundamental problem of its interpretation.... So irrelevant is the 
philosophy of quantum mechanics to its use, that one begins to suspect diat all 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 35. 
Polkingbome points out that "scientists feel that they are right to take a philosophically realist view 
of the results of their researches; to suppose that they are finding out the way things are." 
Polkingbome,TTw Quantum World 2-3. Weinberg'sDrea/n5 of a Final Theory is a well reasoned 
defense of a form of scientific realism. He argues that a "final theory" is still the goal of modem 
physics. See Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory. 
170 
the deep questions about the meaning of measurement are really empty, forced 
on us by our language, a language that evolved in a world governed very nearly 
by classical physics."'® 
Unlike Weinberg, though, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Einstein believed the problem of its 
interpretation, especially with regards to the language of science, was cental to 
quantum mechanics.20 However, I find it ironic and a bit telling that Weinberg puts his 
finger on the issue that Bohr spent much of his life pursuing—how a language and 
lexicon, inherited from an absolutist classical physics, will or will not suit the needs of 
quantum mechanics. Weinberg's opinion also suggests that perhaps Bohr's concerns 
about the language of science have not been adequately addressed. 
Though still a young field, rhetoric of science has an opportunity to contribute 
to a revived dialogue on the use of language in modem physics. Rhetoricians have only 
recently taken up the challenge of scientific communication as a research area. Indeed, 
perhaps the recent rise of our young field of study can be seen as a response to the 
persistent tension between modem science and the rhetorical means through which 
scientific arguments are invented and expressed. As reseai-chers who aie particularly 
interested in discourse, rhetoricians can offer great insight into how language is used in 
science. We are, however, at an infant stage in this pursuit, and there is a great amount 
of work yet to be done. 
Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory 84-85. 
20 Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity 84. See also, Pais, Niels Bohr's Times 310. 
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